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The proceedings of the First Annual Logistics Management Symposium
are forwarded with the hope that the information will be of assistance to attendees
and their staffs in the planning and management of logistics support programs.
I recognize that there is still much study required before all management tech-
niques and procedures for support programs are known and understood, but I
believe that support problems are made easier by exchange of knowledge. The
Symposium was based on this belief and we plan to continue the search for ways
to achieve better program support at a lower cost.
Director, Industrial Operations
PREFACE
Effective logistics support at reasonable cost is
a constant problem for the program manager. Logis-
tics support costs may well reach 25 to 35 percent of
the total cost of the program. Therefore, any sav-
ings in cost or increase in efficiency realizable
through effective logistics management justifies the
closest attention by each level of supervision.
Effective and efficient logistics support manage-
ment is not easily attained. The program manager
needs a thorough background in logistics. He needs
to know how the elements of logistics interrelate,
both with each other and with other program elements.
He needs to know how logistics program visibility
can be achieved. And he needs to know how to estab-
lish and carry out an effective logistics program in
today's rapidly evolving contractual atmosphere.
Recognizing the requirement to supply this much
needed knowledge to program management personnel
in government and industry, Brig. Gen.E.F. O'Connor,
Director of Industrial Operations, MSFC, NASA,
directed that the feasibility of a national symposium
to discuss this vital subject be investigated by his
Project Logistics Office.
The First Annual Logistics Management Sym-
posium was therefore scheduled for September 13-14,
1966, to be presented to these top Leaders of govern-
ment and industry. Recognized logistics experts
from government and industry were invited to make
the presentations, which were arranged into a natural
sequence, (i) definition of support requirements, (2)
management and control of support programs, and
(3) evaluation of support performance.
The Symposium was planned by the following
who comprised the steering committee. The success
achieved in the symposium can be credited largely to
this support.
Steering Committee
John C. Goodrum, Symposium Chairman, Chief,
Project Logistics Office, NASA - MSFC
Ward H. Cook, Symposium Secretary, Staff Logis-
tician, Project Logistics Office, NASA - MSFC
D. J. Arbuthnot, Product Support Manager,
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
E. E. Brashear, Executive Assistant, Logistics,
Space & Information Division, North American
Aviation, Inc.
J. L. Carpenter, Jr., Director, Logistics Support,
Martin Company
R. N. Johns, Assistant Director, Support Technology,
Missiles & Space Systems Division, Douglas Aircraft
Company
J. F. Sutherland, Director, Product Support,
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation
F. E. Waller, Manager, Apollo Logistics Manage-
ment Office, NASA - Office of Manned Space Flight
R. L. Weiss, Director, Site Support and Activation,
Space & Information Division, North American
Aviation, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION 
CALL TO ORDER: JOHN GOODRUM, NASA, SYMPOSIUM CHAIRMAN, Chief, Project  Logistics Office, 
Marshall Space Flight Center, has  a B. S. in Civil 
Engineering from Mississippi State University, and 
an M. S. f rom University of Iowa. H e  served in 
Europe and Okinawa in WW I1 as a Material officer 
with the 8th A i r  Force.  
Engineering Division, Army Ballistic Missile Agency; 
Project  Director for  the Honest John Missile System; 
Chief of the Program Coordination Office in NASA - 
MSFC Central Planning Office; and Assistant Director, 
Saturn Systems Office. 
H e  has been Director of the 
The First Annual Logistics Management Sympos- 
ium v a s  conceived and developed to fill a need of 
MSFC management; "How can we achieve better pro-  
gram support at a lower cost  ? " 
An analysis  of this need resulted in identification 
of several  problem areas 
1. lack of a common base of understanding 
regarding the elements of program support ,  
2. lack of a n  effective vehicle for  communication 
between the agencies of government and 
industry, 
3. incomplete knowledge of support management 
techniques and procedures, and 
4. the need f o r  bet ter  understanding on the par t  
of program management of the consequences 
It was decided that the optimum f i r s t  effort to 
satisfy the requirements of NASA management was  
to make a presentation to top and program manage- 
ment of government and industry. A systematic 
approach to program support and i t s  management 
would be presented. It was fur ther  decided that 
effective response to these NASA top management 
requirements could be achieved only if all elements 
of NASA and industry managers had a common basic 
understanding of: 
1 ,  
2 .  
the elements of program support. 
how these elements f i t  into the overall pro- 
gram, 
how programs other than those of SASX :ire 
providing program support. and 
4. how support programs could be improved. 
The symposium was therefore organized to pro- 
3 .  
of inadequate support planning and m:magement. vide comprehensive coverage of the definition and 
management of program support. It was scoped to 
broad objectives which could be integrated easily into 
total program objectives and constraints by the top 
management audience. Recognizing that a grea t  
amount of hard-earned knowledge existed in other  
agencies and i n  industry, the Steering Committee 
invited logistics experts  f rom various government 
agencies and f rom industry to make the logistics 
management presentations. Also included in the 
agenda were support requirement as seen  by NASA 
Apollo management, by the KSC launch Center Direc- 
tor ,  and by the Saturn Program Managers. 
The symposium covered a period of two days 
and was  organized to  provide comprehensive cover- 
age through papers, a panel, and a tour of the MSFC 
complex. 
the symposium. 
This book parallels the organization of 
The f i rs t  par t  of the symposium included state- 
ments of purpose f o r  the meeting and a n  explanation 
on how the papers  would provide a systematic review 
of support requirements and techniques f o r  imple- 
mentation. 
identification of the problems of support as  viewed 
by top NASA management. Following the Keynote 
Address  was a real-world presentation of the support 
problems in Viet Nam. Papers  on the elements of 
logistics, how they integrate with each other, and 
how this integrated support program can be fitted 
into an overall program were  subsequently presented. 
Then a challenge to government and industry for  
elevation of logistics as a separate  science was 
given. 
aged and controlled through properly scoped and ad- 
ministered contracts, and approaches and techniques 
f o r  evaluation of support performance were  given, 
with audience discussions of some specific problem 
a r e a s .  The final par t  of the symposium sum- 
marized the mater ia l  presented and outlined some 
long- range objectives, the achievement of which 
will insure better program support f o r  future 
programs.  
The Keynote Address  provided a n  
It was discussed how logistics can be man- 
-5- 
WARD H. COOK, NASA, SYMPOSIUM SECRETARY, Staff Logistician, Project  Logistics Office, Marshall 
Space Flight Center, has  a BS in Ch. E .  f rom Kansas 
State University. H e  served  in Europe during WW I1 
with Army Ordnance maintenance and supply units. 
H e  has had R & D positions in the chemical industry; 
and has  nearly twenty y e a r s  management experience 
in field and logistics support of missi le  and launch 
vehicle sys tems including BOMARC, Redstone, Jupi ter ,  
and Saturn with the University of Michigan, Chrysler ,  
Hayes, and NASA - MSFC. 
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IDENTIFICATION 
WELCOME ADDRESS: DR. WERNHER VON BRAUN, NASA.Director, Marshall Space Flight Center, has  a 
bachelor degree f rom the Berlin Institute of Technol- 
ogy, and a doctorate in physics f r o m  the University 
of Berlin. He came to the United States in 1945 
under contract to the US Army and directed high 
altitude firings of V-2's a t  White Sands. 
became director  of the Army's  guided missi le  devel- 
opment unit a t  F t .  Bl iss  and moved the group to 
Huntsville in 1950. He directed development of the 
Redstone, Jupiter, and Pershing missi le  sys tems 
and utilization of them for  launching the Free World's 
f i r s t  satellites. 
rocket and space programs,  he h a s  received 17 
honorary doctorate degrees f rom the United States, 
Europe, and South America, and numerous national 
and international awards,  trophies, and citations. 
He la te r  
F o r  leadership in Amer ica ' s  
Good morning, gentlemen: 
It i s  my pleasant task to welcome you to the F i r s t  
Annual Logistics Management Symposium and to tell 
you that, as your host, I a m  very happy to see all of 
you h e r e .  
who are deeply involved in logistical operations share  
this attitude. 
attention i s  focused on logistics today i s  ample evi- 
dence of the growing awareness  of the fact that the 
logistics manager has  a tough assignment. 
That high-level industry and government 
Logistics h a s  come of age in our space programs.  
F o r  a long t ime we have grappled with the problem of 
determining a real is t ic  and workable concept of logis- 
t i cs  support f o r  manned space flight. A s  la ter  speak- 
ers will tell you, this has  been ra ther  difficult. We 
have, however, succeeded in defining many of our  
logistics problems and we feel that we are achieving 
adequate program support. But we do real ize  that 
we could have done the job more efficiently, and we 
a r e  aware  that the future could bring u s  ser ious 
logistics problems.  We believe we Itnow what these 
problems are, and we'd like not to make the same 
mistakes a l l  over  again. 
We have found logistics management to be a 
demanding and challenging job, and we feel that you 
Management of the ent i re  space effort, in fact, 
has received a great  deal of attention in recent  years .  
Unlike the weather, NASA i s  not only talking about 
it -- w e  a r e  actually doing something about it.  
Why does NASA place so much emphasis these 
days on good management? 
It i s  because the exploration of space i s  the most 
challenging peacetime undertaking in our  history. 
is a l so  the most complicated. And it i s  expensive. 
It 
Science and technology have made possible the 
exploration of space, but economic and social prob- 
lems here  on earth s t i l l  place heavy demands on the 
nation's resources  and energies .  
has heavy commitments which must  be filled -- here 
The government 
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at home in the war against poverty, and in Viet Nam
in the war against oppression.
Managers of space programs have no choice but
to use the resourcefulness placed at their disposal
with the utmost inventiveness and ingenuity. The
technical complexities facing us are immense. Our
timetable is tight. Now, more than ever before, we
must plan precisely. Our decision makers must re-
spond immediately. But no matter how effective we
might be in organizing the management of our pro-
grams, we still nmst remain flexible enough to adapt
to a changing environment.
We are living in a rapidly changing world- chang-
ing so fast technically, socially, and politically that
we can hardly keep pace with the changes. As Richard
Wilson, a Vice-President of Trans World A_rlines,
so aptly put it in a speech last year: "It" you have
trouble comnmnicating with your 18-year-old son or
daughter, you might take solace in the fact that tech-
nologically speaking, you grew up in an age further
removed from theirs, than your childhood was re-
moved from Paul Revere's. "
I make this point primarily to emphasize the need
for flexibility in our management outlook and to re-
state a principle: The mere fact that something has
been done a certain way for the past hundred years
is no reason for continuing to do it that way; in fact,
it is the best reason I can think of for subjecting it to
a very critical analysis.
When we first discussed the possibility of holding
this symposium, one of the factors that most strongly
influenced our decision to go ahead with it was the
feeling that out of this symposium would grow a pro-
gram for the continuing analysis of logistics manage-
ment -- as it has been practiced in the past, as we
practice it now, and how it should be practiced.
I am firmly convinced that this area of logistics
management offers us a significant opportunity to re-
evaluate our goals and our means of reaching them,
and I suspect that if we ask ourselves really meaning-
ful questions and respond with really truthful answers,
we will arrive at stone interesting conclusions.
I do not mean to imply that we have resisted all
change. We have made great many changes, in fact.
But we have only scratched the surface.
One further critical observation needs to be made,
I believe. All too often I have seen attempts made to
update procedures and practices by putting them on
computers. I fail to see what this accomplishes.
Ratther than apply rapid data processing to a practice
that is obsolete to start with, why not back off all the
way, look at the whole forest, and revise the entire
concept, if that is truly what is needed?
NASA is a relatively young organization. Our
key people came from literally everywhere, from a
great variety of environments, and with a wide vari-
ety of backgrounds. I hope that our collective atti-
tude is one which will allow us to listen patiently and
attentively to the other fellows' ideas and to adapt
them realistically to our own needs.
I think that we do need to apply advanced manage-
ment concepts and tools realistically to the solution
of our management problems, including those asso-
ciated with logistics. Many new management tools,
techniques and terms are emerging today in the con-
cious effortof government and industry to stay on top
of huge scientific and engineering undertaMngs whose
scope would have taxed the imagination two decades
ago.
Some of our management terms tend to confuse
as much as they enlighten, which disrupts communi-
cation. And some of our most recent innovations and
elaborations of management techniques, while praised
highly as the cure-all for all of management's woes,
must be applied with discretion. With all our refine-
ments we must not overlook the basic principles of
good management -- planning, organizing, staffing,
coordinating, budgeting, and constant review.
Logistics management is really no different from
any other kind of management. So why, you ask, are
we putting so much emphasis on it now and holding
this national symposium ?
There are two quite important reasons: The
first is that logistics support is a very significant
part of the entire program in terms of d¢fllars. It
might run to one-third of the program budget. Con-
sequently, any improvement in logistics management
will greatly alleviate an already serious money problem.
Secondly, we will all agree, I feel sure, that the logis-
tics support portion of the program is often taken for
granted, frequently to the detriment of the program as
a whole. For these reasons, we have decided to put
logistics management in the spotlight, to take a day
and a half from our busy schedules and at least bring
to light some of the perplexing problems that plagxm
our program managers as they attempt to bring some
order out of the potential chaos.
So far, on the Saturn launch vehicle development
program we have enjoyed outstanding success. We
have now launched 13 vehicles successfully. Not the
least of the contributiug factors to this success, is a
good logistics support program. But there have been
some awfully close calls, and we are realists enough
to know that program acceleration and program ma-
turity will enormously complicate our support job.
We've had a little experience then, and I hope
we've learned some lessons. Let me recite a few:
Extensive modifications, made under the condi-
tions that exist at the launch pad, lead to too many
compromises, and occasionally an undefinable
configuration. In greatly oversimplified terms
it is better to make a rocket at the plant than at
the pad.
Logistics is not a separable program element.
Logistics influences, and is influenced by, all
other program elements. Consequently, it must
be a full partner with reliability, quality, con-
figuration management, and all the other manage-
rial segments.
You get about what you ask for in a contract.
And a contractual request to "please do a good
job" usually guarantees you a job that is not only
not what you had in mind (although it may be
entirely adequate), it is costly.
A related lesson learned is that you do not
achieve a good logistics program by generating
and shuffling papers with all kinds of statistics.
One final observation, gained through our Saturn
experience: logistics is not a part-time job. It
demands the full-time attention of someone who
knows logistics, who is interested in it, and who
also understands and appreciates the overall
program requirements. The logistics function
deserves top level support.
Our audience today is a happy mixture of industry
and government representatives. This is an indication
of the close working relationship that has been devel-
oped over the recent past.
It is true more than ever now that a government
agency like NASA or the Marshall Center cannot run
a program unilaterally. Today, before we can even
begin to write the specifications for the space items
we want, or the support service we desire, we must
seek the advice, knowledge and ideas of industry.
We are truly partners. In the next day anda half
I think our relationship will become even closer.
The exploration of space is a tremendous challenge.
This country is firmly committed to a broad program
that will place heavy demands on our best talents and
valuable resources for years to come. Good manage-
mcnt is essential for the timely exploitation of this
fascinating new environm?nt. If we will apply both our
imagination and common sense to better management,
as we have to technology', I am sure that we will not
only complete the programs now outlined, but will con-
tinue our march of progress toward the infinite reaches
of the universe.
I wish you success in this symposium, and I hope
that out of it wilt grow a positive plan for the continual
improvement of logistics management.
Now, I would like to introduce to you the Director
of our Industrial Operations, who counts logistics as
one of his "blessings" -- a gentleman all of you know,
I believe -- Brigadier General Ed O'Connor.
SYMPOS IUM PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES: BRIGADIER GENERAL EDMUND F. O'CONNOR, NASA, 
Director, Industrial Operations, Marshall Space 
Flight Center, graduated f rom the US Military Acad- 
emy, has  an aeronautic engineering degree f rom A i r  
Force Institute of Technology, i s  a graduate of theAir  
W a r  College and the Command and General Staff 
School. He was  a WW I1 command pilot in Italy and in 
the Korean conflict. He had R & D and procurement 
positions a t  the Air  Material Command and USAF Hdq. 
H e  was in charge of the Mobile Mid-Range Ballistic 
Missile Program,  GSD, A i r  Force  Systems Command 
before joining NASA. H e  holds the Air  Medal with 
seven Oak Leaf Clusters, the Distinguished Flying 
Cross  and the Commendation Ribbon. 
Thank you, D r .  von Braun. 
k t  me add my own welcome to this distinguished 
group and tell you that we a r e  extremely gratified 
that so  many top-level industry and government man- 
a g e r s  responded with such enthusiasm both to our  
invitations to speak on the subject of logistics and 
to our invitations to come and meet with u s .  
John Goodrum, Director of  Marshall 's program 
logistics effort, and I f i r s t  talked about holding such 
a symposium late las t  year .  It had become apparent 
a t  Marshall, and to me, a s  Director of Industrial 
Operations, that logistics management for  the lunar 
program and la ter  Space Operations in general needed 
some attention. In other  words. we were having the 
same kind of trouble with logistics that we have had 
with documentation, reliability, and the like. We had  
a ser ious communications problem, no logistics base- 
line, no logistics thread running through the entire 
program.  
Logistics planning documents were developed to 
improve o u r  communications. 
tics staff people have worked with the contractors'  
logistics people. and great  progress  has been made. 
But the missing link in our communications chain was 
getting the message through to all layers  of manage- 
ment. And that i s  the background for  this symposium. 
Meanwhile. our logis- 
Today and tomorrow we hope to parade before 
you a rather  impressive group of speakers, each a 
real  expert in his field, who will address  his  r e m a r k s  
to a specilic eieiiient ~f Icgistics mmagement .  
know a great  many of these men, and I know what they 
have to say will be both interesting and informative. 
I 
The pr imary  purpose, then, of this symposium i s  
to bring together industry and government management 
and discuss the how's, why's, and wherefore's of the 
often knotty problem of managing the logistics par t  
of the program. 
Although Marshall Space Flight Center i s  acting 
a s  host  for  this event, i t  i s  actually a Manned Space 
Flight-sponsored symposium, involving Kennedy 
Space Center and Manned Spacecraft Center a s  well 
a s  the Office of Manned Space Flight in Washington. 
P lease  note that this symposium is  titled " F i r s t  
Annual Logistics Management Symposium. " We feel  
that this  subject i s  important enough to warrant  annual 
attention, and we propose that another such symposium 
be held a t  about this  t ime next year .  
The key word in the title i s  "management. " A s  
Dr.  von Braun stated, we a r e  placing a lot of emphasis 
on management throughout ou r  space programs,  and 
the logistics program fal ls  readily into this category. 
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Wesimplymustdoourjobbetter,quicker,andat
lesscost.Wedon'thaveanychoice.
Everywhereweturnwearetoldthatthereis
lessmoneytodothethingsweknowverywellwe
haveto do,notjustthethingswewantodo. I know
fromexperiencethatthisis tobecomeawayoflife,
andthemanwhocandoafirst classprofessionaljob
andstill doit economicallyis themantowhomman-
agementwill turn.
Thisisatimefor criticalself-analysis.And
this,I expect,willbeasecondaryesultofthissym-
posium.
WhenwetalkaboutlogisticshereatMarshall,
thesearethethingsweinclude:
Logistics engineering planning -- the activities
executed at program level in defining what is to
be done.
Spares provisioning -- The process of selecting
spare parts, quantities, location and disposition;
preserving, packaging and shipping them; main-
raining the proper configuration; and documenting
the entire process.
Inventory management of these high-value resour-
ces.
Maintenance -- Two types of maintenance are
included: Scheduled maintenance includes the
activities taken to enhance or preserve the func-
tional ability of the hardware; unscheduled main-
tenance includes the corrective actions required
as the result of failure or malfunction.
Maintainability -- The process of assuring that
the combined features of design and installation
result in a configuration which permits inspec-
tion, test, repair, overhaul, and servicing to
be accomphshed with a minimum of time, skill,
and resources.
Technical support documentation -- The docu-
ments required to assist in the performance of
the above activities.
Training -- Those activities designed to assure
that all personnel have the proper knowledge and
skill level to execute the support mission.
Transportation -- The movement of spares, com-
ponents, and complete items of equipment wher-
ever needed and in a timely and eompletely safe
fashion, including the control of the environment
in which the hardware moves.
Propellants and pressurants provisioning -- The
process of planning for and managing the acqui-
sition, storage, movement, and utilization of
propellants and pressurants. We give this spe-
cial consideration because of its unique nature in
the aerospace field.
Logistics control and evaluation -- The process
of managing all of the above, with special empha-
sis in the central coordination of these activities
and the evaluation of the associated efforts.
There are other ways to slice this logistics pie,
I'm sure, but this happens to be ours.
The proof of any logistics system is its ability
to support the operation.
Theoretically, the system should be one hundred
percent perfect, with everything in the right place at
the right time. This degree of perfection is difficult
to achieve. There will at times be missing spares,
or late deliveries, simply because we don't have the
ability to foresee the future with the required accu-
racy to achieve perfection. But we can and do plan
for contingencies, and we are able to quickly detect,
and correct, our system malfunctions.
Let me cite only one example. Just recently our
propellants and transportation people had to solve a
difficult problem of providing liquid oxygen to KSC in
a hurry and in very large quantities, hundreds of
thousands of gallons. Special purpose barges not
really designed for open seas were taken from our
Mississippi Test Facility, loaded with liquid oxygen,
and taken through the Intercoastal Waterway and, with
great caution, across the Gulf to KSC.
This is typical of the contingency-type operations
with which logistics planners are continually faced.
Gentlemen, a lot of hard work has gone into this
symposium. Some fine speakers have taken time out
to come and talk to us about this subject of growing
importance. Many of our top industry and govern-
ment people have given this day and a half to meet
with us. We have an opportunity to achieve really
significant improvements in an area where the payoffs
are large.
And now it gives me very great pleasure to pre-
sent to you NASA Associate Administrator for Manned
Space Flight, Dr. George E. Mueller, who will deliver
our keynote address.
-- Dr. Mueller
KEYNOTE ADDRESS: DR. GEORGE E. MUELLER, NASA, Associate Administrator f o r  'Manned Space Flight, 
has  a BS in EE f rom Missouri School of Mines, a n  MS 
in EE from Purdue, and a PhD in physics f rom Ohio 
State University. He performed research  a t  Bell Lab.; 
was assis tant  professor  of e lectr ical  engineeringat Ohio 
State University; at Space Technology Laboratories 
he served successively as Director of the Electronics 
Laboratories, was Program Director of the "Able" 
Space Program,  Vice President  of Space Systems 
Management, and Vice President  f o r  Research and 
Development; and he joined NASA in his  present  po- 
sition in 1963 He holds several  patents, i s  the author 
of more  than 20 technical papers, and i s  co-author 
of the book Communication Satellites 
Good morning: 
It i s  a pleasure f o r  me to be able to participate 
in this F i r s t  Annual Logistics Management Symposium, 
and I a m  very flattered to have been asked to  be the 
keynote speaker. 
Of course it i s  always gratifying to  meet with 
such a distinguished group as we have both in  the 
audience and on the platform. I a m  a lso  pleased to 
see attention being given by the top management level 
of industry and government to  the betterment of logis- 
tics management, which is one of our  most perplex- 
ing problems. 
Whether you represent  industrial contractors ,  
the DOD, or NASA, all of you appreciate the impor- 
tance of management in furthering the programs 
established to  achieve our national objectives. As 
your keynote speaker f o r  this  symposium, I a m  h e r e  
to  s t r e s s  one point -- NASA needs top management 
attention f o r  its logistics requirements, now as never 
before. 
With the Gemini program, as with Project  Mer- 
cury,  NASA's direct involvement in logistics was 
confined principally to the spacecraft. That i s ,  the 
A i r  Force  provided us  with the launch vehicle and 
gave us superb launch operations support. The en- 
t i r e  Department of Defense saw to i t  that recovery 
could be car r ied  out on a global scale .  Now NASA i s  
entering the operational phase of the Apollo program, 
but unlike Mercury and Gemini, NASA i s  responsible 
f o r  the launch vehicle and launch operations as well 
as the spacecraft. For the f i r s t  t ime in a NASA man- 
ned space flight program, the grea te r  par t  of logistics 
i s  not being provided by the Department of Defense. 
This  is why you and I a r e  here  today -- to put 
into action the maxim that effective logistics manage- 
ment i s  indispensable to program success .  
Manned space flight logistics management, as in 
the military, i s  evident in the s p a r e s  requirements  
effort for any system, as reflected by the maintenance 
analysis. It is evident in the maintenance of systems,  
including the training of field maintenance people who 
follow the hardware. It is evident in both space and 
military hardware in the maintainability concept, 
which must  be incorporated into system design at the 
outset. It i s  evident in  transportation to get the right 
thing to the right place at the right t ime,  whether the 
place be Viet Nam, Sacramento, White Sands, o r  
along the c rescent  f rom Louisiana to  Florida. It i s  
evident in  the handling and s torage of propellants. 
And i t  is evident in  the generation of adequate tech- 
nical manuals and documentation. 
NASA does not stockpile la rge  end i tem inven- 
tor ies ,  however, and our  logistics support, except 
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Dfor tracking and recovery operations, is confined to
the continental US. We do not have to compensate
for the use of newly trained field personnel, and we
do not have to overcome losses in transportation or
losses to enemy action. Our spare parts require-
ments are concentrated at test and launch sites which
are sophisticated industrial complexes, and our launch
operations are carried out by technicians with years
of experience. NASA end items are characterized
by high cost, low density, and, until now, short life
span.
Nonetheless, we in NASA have learned that any
of our program logistics elements can become criti-
cal to cost, schedule, or performance in the absence
of effective logistics management, a conviction shar-
ed by our friends in the military and industry. The
viewpoint of the Office of Manned Space Flight is that
without logistics excellence, our efforts can fail just
as surely as if we had neglected cost control, relia-
bility, quality assurance, or scheduling.
To translate this conviction into action takes
high level management effort. For this reason, I
am particularly pleased to see so many of our
contractor officers joining with NASA management
for this first annual Logistics Management Sympos-
ium.
Through the medium of this symposium, and its
focusing upon logistics management, the Manned
Space Flight Directors and I believe that the tenents
of good program management and good logistics en-
gineering may be more effectively applied to NASA
programs. It is truly important, that top management
members of NASA and industry identify clearly the
requirements of program logistics, and meet these
requirements with timely, positive, cost-effective
action.
I am pleased as well to see the formation here of
a new society of Logistics Engineers. Through the
formal framework of this new society will spring
greater professional interest in our common logistics
problems, and greater assurance of their solution.
My congratulations to the charter members of this
new professional organization who have pledged them-
selves to the cause of advancing logistics management
and technology.
Turning to our NASA programs, I should like to
comment briefly on some of the logistics considerations
that we in Manned Space Flight are facing today as
our Gemini program moves toward the final flight and
we move into the operations phase of the Apollo pro-
gram. Before I proceed, however, it is appropriate
at this time to commend all of the people -- many of
them are here today -- who have contributed to the
achievements of Gemini.
There wasn't an area of logistics that at some
time didn't present a challenge for NASA and the
Gemini contractors, the Air Force, and the D_D
recovery team. However. all members of the team
applied their logistics skill in achieving Gemini's
proud record of success.
An example of contractor management's attention
to logistics is provided by the Martin Company's
Gemini Assets Task Team. This team was set up at
Martin, Baltimore to assure that adequate program
assets, both production and spare units, are avail-
able when needed for successful launch of the final
Gemini launch vehicles.
Martin's Assets Task Team includes personnel
from the functional program elements -- Logistics,
Engineering, Quality, Procurement, and Planning-
as well as from the Martin Canaveral Division.
Since its formation prior to the Gemini IX mission,
thisteam has developed the responsiveness necessary
to assure timely completion of the Gemini Launch
Vehicle program.
In the supply support area, the team is working
to provide acceptable replacements units quickly for
failed parts. The team also is maintaining a contin-
uous survey of program assets with the objective of
preventing launch vehicle failures. This is the kind
of management attention I want to see for each of our
launches in the future to insure against delayed
launches with their attendant cost.
These and many other valuable lessons of Gemini
are being put to good use in the Apollo program.
However, the need for increasing the emphasis
on logistics management for Apollo is great. Be-
cause of its size and scope, the Apollo program poses
logistics problems well beyond the demands of Gemini.
The experience and technology resulting from Gemini
have contributed substantially to Apollo in all aspects,
including logistics -- but Apollo's combined require-
ments are an order of magnitude greater in terms of
hardware, facilities, ground support equipment, per-
sonnel, and logistics.
The Apollo Saturn space vehicle involves 20,000
contractors and subcontractors and has more than
900,000 individual parts. The Saturn V first stage
holds 56 tank cars of propellants. The second and
third stages of Saturn V transported by water during
the Apollo program will spend a total of 700 days at
sea. Apollo program transportation by all modes
will require coordination with nine Government agen-
cies. The launch windows for the Apollo lunar mission
are relatively small; malfunctions on the pad must be
q' p
kept to a minimum while corrective maintenance must
be extremely fastand reliable. All of these elements
make the Apollo logisticsprogram both complicated
and costly.
Considering the obvious demands for control and
integration of these large-scale, complex logistics
support elements, itis only prudent to recognize that
we are now entering our most criticalperiod for lo-
gistics support of Apollo. The operational phase of
the program willmake the greatest demands upon
the logisticselements required to sustain the flight
hardware preparatory to launch.
The stringent requirements for controlling and
reducing program costs impose further demands upon
Apollo logistics management. The Apollo contractors
are well informed as to our critical requirements to
control program costs parts. This can be accom-
plished only by controlling all parts of the program
budget, including that allocated to logistics. The
manned space flight budget represents an operating
cost of $10 million a day, and the cost continues
regardless of whether or not we accomplish anything.
In this sense, a missed launch due to technical or
logistics deficiencies costs millions for every day
we are delayed.
In emphasizing logistics, therefore, I certainly
am not suggesting a more costly logistics effort; on
the contrary, I am suggesting that more management
brainpower be applied to achieve cost-effective logis-
tics support for the operational phase of the Apollo
program. It is reasonable to assume that the appli-
cation of brainpower will result in fewer dollars
spent in meeting unplanned logistics requirements,
fewer dollars spent in solving unexpected logistics
problems, and fewer dollars invested in support
which exceeds program requirements.
I have encouraged all Manned Space Flight man-
agers to be alert to innovations which will enhance
our logistics posture or reduce logistics operating
costs. For example, we have recently negotiated
an agreement with the Air Force to provide propellant
management for certain selected fuels and propellants,
an agreement we expect to result in substantial savings
for both of us. In addition, a study is now underway
here at Marshall Space Flight Center to determine
the size and preferred location of a central repair
and supply facility for launch vehicle ground support
equipment.
The area of spares management provides another
illustration of the application of brainpower. At the
present time, Apollo program managers are reeval-
uating the planned program support against available
ground and flight test results. In this evaluation they
t0
will assure that the planned logistics support in extra
components, spare parts, and other support elements
meets but does not exceed the requirements, as
indicated by current program experience.
Such planning recognizes that logistics support
requirements might change in the future with changes
in the overali program or program operations envi-
ronment.
For example, during Gemini launch preparations
in September 1965, we had just completed arrange-
ments to consolidate our liquid hydrogen supply source
for the East Coast with one contractor in New Orleans.
Then tturricane Betsy hit the Gulf Coast and our New
Orleans source was cut off. Fortunately, a Florida
plant that was to be phased out with the new supply
plan was still operating. We quickly brought it back
into full-scale operation. Otherwise, we would have
had to bring the propellant all the way from the West
Coast, which could have easily delayed the Gemini
launch schedule. We have since provided contingency
plans for all of our sources of supply.
While planning for contingencies, we consider
accelerated schedules as well as program delays,
something we learned when a Saturn stage was delivered
well in advance of plan. Our contingency planning now
provides for the logistic lines to be open whether the
stages are delivered on, behind, or ahead of schedule.
On the subject of contingency planning, it is
worthwhile to consider the impact of the Viet Nam
military operational requirements on Manned Space
Flight program logistics. We are learning that it is
unwise to assume yesterday's plans will always sup-
port tomorrow's operations. Our nation's support of
Viet Nam is affecting lead times, materials, priorities,
and schedules. Yet our collective planning has been
responsive enough so that I know of no direct program
impact resulting from the effects of Viet Nam.
With the quickening tempo of Apollo program oper-
ations and the peaking of logistics support, we must
not overlook the application of another management
technique that is not always found in the formal liter-
ature. This is the ingredient which I call teamwork --
teamwork within NASA and teamwork of NASA with
its contractors and the Department of Defense.
The geographical scope of the Apollo program
and the size of the Apollo government-industry organ-
ization make teamwork vital to success. This need
for cooperative effort is particularly evident for
logistics , which pervades the entire program effort.
There must be a strong sense of teamwork within the
entire program organization so that logistics con-
siderations are made concurrent with other program
decisions.
All ofusknowthatconsideration of logistics
problems at the appropriate level has a way of being
postponed to a day of reckoning farther down the road.
We are inclined to defer those decisions for which
one will not be called to account until later, even
though the delay compounds the problems and often
prevents any practical solution. It is management's
responsibility to determine the impact upon logistics
of other program elements, and in turn, the impact
of logistics on everything else, before the fact.
We must plan in as much detail as our knowledge
permits. We must determine where we are going,
how and when, and having done this, we must allocate
our resources and specify all of our technical require-
ments. We must determine our logistics support
concept and our plans to execute it.
In this regard, we need to improve our definition
of what we want the contractor to do, by improving
the scope of work we give him. We need to define
the effort expected considerably earlier in the pro-
gram. And we must follow through with better con-
tract management so the program manager will know
at all times just where he stands with relation to
achieving his goal in logistics.
The Office of Manned Space Flight recognizes
that logistics must be integrated thoroughly into the
program from the preconceptual phase, and must be
effectively managed throughout operations to ultimate
disposition of the hardware.
Logistics planning is just as vital to the space
effort as it is to military operations. We must plan
our support activities in detail, taking every advantage
of our ever-expanding capabilities in accurate re-
quirements computation, reliable communications and
fast, responsive transportation. These are impor-
tant considerations both operationally (unneeded
stocks are a millstone around our necks) and from
the point of view of program costs.
Indeed, the early consideration of program logis-
tics has become increasingly important from the stand-
point of cost effectiveness. We are required to look
at our total program costs, and will do so increas-
ingly in the budgeting of future programs.
As we move into programs beyond Apollo we must
reassess our logistics support conaepts based on the
needs of these new programs. The_e programs will
be characterized by longer and longer flightdurations
and constrained by the reliabilitywe can achieve in
components, subsystems and systems and by the new
concepts for maintainability we develop.
The need for reliability has been with us, of
course, right from the start, in Mercury, in Gemini,
and on into the Apollo program. As we go onto longer
and longer duration missions, however, reliability
(extended reliability) becomes more and more impor-
tant. In the past we have stressed reliability. We
have utilized redundant subsystems, and this approach
has been reasonably successful to date. We have had,
and will have, thoroughout Apollo, extremely limited
capability for maintenance in flight.
As we go into the post-Apollo era with flight
durations of a year or more, we will, of course, have
larger crews, greater mobility for individuals, and
certainly some capability for inflight maintenance and
repair. However, this capability will always be
limited and reliability of components and subsystems
will be vital to mission success and indeed to crew
safety.
The analytical trade-offs necessary for NASA to
reach optimum cost effecitveness cannot be carried
out without thorough consideration of balanced logistics
support. Contractor studies for future programs be-
yond Apollo must, therefore, emphasize logistics as
a prominent factor in life-cycle cost determination.
The speakers who will follow during this sympo-
sium will have much wisdom to impart on the speci-
fics of meeting logistics support requirements. My
purpose has been to stress NASA's need for continuous
top level attention to provide timely and effective
logistics management, particularly as we reach the
operational phase of the Apollo program.
This symposium presents us with a rare oppor-
tunity. Assembled here are the people who have the
ability and the authority to make whatever changes
and improvements are needed to establish a strong
chain of logistics support in all our organizations.
Through your personal interest and attentions, we
will reach the excellence of logistics management and
technology needed for successful achievement of
national goals in space.
I wish you the greatest success in this symposium.
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LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR M U N C H  SITE OPERATIONS: DR. KURT H. DEBUS, NASA, Director, 
Kennedy Space Center, has  initial and doctorate 
degrees  in mechanical and electr ical  engineering 
f rom Darmstadt Technical University. He was a n  
assis tant  professor  at Darmstadt where he became 
involved in Peenemuende rocket research programs;  
participated in research  and development missi le  
launchings at Peenemuende; participated in V-2 and 
other  missi le  launchings at White Sands Proving 
Ground; and began Cape launchings in 1952. Here,  he 
has  directed launchings of Redstone, Jupiter IRBM, 
Jupiter-C, Juno, Pershing, and Saturn missi les  
and launch vehicles .  
Let  me express  my genuine pleasure a t  being 
invited to participate in your Logistics Management 
Symposium. These meetings, and others  like them, 
can make vaiuabie contributions t~ the mtinn 's  s p i c e  
program by probing into critical areas of logistics 
management and seeking the highest level of refine- 
ment. 
A s  NASA's launch organization, Kennedy Space 
Center i s  responsible for  the preflight preparation 
and launch of NASA's space vehicles. In addition 
to  the execution of this pr ime mission, the Center 
has  a total responsibility that i s  heavily grounded in 
support. 
milestone which i s  the launch date, KSC must pro- 
vide a s t rong program of logistics management and 
logistics action to insure availability of equipment 
and serv ices  a t  the proper  time and place, accom- 
panied by the necessary skills. 
F r o m  ear ly  design s tages  to that major 
I will attempt to show the complexity and magni- 
tude of KSC's "Logistics" by looking at various seem- 
ingly disconnected a r e a s  of endeavor and activities, 
by using a kaleidoscopic view at some of these ele-  
ments. 
Le t ' s  take a look a t  a launch concept and launch 
complex, which by themselves a r e  conceived and a r e  
configured in  response to t rue logistic challenges, i. e. , 
Launch Rates 
Manpower Utilization 
Flexibility to meet mission changes 
Quick response to threatening hurr icanes with 
minimum t ime loss 
Maximum use of rea l  estate 
Maximum operational re turn  for  investment 
LAUNCHCONCEPTANDLAUNCHCOMPLEX 
In support of the Apollo Program,  which will cul- 
minate in a manned lunar landing, we have activated 
a new mobile concept a t  Kennedy Space Center ' s  
Launch Complex 39. This concept embodies the as- 
sembly and checkout of flight s tages  in the protective 
environment of a massive building, whose s ize  has  
been dictated by the configuration of the Apollo/Saturn 
V space vehicles. These a r e  the largest  space vehicles 
ever  built, with a fueled weight in excess  of s ix  mil- 
lion pounds. 
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I These following figures indicate a quantum 
growth in s ize  and weight. It follows that this type 
of growth must b e  paralleled by a multiplication of 
complexities in support  requirements.  
FIGURE 1. ARTIST'S CONCEPT OF ENTIRE 
COMPLEX AND HOW MOBILE CONCEPT WORKS 
FIGURE 2 .  VAB, BARGE, AND MOBILE 
APPEARS TODAY 
LAUNCHERS -ELEMENTS OF COMPLEX AS I T  
PRODUCT PIPELINE 
Coming at the end of a product-and-man-effort 
pipeline 300,000 people long, employing products 
manufactured by a diverse network of contractor 
suppliers,  and implementing programs under a tri- 
Center  directorate,  Kennedy Space Center requires  
launch support  teamwork, cooperation, and interaction 
based on a high level of logistics management. 
FIGURE 3. MOBILE LAUNCHER AND 500-F 
LAUNCH VEHICLE ON PAD WITH SERVICE 
STRUCTURE BEING MOVED IN 
FIGURE 4. SATURN V ASSEMBLY AND TEST 
SEQUENCE 
LOGISTICS CONSIDERATION FOR SELECTION O F  
LAUNCH SITE 
F r o m  the very beginning of advanced planning 
for  the manned lunar landing program, logistics 
played an  important role in creating what was  ulti- 
mately to become Kennedy Space Center .  
The selection of Merr i t t  Island as  a pr ime oper- 
ational base fo r  America 's  space effort  was, to a 
large degree.  influenced by logistical facts  of life. 
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From cer ta in  viewpoints, such as flight safety, 
noise, and other  ground safety considerations, ideal 
conditions f o r  this base could have been found on a 
remote island, e i ther  in the Atlantic o r  Pacific. 
However, ear ly  planning pointed to the fact that 
there  would be  difficulty in  acquiring and keeping 
personnel a t  such a site, and there  would be problems 
in establishing and maintaining the flow of mater ia l .  
The remote location would c rea te  problems in com- 
munications, especially in the area of data t rans-  
mission. 
TER 
FIGURE 5 .  MAP OF MERRITT ISLAND AND 
CAPEKENNEDY 
In evaluating eight potential s i tes ,  the final 
choice fell on the Merritt Island location, adjacent 
t o  the existing facilities on Cape Kennedy. 
vided a n  operational base with close proximity to the 
Eastern Test Range and i t s  instrumentation invest- 
ment. Nearby communities with schools, housing, 
and other  facilities f o r  family living constituted an 
adequate inducement in acquiring skilled personnel. 
Another major factor in the decision was that the 
a r e a  would be less  expensive to develop. It also 
has  the advantage of additional undeveloped land 
which would provide adequate buffer zones and room 
f o r  future expansion. 
This  pro- 
KSC ORGANIZATION 
The KSC organization i s  constructed against a 
realization of proper separation between pr ime line- 
doing functions and logistics support functions. 
FIGURE 6 .  KSC ORGANIZATION CHART 
The program function a t  KSC fal ls  under the 
office of the Manager of the Apollo Program.  A s  
the central  point for  management of a l l  program 
activities, this function, then, i s  not one of direct  
support, but i t  must be actively interested in and 
concerned about such matters .  Therefore, as far 
as  policy i s  concerned, program management initi- 
a t e s  the guidelines for  logistics, and in this context 
i s  related to the effective execution of required sup- 
port. 
The launch function comes under the Director of 
Launch Operations 
initiates, supervises  and coordinates the preparation 
of preflight and launch operations and i s  responsible 
for  execution of these plans. 
Here we have the element that 
Internally, the launch function wres t les  with 
problems that could be termed logistical, and the 
launch team must coordinate with support e lements .  
But as  a purified launch team, launch operations 
deals with flight hardware and that portion of GSE 
which i s  intimately connected with it. This, of course ,  
i s  a function that executes ra ther  than supports. 
Excluding the program and launch functions, 
however, everything else ,  under the other director-  
a tes ,  support. 
LAUNCH AND SUPPORT ORGANIZATION 
The ultimate focal  point of the total mission 
effort i s  found at the launch pad, where a purified 
launch crew and a flight ready vehicle activate the 
mission. At this point, in both t ime and place, we 
must have experienced a n  adequacy of support in 
both quality and quantity. This includes facilities, 
ground support equipment, flight hardware, propel- 
lants and pressurants ,  instrumentation and commun- 
ications and, of course,  s p a r e  par ts ,  both f o r  flight 
hardware and ground equipment. 
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FIGURE 7. LAUNCH TEAM ORGANIZATION
NTA_'_ TlST
_TR,
FIGURE 8. LAUNCH TEAM ORGANIZATION
THE LOGISTICS OF SPARES
The task of spares determination is one that holds
a place of special importance in launch operations.
Incorrect selection and quantification of spares can be
very costly. If NASA is forced to stop a count and go
into a hold, the cost, for contractor personnel and
range support, lies in the neighborhood of $18, 000
an hour. If the hold is due to a faulty part, and a spare
is lacking, this extends the hold and multiplies the
cost by the number of hours lost. If we are faced
with a narrow launch window, the hold can extend into
days. So, we must have adequate spares, but the
types of spares we are dealing with are not in the
category of paper clips and thumb tacks. They are
expensive. Indiscriminate overstocking in prohibi-
tively costly, but cannibalizing other flight hardware
is not the answer. Cannibalization has, at times,
been practiced on a planned basis. In these instances,
items have been taken from the next copy of flight
hardware, or ground support equipment has been
moved in from another pad. But even the slightest
reliance on cannibalization as a contingency measure
is bad support. The solution to the problem of spares
provisioning lies only in the proper application of
logistics and management skills.
The ability to provide cost effective support in
all areas is a basic objective in launch site operations.
Attainment of this objective depends heavily on early
identification of logistics requirements.
I mentioned that at Kennedy Space Center we
experience an input of products from all over the nation.
This input requires that prior consideration be given
to the support of all of these items. Early in the
design of complex equipment, KSC makes gross deter-
minations of logistical support requirements and coor-
dinates these with the design centers.
These gross requirements are refined as design
progresses toward stabilization. During this period,
if items change in configuration, we must make changes
that keep the support pipeline concurrent with the pro-
ducts. KSC, in close cooperation with the efforts of
the other Centers and their contractor suppliers,
must analyze maintenance requirements, must design
and procure support equipment, must construct facil-
ities, and acquire the necessary amounts of human
skills and material.
BLACK BOX POLICY
Applied maintenance offers an example of the
necessarily flexible quantities of the support concept.
Black boxes are supplied as total units, where pos-
sible, and the replacement is normally a unit replace-
ment. There is a general awareness that, in a field
situation, the support elements cannot have a team
that is as knowledgeable in design intent as the devel-
opment engineer. The unit replacement concept is,
therefore, by and large, an intelligent one. However,
if it is necessary, to meet requirements or time
schedules, our people will open a black box with the
consent of the developer. We may then decide to send
it back to the source, or we may repair it on the spot.
The decision for action is based on an appraisal of our
systems knowledge in a specific case and criteria
such as fault isolation capability, environmental con-
ditions, and capability to retest to specifications,
always within the time frame of the launch schedule.
BULK SUPPLIES
Not all support requirements are related to com-
plexity or systems knowledge. We also have problems
associated with bulk. Here we can point to the logis-
tics products of propellants and pressurants.
The nation's first satellite was launched on a
Jupiter C vehicle in 1958. At that time we held three
15
trailer loads of liquid oxygen in  storage. This was 
approximately 15,000 gallons. 
unexpected. This  loss could have ser ious  consequen- 
ces if it had occurred during the terminal  period of a 
Saturn V launch. 
FIGURE 9. UNLOADING FUEL FOR MERCURY 
REDSTONE QUANTITY COMPARISON 
Today, as we activate Launch Complex 39 f o r  
the flights of the Apollo/ Saturn V configuration, we 
must  s t o r e  the equivalent of 200 trailer loads of 
liquid oxygen, o r  about one million gallons. We 
s tore  another million gallons of liquid hydrogen. 
single launch of a Saturn V req.&rcs 15 million cubic 
feet of helium, fifteen thousand tons of liquid nitrogen, 
seven thousand tons of liquid oxygen, and 900,000 
gallons of liquid hydrogen a t  Launch Complex 39. 
A 
Figure 11 depicts a broken hose at the base of a 
liquid oxygen s torage tank. This loss  did not occur  
during the period of a n  approaching launch, but i t  
points to  the need f o r  quick logistics reaction to  the 
FIGURE 10. LOX TANK AND PIPING, L/C 39 
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FIGURE 11. BROKEN FLEX HOSE AT BASE O F  
LOX STORAGE TANK 
Fortunately, a LOX t ransfer  operations system 
has already been planned that will extend between P a d s  
A and B at Complex 39. Next year ,  when we reach a 
launch operational mode, standby supplies will be 
available. 
COMMUNICATIONS LOGISTICS 
Another segment of logistics where we deal with 
many var ie t ies  and grea t  quantities of units can be 
found in  the areas of instrumentation and data, o r  
more  generally launch related communications. 
KSC's data acquisition starts with prelaunch test 
and checkout operations. It continues through launch 
and orbital flight with KSC responsible f o r  all data 
fed into the Eastern Test  Range o r  generated by KSC. 
The increase  in  this area of support i s  a lmost  directly 
related to advancements in  flight hardware. 
ear ly  Jupi ter  C launches required about 100 measure-  
ments for  which KSC was responsible. During the 
f i r s t  ten Saturn flights the number of measurements  
jumped to a n  average of 1200. The uprated Saturns 
require  approximately 1800, and the est imate  f o r  the 
Saturn V i s  close to 2400. This i s  by no means the 
total amount of KSC data, but only a n  indication of the 
growth in support requirements. 
The 
The responsibility h a s  never ended with acquiring 
data, but continues through dissemination. We must 
maintain a n  ability to keep this data flowing. Fortun- 
ately, through the installation of high speed data links, 
the impact of data flow h a s  been eased, but it i s  worth 
noting that a lack of logistical foresight could have 
created a n  almost  insurmountable b a r r i e r  in this area 
of vital communications. 
In the days before we had these high speed data 
links, it was  necessary to  take data out of computers 
and recorders ,  pack it i n  boxes, and t r y  t o  meet  the 
need f o r  this data by sending it out by plane on Satur- 
days, Sundays, holidays, o r  a t  any time required to 
maintain the flow. Frequently it took f r o m  35 to  40 
days to get a summary of performance character is t ics  
of the vehicle following a launch. Today, by the t ime 
we have the information at Kennedy, it is a lso  avail- 
able  at other  required locations. A summary  can now 
be obtained in a mat te r  of a few hours. To this extent 
we have acted to solve the logistics problem of data 
flow. 
DATA STORAGE 
We are still faced with a problem of s torage and 
retr ieval  of huge quantities of data. We can a r r i v e  
at a partial solution to this problem by increasing 
our  capability commensurate with anticipated needs. 
A s  a step in  this direction, KSC h a s  ordered, and 
will receive in the future, a m a s s  memory device 
which will be added to the memory core  in the Central 
Instrumentation Facility. This  equipment will be able 
to  s tore  a n  additional 450 million bits of information, 
and make data available within 17  milliseconds of 
command. 
The addition of equipment does not, however, 
solve the toh! prob!em.. 
ment, within the strict limitations of budget, requires  
the most incisive application of intelligent logistics 
management. We must  evaluate the need f o r  data 
storage, and we must  determine that every request 
that is granted is a justifiable request. 
The expense of such equip- 
One of our  stage contractors ,  and this i s  only 
one, h a s  requested s torage of nearly three billion 
bits of data. It is entirely possible that he has  levied 
s imi la r  requirements  on other  Centers .  In the final 
evaluation i t  may be more  economical to provide the 
contractor a c c e s s  l ines  to a centralized place of 
data storage. Close scrutiny and coordination must 
be applied before such requirements  are met by the 
government. 
EXAMPLE O F  MANPOWER ECONOMICS 
Today, we can consider Launch Complex 39 as 
a n  example of this flow of logistics f rom ear ly  recog- 
nition of requirements  to  the working support of an 
operational base f o r  the lunar expedition. 
More than 63,000 contract end i tems will go into 
Launch Complex 39 before the installation becomes 
fully operational. 
A s  a dynamic facility, the support problems will 
never  end, but confidence has  been established through 
a support p rogram that s ta r ted  ear ly  and h a s  remained 
flexible. 
An illustration of ear ly  considerations now exist- 
ing as an outflow of support is found in  the manner in 
which supporting contractor engineers have been placed 
inside the Vehicle Assembly Building where the 
vehicles are assembled and checked out. F o r  logis- 
t ical  reasons, more  than any other, the building has  
been designed f o r  simultaneous assembly of as many 
as three Apollo/Saturn V’s. 
FIGURE 12. 500-F IN VAB 
Since we are assembling vehicles on s t ruc tures  
that require access  f rom the floor to a height of 
more than 445 feet, key engineering personnel have 
been placed in offices that lead directly to the platform 
levels where their  s tages  are located. Systems engi- 
neers can then move laterally throughout the building. 
With this  type of personnel placement, severa l  c rews  
can be supported as they work on different vehicles. 
When you consider that the Vehicle Assembly Build- 
ing contains more than 129 million cubic feet of space,  
you can readily understand the importance of keeping 
our skills proximate to the areas of responsibility. 
CONCLUSION 
You saw many elements of a mosaic which, if 
taken together, indicate the logistic challenges--in our 
field alone--which partially have been solved and those 
which need to be resolved fur ther .  
symposium is the beginning of a well coordinated team 
work to  lead the unresolved problems to good solutions. 
I hope that this 
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THE-US ARMY'S LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF OPERATIONS I N  VIET NAM: BRIGADIER GENERAL 
THURSTON T. PAUL, USA, Director, P lans  and P r o -  
grams,  Office of Chief, Research and Development, 
US Army, was  responsible a t  Redstone Arsenal  f o r  
logistics and training for  the Redstone Missile System, 
resulting in i t s  deployment to Europe. He was project 
manager for  deployment of the Jupiter, f i r s t  to Italy 
and then to the Air  Force,  and he coordinated the 
Government-industry engineering of the Pershing 
missi le  system 
combat duty in Europe in WW 11; research  and develop- 
ment assignments in mater ia ls  research ,  weapon devel- 
opment, and missi le  testing; and logistics assignments 
in Korea, Hawaii, Japan and Washington. 
His military career has  included 
A year  ago our mission in Viet Nam was that of 
providing military assis tance and advising the Viet- 
namese armed forces  in their efforts against the 
subversion and banditry of theViet Cong. Our Army 
personnel there  totaled about 10,000.  and the principal 
Army logistic action was in providing helicopter t rans-  
portation for ARVN forces. Now. as a resul t  of the 
past y e a r ' s  build-up, there  a r e  185, 000 Army troops 
in Viet Nam, and our  Army logistical operations have 
grown t o  the dimension of supporting a full-fledged 
combat force. To understand and appreciate  this 
logistical build-up, one must know something of the 
country's geography and of i t s  transportation and 
economic situations. 
By US standards, Viet Nam i s  a primitive country, 
predominantly agricultural and rura l .  It has  a long 
coastline with no developed d e e p w a t e r  por t s .  Rugged 
mountains, covered with dense tropical forest ,  r i s e  
steeply f rom the east  coast. The delta region south 
of Saigon is a swampy riceland. The center  of indus- 
t r ia l ,  communication, economic, and governmental 
activity i s  the city of Saigon, 40 miles  up the winding 
Saigon River. Viet Nam's  railroad net i s  limited and 
has  been paralyzed f o r  years  by Viet Cong harassment .  
Its highways a r e  mostly unsurfaced, many no bet ter  
than f a r m  roads and t ra i l s ,  and easily (and frequently) 
blocked by the VC. Hostile Cambodia and the Com- . 
munist-controlled border  with Laos confine logistical 
support to  that which can be provided from the eas t ,  
and the lack of ports  there  gave us  some r e a l  problems. 
VietNam i s  a l so  1500 miles f rom our  neares t  
major  logistical base on Okinawa, 5000 miles  f rom the 
Army 's  Pacific Command HQ in Hawaii, and 7500 
miles  f rom San Francisco and CONUS Logictical 
Support. 
So you see we h a d  our  work cut  out f o r  u s  in 
creat ing a logistical support sys tem in Viet Nam. 
The backbone of this system i s  a handful of newly 
developed installations. 
Tan Son Nhut, just  north of Saigon, is now one of the 
world 's  busiest a i rpor t s .  Here cargo a r r i v e s  f rom 
Okinawa, f rom Japan, and from the United States, and 
i s  transshipped to  bases  within South Viet Nam. 
Personnel  and priority shipments of supplies move by 
a i r ,  and planes land and take off incessantly. 
than 2 percent of our  supplies and equipment move by 
plane, however, sea transportation is s t i l l  the lifeline 
of our  forces  overseas .  
The main air terminal  at 
Less  
The old port a t  Saigon i s  the big one, in  spite of 
i t s  limited berthing and docking facilities. Many ships  
must  be anchored in the r iver ,  and the i r  cargo  brought 
into the port  on l ighters  and barges .  The port ' s  face 
is being lifted, however, and new warehouses, increased 
and improved docks, more  and bigger cargo handling 
g e a r  are showing the effect of development by the US 
Forces .  
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A major deep-water port has been developed on
Viet Nam's East Coast at Cam Ranh Bay, on a sandy
peninsula which might have been the desolate setting
for a Foreign Legion movie. It has Viet Nam's best
harbor, one of the four or five best natural harbors
in the world. There's plenty of deep water surround-
ing the peninsula, and new piers on the leeward side
give protection from the monsoon storms blowing in
from the South China Sea.
Other coastal ports include the Navy-operated
port at Da Nang which supports the US Marine Corps
in the northern sector of South Viet Nam, and Army-
operated ports at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Vung Tau.
Major improvement is well under way at Qui Nhon and
its increased capacity now rates it in the major port
category. Vung Tau is also being improved. Cam
Ranh, Qui Nhon, and Vung Tau still rely heavily on
lighterage operations to provide the required capa-
city, and Nha Trang will remain a shallow draft and
lighterage port.
Our logistical operation is directed by the First
Logistical Command. It has two main supply centers,
Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay, the "wholesale" supply
bases. It operates "retail" supply centers at the
minor ports at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Vung Tau,
and at Can Tho in the delta region.
Distribution of supplies from these bases is no
mean task. Where highways can be used, trucks move
in armed convoys. Short, isolated stretches of the
meager railroad net operate sporadically, but most
of the deliveries of supplies are by air. At each of
the ports and supply centers there is an airfield, and
planes stream in and out on their flights to up-country
fields or drop zones.
As you can well imagine, there have been some
real problems in getting this logistical support system
working. Support units were faced with the gargantuan
task of receiving the US forces, of furnishing them
their supplies, and at the same time of building their
own logistical facilities and building up their own stocks.
In one 51-day period between September 13 and Novem-
ber 4, 1965, the First Log Command landed the US
1st Air Cavalry Division, the US 1st Infantry Division,
and a Korean Infantry Division. Sixty-four ships were
unloaded, over 67,000 tons of equipment, over 10,000
vehicles, and over 40,000 men.
It was all done smoothly and well, but it meant
working men and equipment 20 hours a day. Couple
the intensity of equipment use with the abrasiveness
of the ever-present sand and dust and with the hot,
moisture-laden climate, and you have trouble. Equip-
ment failures began to climb. The list of deadlined
vehicles, aircraft, tractors, and construction equip-
ment increased. The supply of repair parts shipped
from CONUS depots had not been planned for this sort
of situation and quantities on hand soon were depleated.
Something drastic had to be done to get the repair
parts into Viet Nam so that this vital equipment could
operate, and on December 1st, SECDEF McNamara
directed the establishment of a high priority supply
operation for that purpose. Dubbed the "Red Ball
Express, " it handles only parts required to return
deadlined equipment to operation.
Requests for parts originate with the First Log
Command in Viet Nam and are forwarded to San
Francisco. Each requisition is identified as Red Ball,
and all are given priority handling as they are forwarded
to the national inventory control points and the CONUS
depots. Parts are picked from stock, packed sepa-
rately, labeled with Red Ball insignia, and flown to
Travis AFB, California. From there they are flown
by the Air Force Military Airlift Command directly
to the air terminal at Tan Son Nhut, near Saigon. Par
for the course, from requisition to receipt, is seven
days, but an amazing number of Red Ball shipments
break par.
Since the first shipment on December 8, over 5800
tons of urgently needed repair parts have reached
Viet Nam by way of the Red Ball system; over 120,000
requisitions have been filled, over 90 percent of them
within the seven allotted days. At the same time,
normal replenishment procedures are building up the
stocks of these same parts in the Depots in Viet Nam,
and some day soon we expect to see the number of
Red Ball requisistions taper off as the normal logisti-
cal support system hits its stride.
This has been a sort of thumb-nail sketch of how
we support our forces in Viet Nam. We have had our
good days and our bad; we have seen the satisfaction
of success and the frustration of failure; but it has
been repeated, time after time, by our leaders in the
rice paddies and in the mountain jungles of Viet Nam,
no fighting operation has been cancelled, no battle has
been lost because of any lack of logistical support.
This is the highest accolade that can be given to the
hard-working men of the First Log Command and to
the thousands who support them in our entire Army.
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DEFlN ITION 
I NTRODU CT I ON TO AFTERNOON SESS I ON: wITJTJAM A.  PARKER, NASA, Deputy Procurement  Officer, 
Manned Spacecraft Center, has  a BS in Business Ad- 
ministration f rom Louisana State University. He 
served with the Air  Force  during the Korean conflict 
as  a Manpower and Management Officer. He has  been 
a n  operations analyst with the Strategic Air  Command; 
had Management Analysis, Procurement  Plans and 
Operations, and Program Office assignments at Mobile 
A i r  Material Area ;  and had a Procurement  Division 
assignment at the NASA - Goddard Space Flight Center. 
This  morning we heard from Dr. von Braun that 
logistics had a r r ived .  We heard that i t  was essential. 
And we reemphasize the need to.-make logistics work 
f o r  the par t icular  needs of the program that you are 
serving. Dr.  Mueller dealt with the logistics philo- 
sophy and the pract ice  and plans for  the Manned Space 
Flight program, and Dr.  Debus has  posed several  
unique concepts and ideas that we might not have pre- 
viously considered to be in the logistics field. General 
Paul has  dealt with the classical  logistics application. 
This  afternoonls sess ion  we are going to devote to 
definition. And I a m  s u r e  that this i s  one of the most 
perplexing questions about logistics, and that i s ,  
really, “what i s  i t ?  “ “What does logistics really 
consis ts  of?  ‘’ You talk to one person, you get one 
concept. You talk to another and you have another. 
But this afternoon’s session i s  on definition. We have 
a very distinguished panel of speakers  who are going 
to deal with these matters .  They’re going to go into 
what logistics i s  and why planning is essential: How 
do you integrate i t  into your total program? What pit- 
falls a r i s e  when we don’t made the necessary and 
proper applications of logistics? Heading up this 
panel as moderator i s  M r .  J a m e s  L. Carpenter, who 
i s  director of logistics support on the staff of the 
general office of the Martin Company. Mr .  Carpenter 
is not only the moderator of this afternoon’s panel 
but he was also on the s teer ing committee that worked 
very hard on bringing this whole symposium to pass .  
My pleasure to present  Mr.  Carpenter. 
. cs SUPPORT: JAMES LCARPENTER,  JR. , Director of Logistics Support, 
General Offices of \Martin Company, is responsible 
f o r  those aspects of product engineering which ensure 
useability and supportability in the field. 
Corporation from 1956 through 1960, he was Director, 
Plans and Programs,  for  Advanced Projects ;  and 
With Chrysler  
managed support programs for the Redstone and 
Jupi ter  systems.  Previously, he spent s ix  y e a r s  i n  
electronics systems design with the Bureau of Ships 
and the Newport N e w s  Shipbuilding and Drydock 
Company 
Earl ier  today Dr .  Mueller and Dr. Debus have 
discussed why a n  adequate support activity i s  essen- 
tial to aerospace operations General Paul has pro- 
vided u s  with a timely and comprehensive view of the 
necessity for adequate support planning before under- 
taking a military operation such as Viet Nam. They 
have identified the a s s e t  afforded by proper logistic 
support .  
This session will be devoted to definition. My 
function i s  to se t  the stage for  Generals Cody and 
Phillips and for Admiral Sager who will discuss, in 
detail, some facets of the logistician's role in a pro- 
duct program. 
The immediate objective i s  to take a closer  look 
To do this we.must look a t  the interplay 
at the elements of what we shall call integrated logis- 
tic support. 
between support considerations and other essential 
program activity. W e  must at least  touch on the inter- 
action among the elements of support. We must a l so  
talk about cost and schedule, subjects not unfamiliar 
to a program manager. In short  we will look a t  what 
constitutes integrated logistic support and why i t  
must be given premium consideration throughout the 
planning f o r  acquisition of any hardware system. 
Early las t  year  Lieutenant General Richard D. 
Meyer, Logistics Director for  the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, stated: "Logistic support problems and added 
costs  have been generated during the conceptual, 
design, and production phases of system o r  equipment 
acquisistion because adequate consideration had not 
been given to the systematic cohesion of a l l  the e le-  
ments of logistics and follow-on support of the equip- 
ment when i t  becomes operational. " 
General Meyer's statement i s  pertinent f o r  two 
reasons.  F i r s t  there  i s  a lack of real is t ic  consider- 
ation of the total life cycle f o r  hardware and systems,  
resulting in logistic support problems and additive 
cos ts  that need not exist. In a sense that i s  what h a s  
motivated this symposium. Second, there  needs to be 
a systematic merger  of the elements  of support ear ly  
enough in programs evolution to preclude the generation 
of la rge  additive costs .  
the topic of this afternoon's session. 
This integration activity is 
The cost  picture i s  a n  old s tory but i t  may bear  
repeating. 
Each y e a r  approximately one fourth of the nation's 
defense budget i s  allocated to the logistic support of 
operational programs.  
remained fair ly  stable f o r  more  than five y e a r s .  
fiscal 1966, the Department of Defense O&M budget, 
which includes these costs ,  was  estimated a t  $ 12.  5 
billion. 
i t  to t e r m s  of our  individual pocketbooks. It repre-  
sen ts  a n  expense of more  than $ 1 3 5  p e r  y e a r  for  
every man, woman and child in  this country. 
This budget percentage h a s  
F o r  
This figure i s  more meaningful if we convert 
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oIt is worthwhile for us to look at what makes up
the total. One billion is provided to train military
and civilian personnel to operate and maintain mate-
rial. An estimated $ 400 million is used to purchase
technical manuals. Approximately $ 2.75 billion is
required to pay the salaries of the 300,000 civilians
(civil service and contractor employees)who operate
and maintain equipment in support of uniformed per-
sonnel. Nearly $ 8 billion is allocated annually to
manage the spare and repair parts inventory and for
the maintenance of equipment and facilities. These
costs are significant. But we should note that they
are usually termed additive costs and that they do
not include other logistic support costs which are
incurred in product acquisition. For example, they
do not include the acquisition cost for initial spare
and repair parts or associated documentation; they
do not include the initial investment in support equip-
ment and facilities; they do not include the cost of
maintenance planning and analysis, intended to pro-
vide for an adequate support environment. Some
people estimate that these costs raise the grand total
of dollars involved to more than half of the defense
budget.
Needless to say, in a cost conscious economy,
these costs are receiving considerable attention. For
at least two years there has been a deliberate effort
to improve, reduce, or eliminate the cost of techni-
cal data without degrading the flow of essential in-
formation. Within the past year the Department of
Defense has reorganized its approach to materiel
maintenance for purposes of cost reduction. We are
beginning to realize the impact of new concepts of
item entry control and federal inventory management,
both largely precipitated by cost reduction goals.
Just three months ago, the Government embarked on
a major examination of the effectiveness of training
concepts and practices. Here too, the cost of train-
ing is a major consideration.
In addition ot these efforts new contracting tech-
niques include life cycle costing, total package pro-
curement, and step-by-step program definition. All
of them are in a sense the result of an increasing
sensitivity to the cost of support.
Separately, or together, these techniques will
reduce the future cost of support. However, to exe-
cute them effectively it is essential that materiel
support be conceived as an integrated discipline and
that the planning for it start well back in the begin-
ning stages of the hardware development cycle. This
is the second part of General Meyer's statement.
In the program manager's world, already re-
plete with terms like maintainability, supportability,
and reliability, integrated logistic support is the
newest concept for obtaining an improved support
posture.
Like the "abilities, " integrated logistic support
has almost as many definitions as it has users. The
definition most widely read is that in Department of
Defense Directive 4100.35. There the definition reads
"a composite of the elements necessary to assure the
effective and economical support of a system or equip-
ment at all levels of maintenance for its programmed
life cycle. It is characterized by the harmony and co-
herence obtained between each of its elements and
levels of maintenance. "
The DOD directive lists the elements of integrated
logistic support as: Planned maintenance ... Logistic
Support Personnel ... Technical Logistic Data and
Information... Support Eq'aipment... Spare and Repair
Parts... Facilities... Contractor Maintenance.
These terms become more meaningful when we
look at the definitions of each of them.
1. Planned Maintenance -- The philosophy, plan,
and procedures related to the management, accom-
plishment, and quality control of preventive and cor-
rective maintenance at each level to retain material
in a serviceable condition or restore it to an operable
condition once it has failed. Planned maintenance
includes servicing, repair, inspection, corrosion
control, testing, calibration, overhaul, modification,
handling, and storage.
2. Logistic Support Personnel --Qualitative
and quantitativeskill,performance requirements,
and standards; training requirements, standards,
curricula and devices; human factors engineering
requirements; personnel protection, including safety,
survival, clothing, escape and rescue and stress
pertaining to the system or equipment under develop-
ment.
3. Technical Logistic Data and Information -- In-
cludes, but is not limited to, production and engineer-
ing data, prints and drawings; documents such as
standards, specifications, technical manuals; changes
and modifications; inspection and testing procedures;
performance and failure data; or other forms of tech-
nical logistic data and information acquired from con-
tractors, prepared by the Military Departments, or
obtained from other Government Departments and
Agencies.
4. Support Equipment -- Equipment such as
special purpose vehicles, power units, maintenance
stands, test equipment, special tools, and test benches
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usedtofacilitateorsupportmaintenanceactions,
detector diagnosemalfunctions,or monitorthe
operationalstatusof systems,subsystems,or equip-
ments.
5. Spares and Repair Parts -- Spares are com-
ponents or assemblies used for maintenance replace-
ment purposes in major end items of equipment. Re-
pair Parts are those "bits and pieces," e. g., indi-
vidual parts or nonreparable assemblies required
for the repair of spares or major end items.
6. Facilities -- Physical plants such as real
estate and improvements thereto, including buildings
and associated equipment which are required for or
contribute to system or equipment maintenance activ-
ities.
7. Contract Maintenance -- That maintenance
(i.e., modification modernization, rebuild, overhaul,
repair or servicing of materiel) performed under con-
tract by commercial organizations (including original
manufacturers) on a one-time or continuing basis
without distinction as to the level of maintenance.
Included in this term is that contracting for services
to augment military capability for the direct mainte-
nance support of materiel.
At this point you might ask: "What's new?" The
novelty is in the emphasis being placed upon the inte-
gration of the elements of support and the timing of
the support consideration.
Historically the support consideration has been
late, costly and frequently ill-matched for its intended
purpose. Much of this has been due to the method of
contracting. Spares, training, support equipment,
and other operational requirements were specified
and procured after the design was firm and to accom-
modate that design as it went to production. More
often than not each support element was procured under
a separate contract.
Equally significant has been an environment
wherein those responsible for the development pro-
curement had no responsibility for the production pro-
curement. They, therefore, were either unapprecia-
tive of or unconcerned with the gain to be realized
in giving greater weight to operational requirements
during the design of a basic system.
The logic of the timing of the support consider-
ation is simple. More time is available in the con-
ceptual or contract definition phase of hardware
development to seek optimum relationships between
systems readiness requirements and total systems
costs. The analysis and fix can also be done at less
cost. Any change or addition to the system package
made after the production of hardware begins is an
accommodation and will cost more.
I will not pursue the subject of timing or schedule
beyond those statements since I know that the follow-
ing speakers will discuss it in more detail.
Up to this point we have reviewed the elements of
support, looked at their current and recent costs, and
noted that the Department of Defense has entered into
a concerted and vigorous effort to improve logistic
support planning and implementation. The goals are
set forth in formal statements of policy.
The impact of DODts effort, in which industry
cooperates, will be far reaching upon contractors
and procurement agencies alike, especially in terms
of systems acquisition and management. Signalling
these developments are current RFP's for major mili-
tary contracts, calling increasingly for logistic sup-
port planning in earlier development stages, in far
more extensive detail, and with far greater cohesive-
ness than ever before.
A recent Air Force project, for example, called
for a detailed material support plan to be prepared as
a CDP task, but also required detailed discussion of
logistics concepts in the management section of the
pre-CDP proposal.
A recent Army solicitation specifically calls out
an early support plan as a CDP requirement. "The
plan shall include an analysis of the (system) support
requirements and a comprehensive program for con-
tractor support beginning with the development phase
and extending into the acquisition and operation phases
until such time sufficient records and support items
are on hand in the supply system to enable the Army
to take over full uninterrupted support. "
There are many similar statements including the
guidance provided in DOD's CDP guide. All indicate
that there is a change in the ground rules for approach-
ing support considerations. If confirmation of this is
needed or of DOD's intent to implement their plan it
is easily found in The Honorable Paul R. Ignatius's
statements to the DOD Equipment Maintenance and
Readiness Council: "It is clear that industry must be
organized to respond effectively to the qualitative and
quantitative support requirements levied on it... " My
office will assess this response through our Program
of Contractor Performance Evaluation... "
Gentlemen, I have defined the subject of this ses-
sion. To do so, I have freely plagiarized the litera-
ture. My objective was to facilitate communications.
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OurnextspeakerisMajorGeneralJ. J. Cody,
DeputyChiefofStaffor SystemsatAFSC.General
Codyis goingto discussthesignificanceofpreplan-
ningsupportandits placeinaprogramschedule.
Hiswealthoffieldexperiencein thehousing,serv-
icing,andlaunchingof largeboosters,admirably
qualifieshimfor thetopic.
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PRE-PNNNING LOGlSTlCS SUPPORT: MAJOR GENERAL JOSEPH J. CODY, J R . ,  USAF, Deputy c/S 
for  Systems, ; A i r  Force  Systems Command, has  a 
B. Sc. in  physics f rom St. Mary 's  University, San 
Antonio, and is a graduate of the A i r  War College. 
He served during WW I1 in Europe with the 70th Fight- 
e r  Wing; participated in  R & D nuclear testing projects; 
had several  ARDC assignments; was Commanding 
General, 6595th Aerospace Test Wing; and Vice Com- 
mander, Space Systems Division, BSD. He directed 
more  than 100 field tests of Thor, Atlas, Titan, and 
Minuteman systems.  He holds the Bronze Star ,  
Legion of Merit,  and Belgian F o w r a g e r e .  
About a month ago, your conference chairman 
kindly forwarded me a suggested topical outline of a l l  
the speeches to be  used a t  this symposium. Naturally 
I read f i r s t  the suggested outline assigned to me. Then 
I read the preceding and succeeding outlines to place 
my outline in perspective. I couldn't help but notice 
that a l l  the preceding speeches had as their  key words: 
"importance of, " "need to, It  objectives of, and the 
like. The key words in my outline were  "show how, " 
and "relate how. I' That makes the subject of my talk 
rea l  straightforward: how do you plan for  logistic 
support. 
A s  i s  obvious to you al l ,  there  i s  no simple form- 
ula by which we can satisfy such a requirement. Yet 
by looking at various facets  of the requirement we can 
develop a n  approach to the solution. The approach I 
will develop f o r  you will naturally be the one we have 
acquired in our A i r  Force  experience. 
Before addressing the "how" and "what" aspects ,  
let me discuss f o r  a moment the "who" of planning 
logistic support. As you know, we call M r .  Respon- 
sible--the System Program Director, or m-rely the 
SPD. We have made his  mission as simple as we 
possibly could. We have condensed i t  down to four 
words. All that i s  expected of him i s  that he "accom- 
plish system program objectives. 
himself with those people who have the necessary 
knowledge, and the necessary authority to input their  
He has to surround 
knowledge into sys tems management. 
of people, of course,  i s  the System Program Office, 
o r  simply SPO. 
ability requires  him to place l imit less  t rus t  in 
his  c rea tures ,  to the effect that each knows h is  area 
perfectly, and makes his  input to a perfect degree, in 
a timely manner, and on a fully coordinated basis .  
This collection 
Mr .  SPD's a r t  of infinite management 
These specialists who constitute the SPO are not 
a l l  f rom the A i r  Force  Systems Command--since the 
SPD's mission ( i .  e . ,  to  accomplish sys tem program 
objectives) is a statement f rom higher headquarters, 
e i ther  Headquarters USAF o r  even OSD. 
i s t s  will therefore  be drawn f rom other  elements of 
the A i r  Force  o r  even other  branches of the Govern- 
ment. 
The special- 
The logistics specialty i s  a par t icular  c a s e  in 
point. The very grea t  majority of work we do in the 
A i r  Force  under the sys tems management concept 
ends up as  a continuing inventory item-- such as the 
B-52 fleet o r  the North American Air  Defense com- 
plex a t  Cheyenne Mountain. We in the Systems Com- 
mand are no longer responsible f o r  these products. 
Operational responsibility i s  vested in  a using activ- 
ity. 
Air  Force  Logistics Command. Yet a t  a cer ta in  point 
in  t ime past they were  Systems Command's responsi- 
bility--both f rom a tes t  inventory and f rom a logistic 
support standpoint. 
Logistic support responsibility i s  vested in the 
This means that there  was a point 
26 
min time when logistic support responsibility for these
now inventoried items was transferred from Systems
Command to Logistics Command. It means also that
we have a twofold logistic support responsibility to
worry about in the Air Force; namely, one during ac-
quisition, and another during operational employment.
I would suggest that the former aspect--logistic sup-
port during acquisition--is more comparable to the
type of logistic support that goes on in NASA.
The final question on "who" is, "how do we mean
to accomplish this dual logistics job?" In both cases we
do it through the SPO. The personnel complement to
accomplish the logistic support during acquisition
comes from Systems Command; it comes from Logis-
tics Command for support during operational employ-
ment. Logistics Command representation in the SPO
starts in the earliest days of the SPO so that (a) his
voice is heard from the earliest days in development
of logistics concepts and plans, and (b) the transfer of
responsibility I referred to above is as smooth a transi-
tion as is possible. We will see shortly how the exten-
sive capability of Systems Commandis brought to bear
on the logistic support problem Juring acquisition. In
similar fashion, the massive depot capability of the I_-
gistics Command is brought to bear on logistic support
during operation due to the early participation of Lo-
gistics Comma.ld in the systems maaagement process.
Now let's get closer to the immediate subject of
how we plan for logistics support in systems manage-
ment.
The very word "system" has a dual connotation:
one of pieces, the other of integration of these pieces.
Each of these pieces has a function to perform and
interfaces to satisfy. When any function or interface
is awry, the system can at best attain only partial
mission capability. I would call your attention to the
fact that this interrelationship is not just one of physical
pieces of equipment, one to another; it is also the
interrelationship of functional disciplines such as reli-
ability, maintainability, and logistics. The question,
then, is how do we decide what these equipments should
be, what are their interfaces, and what is their inter-
relationship with any given functional discipline.
The name of this process is systems engineering.
A design engineer is concerned with the detail design
of end items and components, either from a pure de-
sign standpoint or from the standpoint of one of the
specialties such as logistics. But this type of activity
is far, far down the pike in relation to what is initially
required of the system engineer. The system engineer
must look to total system design to satisfy a stated
sst__requirement. The system engineer must con-
sider military and economic, as well as technical
variables, and how the change in any aspect of one
affects the other variables. His major design decisions
at the system level will not be validated until years
hence when system tests have proven the adequacy of
the detailed design and production specifications at
the end item level which are based on his system design
decision.
None of this is to say that the system engineer
should divorce himself from the design engineer, or
the logistician, or any other of the design specialists.
It is absolutely essential for the system engineer to
recognize the predominant and highly complementary
role played by all the design specialists in satisfying
the need for total system design. It is not the function
of the system engineer to constrain technical thought
of these specialists. The interplay between the system
engineer and the design specialists requires the closest
coordination. Even in the initial effort to translate
the requirement document into a gross system speci-
fication, the system engineer has to look forward to
the point in time when the design specialists will have
to do the detailed engineering and when the results
of all detailed engineering will have to interface to
satisfy his system specification requirement.
In the systems engineering process the system
operational requirements are first translated into basic
functional operations. From these a block flow diagram
is created which depicts the various sequential and
parallel relationships. Note that this brings us only
to functional design, not hardware design. It is very
easy for the system engineer to become a design
specialist at this point and shape design solutions on
his preconceived notions. At best his preconceived
design solution is a first hypothesis for drawing the
parameters around the eventual solution.
As a second step the system engineer proceeds
to analyze each functional operation and associated
criteria to determine the design requirements neces-
sary to satisfy the operation, including interfaces
between operations.
A design approach is then selected and trade-off
studies of functions, alternate functions, and sequence
of functions are conducted. It is here that the various
design specialists have a paramount role. For example,
a maintenance design analysis is conducted to determine
what maintenance functions must be performed. The
maintenance concepts of the requirement document are
further defined and detailed into specific levels of
maintenance and the determination of required end
items and components. This maintenance analysis is
iterated to reflect later decisions in maintenance de-
sign or concept, such as unavailability of adequate
test equipment for predicted fault isolation.
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The fourth and final generic step of the systems
engineering process is to integrate and group design
requirements wherever possible to provide design
requirements for specific items.
The entire systems engineering process is re-
peated and refined as many times as necessary to
obtain the required level of information for detailed
design and development of each end item, and as
many times as necessary to assure an integrated
design.
The same systems engineering procedure is
followed at each succeeding level required to define
and design the system. There are, of course, inter-
actions and feedbacks between levels as the cycle is
rcpcatcd.
Then, too, as systems engineering proceeds, in
addition to refinement of information on and between
initially predicted end items, additional requirements
and functions are generated resulting from the specific
techniques or device selected. These, in turn, again
cause an iteration of the entire systems engineering
process.
The systems engineering process cannot, and
obviously will not make logistic support decisions--
any more than it will make engineering decisions.
But it does provide a basis for the decisions and pro-
vides a discipline for maintaining a system perspec-
tive across end items and across functional special-
ities. It establishes a single source of standardized
series of engineering reference points or baselines
which are based on the progressive and evolutionary
development of specifications which, in turn, are a
forcing function upon design.
If I seem to have wandered somewhat far from
the subject of how to pre-plan logistics support, let
me bring you back into the corral with two references
from the preceding speaker's text. First, he quoted
the following from the Logistics Director for the
Joint Chiefs of Staff: "Logistic support problems and
added costs have been generated during the conceptual,
design, and production phases of system or equipment
acquisition because adequate consideration had not
been given to the systematic cohesion of all the ele-
ments of logistics and follow-on support of the equip-
mentwhenit becomes operational." Second, Mr.
Johnson stated: "lIistorically the support consider-
ationhas been late, costly, and frequently ill-matched
for its intendcd purpose. Much of this has been duc
to the method of contracting. Spares, training, sup-
port equipmcnt and other operational requirements
were specified and procured after the design was
firm and to accommodate that design as it went into
production. " By way of contrast to this historical
method alluded to by Mr. Johnson, I bring to your
attention the Total Package Procurement Concept
that was used on the C-5 program where proposals
were required at the end of the contractors' definition
effort covering not just design and development, but
also production and logistic support costs.
Returning to the systems engineering process,
a technical baseline will have been established at the
end of the process. We refer to it as our program re-
quirements baseline. This technical baseline has to
be supplemented with other data, primarily the system
package documentation, to constitute the total base-
line. It is through the system package documentation
that required technical developments are married to
the other two parameters of cost and schedule. The
pace quickens, not only to accomplish this marriage,
but also to develop all the necessary implementing
documents which will describe the specific actions
necessary to implement the logic of the systems
engineering process. Let's follow this through several
examples.
As a result of the systems engineering process
the person in the SPO charged with responsibility
for management of the test program has made his
initial determination of test requirements -- whether
any test is required, the type (qualification, prepro-
duction, individual acceptance, sampling), the "how"
(parameters to be used, inspections required, cri-
teria of failure), instrumentation and facilities re-
quired, and the like.
The test plan is the next step, a logical expansion
of the test program requirements which, in turn,
were built on the systems engineering process. A
portion of the test program requirements is levied
on appropriate test agencies -- our test centers and
ranges for example. They each develop the plan
appropriate to their assigned portion of the test pro-
gram, including inspection and test procedures,
utilization of or requirement for new support equip-
ment and facilities, degree of contract maintenance
required, plans for acquiring trained in-house logis-
tic support personnel, method of accumulating or ver-
ifying performance and failure data. These and sim-
ilar factors can be planned only generically against
the program requirements baseline at the beginning
of the definition phase. It is only through a strong
and continuing relationship between the Test Force
Director at the range -- who is responsible for devel-
opment of the test plan and for the actual conduct of
the test -- and the test manager in the SPO who is
responsible for the overall test program -- it is only
through their continuing relationship that these generic
test factors can be translated into detailed integrated
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test and test support requirements toward the end of
the definition phase. It is important to note here that
all this transpires prlor to inception of design and
development, even before letting the contract for de-
sign and development. All the foreseeable require-
ments dictated by the test program, as stated by the
Test Force Directors themselves, are in the hands
of the SPO so that an integrated test plan can be de-
veloped and issued prior to initiation of production.
We know, then, not only what we want (from the de-
sign requirements baseline) but, also, how to prove
we in fact received everything we asked for (from
the detailed integrated test plans).
Lest I leave the impression that the test program
is so perfectly planned that the Test Force Director's
job is one of monotonous routine, let me share a
few reminiscences from my days in that phase of the
business. Keep in mind that the name of this speech
is pre-planning logistic support. First, the tester's
primary job is not to make the system work; it is
to see if the system meets its specification require-
ments. That doesn't mean that the Test Director
deliberately aborts the missions as soon as he dis-
covers a variance from the plan. He must continu-
ously make the distinction, however, between whether
the system works as planned and whether he can make
it work. Testers are ingenious with the jumpers --
but while this may ( or may not!) make the mission
go, it bears only a far-fetched relationship to proof
of engineering design. Second, the test site is not
a true replica of the real operational environment.
If the tester with his ingenuity and model shop back-
up can make the system work, this is no proof that
the operational troops (who lack this support) can
make it work. Third, the tester likes to believe
he is testing what is going to be put in the hands of
the troops. This is not necessarily true. He is
more often than not behind the power curve. His
aerospace ground equipment is not system-peculiar.
His technical manuals, if available at all, do not
match the equipment. Through his liaison with the
SPO the tester knows of many updating changes that
have been approved but have not been incorporated
into the test article. Fourth, among his other ob-
jectives the tester is looking beyond the development
test he is conducting and is attempting to effect a
smooth transition to the follow-on operational test
which will be conducted by the user. The user as
well as Logistics Command and the Training Command
are always looking over the Test Director's shoulder
to assure the system documentation is honest and the
test is being conducted as planned.
If the test program has been conducted strictly
according to the book, the deployment process should
be a natural and relatively simple follow-on. The
more the test program deviates from the test plan,
however, the more we have to undertake initial
testing at the deployment sites. This is just an
additional complicating factor. There are adequate
planning problems in the deployment phase indepen-
dent of playing catch-up to the test program deficien-
cies. A complete plan is required for each site: not
just prime mission equipment, but government furn-
ished equipment, spares, test equipment, and tooling;
detailed procedures and technical manuals for assem-
bling, calibrating, and checking out the equipments;
an overall schedule for activation and turnover to the
using command -- including the long lead-time facil-
ities and the continuous flow of updating changes.
Some of my reminiscences of encounters I had
with deployment site Commanders I will leave with
you in the form of questions. Has total system veri-
fication been accomplished through the test program?
Since every site is different, how different is the
configuration of this site from the verified system?
Is the configuration at this site the same as that which
was tested -- including update changes? If not, what
is the real significance of all lights green? What
degree of validity do we assign to a site test anyhow
since it can only be a simulated one?
This havoc created by inadequate planning for lo-
gistic support of the test program also shows in the
training area when the troops, conducting their oper-
ational test, see equipment that is substantively dif-
ferent in many areas from what they encountered
either in observing the development test or in under-
going their training on simulators. Obviously the
training curricula and procedures, and the develop-
ment of quantitative and qualitative skills must be
keyed to training devices that adequately represent
operational equipment.
If adequate planning for logistic support of the test
program is so paramount to the discharge of the
Systems Command mission, it is no less paramount
to the using command and the Logistics Command.
The using command looks to our development test
program as both proofing of many aspects of their
operational employment concepts (unit maintenance,
availability, reliability and the like) and as a prelude
to what they can expect when it is their turn to conduct
the operational test. Likewise the Logistics Command
looks to our development test program as both the
proving ground for their maintenance planning con-
cepts (depot and base maintenance smoothly transit-
ioning from the contractor; spares and technical data
complementing the planned maintenance and inspection
concept; performance, failure, and usage data ade-
quate for supply actions) and as a prelude to what they
can expect when they inherit engineering responsi-
bility and the configuration management function from
the Systems Command.
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It has been our experience in Systems Command
that there is no known substitute for a thorough sys-
tems engineering analysis beginning in the concept
formulation stage in order to achieve either system
integrity or integrated logistic support. But this is
only the beginning. Logistic support must continue
to be a concern through feasibility studies, prepara-
tion of the request-for-proposal, bidders' conference,
contract negotiations, and in-process reviews and
inspections.
If systems engineering provides the technical
baseline for these logistic support actions, the sys-
tems management documentation (or progressively
the Preliminary Technical Development Plan, Pro-
posed System Package Plan, and System Package
Program) provide the vehicle for integration of these
logistic support actions into the overall cost and
schedule for the total program. Not only is the cost
of developing integrated logistic support inherent in
the overall cost for delivery of an operationally
effective system; this logistic support cost could well
be a major determinant in whether or not program
go-ahead is received. This system program docu-
mentation, I remind you, is the package which Systems
Command must submit to higher headquarters in
order to obtain a go-ahead on any Air Force system
program. The system program documentation must,
and in fact does reflect the best thinking of all partic-
ipants in the SPO -- not just Systems Command, but
Logistics Command, Training Command, and the
using command. The system program documentation,
however, is only a small -- although consolidated --
portion of the overall planning (test plans, standard
item procurement plans, training plans, materiel
support plans, deployment plans, transportation
plans, and on ad infinitum) that has been undertaken.
No one person knows all this -- not even Mr. SPD.
Recall, he is not expected to have the infinite know-
ledge of God, only His management ability to tie it
all together and implement it once it is approved.
In my opening remarks I related that your con-
ference chairman gave me a suggested outline of show
how, discuss how, and relate how one plans for lo-
gistic support. To prevent me from being carried
away, however, either by pure theory or personal
reminiscences, he added a final topic: Present sup-
port planning checklist for use by program managers.
He would not give me authority though to preempt the
time allotted to the next two speakers or to this even-
ing's social hour to accomplish this.
There is no such thing as a checklist which can
be used across the board on any and all programs.
For example, there is no requirement for unconvent-
ional storage of ammunition at a radar warning site,
and we haven't been able to employ the same trans-
portation mode in getting a Minuteman to its site
as we do in getting a C-t41 from the contractor's
plant. But we have not abandoned the concept of a
checklist because of variations in different kinds of
systems. I will conclude by very briefly telling you
about two such lists.
Approximately three months ago we issued a
manual titled "System Program Management Pro-
cedures." Its code number is AFSCM 375-4. It
gives a chronological roadmap of all the major events
that take place along the total life cycle. It is an
event-type checklist and is sowritten that no two
different specialists arrive at the same inferences
at any given event. Take, for example, the event
titled, Conduct Preliminary Design Review. The
aerodynamicist and the maintenance engineer have
a completely different perspective in accomplishing
their respective roles at this event. This manual,
AFSCM 375-4 is available through publications
channels or from the Superintendent of Documents
at the Government Printing Office.
The other list is not as accessible to you. It
originated as part of a Memorandum of Agreement
between Systems Command and Logistics Command
some two years ago where we were sorting out the
logistic tasks that were the responsibility of one or
the other command; that is, logistic support during
acquisition and logistic support during operational
employment. It is some 25 pages long, covering
specific tasks in the areas of maintenance, supply,
transportation, training, and technical manuals.
Each area is separately divided into the acquisition
support tasks of Systems Command and the operat-
ional support tasks of Logistics Command. This
list is in the process of being converted to a joint
AFSC/AFLC regulation. It will then, of course, be
available through publications channels. As an in-
terim measure I have provided the conference chair-
man a copy of this list to be incorporated into the
symposium brochure. You can peruse it at your con-
venience .",_
",_ See Appendices A and B
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THE TECHNICAL PHILOSOPHY OF SUPPORT: REAR ADMIRAL! JOHN P. SAGER, USN, Assistant 
Commander for  Material Acquisition, Naval Ai r  
Systems Command, received University of Michigan 
BS and MS engineering degrees;  completed Pensacola 
flight training and was commissioned Ensign. Pre- 
WW I1 had squadron, flight instructor, engineering, 
and experimental assignments. During WW 11, f o r  
combat duty in the Pacific, he received the Air  Medal 
and Legion of Merit.  He had numerous CONUS and 
foreign assignments before h i s  present  assignment. 
Gentlemen, I appreciate and welcome the oppor- 
tunity to participate in this F i r s t  Annual Logistics 
Management Symposium. The previous discussions 
this aiternoon by M r .  Carpenter. and General Cody 
about integrated support and the degree to which pre-  
planning support make possible the intermesh with 
program scheduling provide a launching pad o r  plat- 
f o r m  from which I shall explore and share  with you 
my concept of the technical philosophy of support. 
Simply stated, our  support philosophy re la tes  to 
the methods by which we determine, plan, procure, 
and distribute the total spectrum of logistic-support 
resources  - mater ia l ,  manpower, facilities, and 
serv ices  - in  the quantities required, at the time 
required, and a t  places where needed so as to operate 
and maintain weapon sys tems in a fully configured, 
combat-ready, mission-capable s ta te  of readiness. 
The Navy long ago adopted the philosophy that 
Naval a i rc raf t  aboard ship must be supported logistic- 
ally while the ship i s  underway a t  sea ,  and that land- 
based patrol-type a i rc raf t  must be supported in  t ime 
of w a r  f r o m  far-flung advanced bases ,  while patrol 
seaplanes must be supported f rom those ships which 
are designated by the Navy as seaplane tenders .  
Having adopted the concept of mobile advanced/ 
underway Fleet  support for  Naval a i rcraf t ,  the Navy 
then had to  resolve the question of what program would 
be undertaken to support such a philosophy. In other 
words, how could we do i t?  
I s tar ted my naval aviation c a r e e r  as a patrol 
seaplane pilot and, therefore, consider myself 
qualified to address  the specific subject of patrol 
aircraft. support; which I should like to discuss f i r s t .  
Patrol a i rc raf t  do far-ranging aer ia l  support of the 
surface Fleet  and in more  recent  y e a r s  have been 
specifically assigned the function of anti-submarine 
warfare duties. Anti-submarine warfare ,  commonly 
referred to as ASW, constitutes one of the Navy's 
top-priority efforts. 
F o r  many years ,  Navy patrol-type a i rc raf t  have 
been large multi-engine aircraf t ,  which can operate 
either f rom the sea (an example being the Martin P-5  
flying boats which are flying over the South China 
Sea today) o r  f rom land bases  (examples  being the 
Lockheed P-2V o r  the newer turbo-prop multi-engine 
Lockheed Electra-type P-3's). Our P-2's and P-3's 
a r e  a lso operating in Vietnamese airspaces .  
In 1957, the Navy decided to buy a military ver-  
sion of the highly successful Lockheed Electra. De- 
signated the P-3, this a i rc raf t  has four turboprop 
Allison engines and has  remarkable performance 
and reliability. 
When the Navy initially bought the P-3, insufficient 
funds were available to purchase a l l  the a i rc raf t  re -  
quired and a t  the same time procure a full range of 
supporting equipment - what the Air  Force  knows as  
AGE and what the Navy has  long known as ground- 
support equipment (GSE).  Not only were the a i rc raf t  
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FIGURE 1. LOCKHEED P-2V AIRCRAFT 
-1 
FIGURE 2 .  LOCKHEED P-3 AIRCRAFT 
extremely expensive, compared to the old P-2 's ,  but 
a l so  the ground-support equipment was very costly. 
This  GSE usually includes not only field engine- 
s tar t ing equipment, liquid-oxygen-servicing equip- 
ment, electrical and radio-test equipment, but a l so  
specialized avionic tes t  equipment required to tes t  
and check the ASW gear  in the airplane, as well as 
special engine stands, engine tools, engine stands 
peculiar to the a i rplanes,  and other  supporting an-  
c i l lary equipment. 
A s  a general practice, the Navy has  always de- 
ployed a land-based patrol-plane squadron to a fixed 
base such as Sangley Point, near  Manila in the 
Philippines, and then after a six-to-nine months 
period of deployment, relieve the squadron on station 
by another squadron flying out f rom continental 
United States. 
full range of shops and supporting equipment to main- 
tain the aircraf t .  
The fixed base almost  always has  a 
Our limited funding of the P-3 presented a ser- 
ious dilemma to the Navy. We were  able  to afford 
only one full set of ground-support equipment f o r  
each squadron. A P-3 squadron usually has  a total 
of nine aircraft. Although we generally deploy a n  
ent i re  squadron as a unit, say, to the Philippines o r  
Alaska, we frequently find i t  necessary t o  send a 
smal l  detachment of three a i rc raf t  to  a n  advanced 
base a considerable distance f r o m  the rest of the 
squadron. The problem then becomes, how can we 
divide our  limited range of equipment to support the 
a i rc raf t  in two separate  locations? The a i rc raf t  at 
home must have ground-support equipment as  must 
the advanced-base unit. 
the s i x  planes remaining at the fixed base, has  the 
advantage of the shops a t  that base;  yet  they a l s o  
need the ground-support equipment, especially that 
par t icular  gear  which must 60 with the a i rc raf t ,  such 
as s tar t ing car t s ,  tow bars ,  work stands, and special 
engine tools. 
The main group, that i s ,  
Before the acceleration of the  w a r  in  Viet Nam, 
the Navy was using a program policy of supporting 
its land-based patrol a i rc raf t  f r o m  three major  
locations in  the Western Pacific. One en t i re  squad- 
ron operated out of Southern Japan, one f rom Okinawa, 
and one f rom a location in the Philippines. It became 
quickly apparent after the Tonkin Gulf incident that 
the Navy must support i t s  land patrol-type a i rc raf t ,  
not f rom three bases ,  but f rom five, and this require- 
ment immediately created a severe  logistics problem 
f r o m  the simple standpoint of the supporting equip- 
ment. 
We approached the problem by two methods. One 
w a s  the use  of air-transportable vans; and the other 
w a s  t o  use  what we cal l  pack-up kits. The van con- 
cept  consis ts  of two vans, one with a full range of 
e lectronics  tes t  equipment; the othei. is a mechanical- 
repair-shop van. In addition to the vans, we develop- 
ed  a n  air-liftable pack-up kit containing a full range 
of high-usage s p a r e s  support, which included not only 
electronics  and engine accessor ies  spares ,  but a l so  
wheels, t i res ,  propel lers ,  bat ter ies ,  fuel f i l ters ,  
s t a r t e r s ,  and such. These pack-up kits were  capable 
of being lifted in the bomb bays of one of the a i rc raf t  
being deployed so that the equipment would be avail- 
able  on s i te  at the advanced base.  Thus, if the squad- 
ron were  based a t  the Naval Air  Station, Kodiak, 
Alaska, we could deploy a detachment f o r  anindefinite 
period to a n  advanced base, by using the air- t rans-  
portable vans and kits. Naturally, we have problems, 
such as a n  urgent  requirement for  a i r  conditioning 
in  high-humidity areas like Viet Nam and the Philip- 
pines. Our electronic tes t  equipment cannot survive 
without air conditioning. 
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Our van and pack-up kit concept has  worked well, 
and the Navy i s  using this technique today in  meeting 
its mission requirements  f o r  land-based patrol air- 
c raf t  in  the South China Sea and off-shore operations 
in  Vietnamese Waters .  
that you see r e f e r r e d  to  in the weekly news magazines 
are a definite program being c a r r i e d  out by the Navy 
patrol-type a i rc raf t .  This  responsibility i s  pr imari ly  
junk surveillance and positive identification of all 
vesse ls  operating in the waters  surrounding Viet Nam 
including the South China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. 
The "Market Time Operations" 
I mentioned our  patrol seaplanes ear l ie r .  Figure 
3 i s  of a P-5 seaplane. 
engine seaplanes do not have the range that our  newer 
P-3 turboprop a i rc raf t  have. We are therefore oper- 
ating o u r  Martin P-5 type seaplanes from tenders  which 
are based in  locations adjacent to  the coast  of Viet 
Nam, such as Cam Run Bay, which you can see and 
hear  about in the news on TV. 
These older  reciprocating 
FIGURE 3. MARTIN P-5 SEAPLANE 
Figure 4 i s  of the USS Currituck, AV-7, a sea- 
plane tender. 
Crews sleep on board the tender and take their  meals  
there .  All engine changes plus hull and other repairs ,  
are provided by the ship, another example of our  concept 
of underway support. The Navy considers  its patrol 
seaplane operations in  Viet Nam waters  to be highly 
successful. 
The a i rc raf t  moor to  buoys nearby. 
Figure 5 shows a P-5 seaplane being hoisted out 
of the water  onto the fantail of the ship. 
I spoke earlier about the Navy's philosophy of 
underway support f o r  carr ier-based aircraf t .  
6 depicts one of our big carriers being replenished 
at s e a .  
o r  a n  ammunition ship, o r  one of our  new multi- 
purpose logistic vessels  such as the USS Mars  o r  USS 
Figure 
The logistic-support vessel  may be a tanker 
FIGURE 4. USS CURRITUCK, 
AV-7 SEAPLANE TENDER 
FIGURE 5. P-5 SEAPLANE BEING HOISTED 
ONTO USS CURRITUCK 
Sacramento. These la t ter  two vessels  are fast under- 
way replenishment ships  which a r e  combination tankers  
carrying fuel and black oil, as well a s  a i rc raf t  je t  
engines and a i r f rame spares  such as landing gear ,  
wing panels, propel lers ,  cockpit enclosures, o r  tail 
hooks, in addition to general supply i tems,  pro- 
visions, and ship-system spare  par t s .  
Our carr ier-based a i rc raf t  a r e  fully maintained 
aboard ship. We service the a i rc raf t  between s t r ikes  
over Southeast Asia, changing engines, helicopter 
blades, o r  guns, when necessary.  Ranger was on 
the line f o r  58 days in  the South China Sea. It i s  
common f o r  our  c a r r i e r s  to operate 30 to 40 days 
without going into port. A full range of high-usage 
spare i tems  i s  aboard each a i rc raf t  c a r r i e r .  To 
determine effectively how much logistic support we 
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FIGURE 6 .  REPLENISHING SHIPS A T  SEA 
must  provide and which are the high-usage items, 
we must re fer  to our  established cr i te r ia  f o r  t ime 
between overhaul, o r  TBO as  we know it, f o r  a l l  the 
a i rc raf t  components. A je t  engine in a fighter, for  
example, has a reliability overhaul interval of apprc- 
ximately 1500 hours. During the accumulation of 
this 1500-hour cycle, we change turbine blades, fuel 
controls, combustion-chamber l iners ,  and perform 
other  minor maintenance. 
a i rc raf t  whether i t  i s  a prop o r  a jet, we must think 
in t e r m s  of the i tem reliability and operating life 
between overhauls. 
into our  support philosophy and determine our  program 
policy. 
F o r  each i tem on the 
These considerations are tailored 
These support concepts which find fruition on the 
c a r r i e r  hangar deck, the advanced land base, and 
the seaplane tender must  have their  genesis far back 
in the life cycle of the aircraf t ,  the engine, and 
other  components. During the past fifty y e a r s  of 
Naval Aviation, maintainability has always been a 
requirement, but there  has  been considerable change 
in recent  years  in the manner in  which maintainability 
requirements are expressed contractually. 
Today, technical development plans and requests  
f o r  proposals stipulate f i r m  operational, maintain- 
ability, and support requirements .  
During the conceptual and design phase of weapon- 
sys tem and equipment development, the Naval Ai r  
Systems Command requi res  that the contractor give 
ser ious  consideration to those fundamental design 
parameters  which will insure  maintainability and 
supportability of the end item. To do so, the con- 
t rac tor  must have control of and remain within the 
f i r m  numerical maintainability and support constraints 
set forth in the program definition and contract. 
Maintainability therefore  becomes the foundation and 
basis  of the logistic subsystem and i s  directly related 
to sys tem effectiveness. 
Maintainability is a parameter  that must  be spec- 
ified, measured, and demonstrated. Maintainability . 
has both qualitative and quantitative character is t ics .  
These make it possib!e to meet  operational objectives 
with a minimum expenditure of resources  such as 
manpower, time, test equipment, technical data, 
mater ia l ,  and support facilities. 
Qualitative character is t ics  of maintainability 
are the direct  resul t  of management and engineering 
attention during design. A quality design ref lects  
detailed attention to the reduction of manpower and 
skill requirements  and a minimum number of special 
tools and equipment. 
The quantitative character is t ics  of maintainability 
are reflected in the operational ra te ,  operational turn- 
around-time, reaction time, and other  mission require- 
ments which can be numerically defined. 
During the design stage, the contractor  gives 
complete consideration to the operational environment, 
such as c a r r i e r  deployment, aus te re  advanced bases ,  
scat tered detachments, and major  Fleet-support 
stations. Toward insuring adequate consideration of 
the serv ice  environment, the contractor  i s  encouraged 
to famil iar ize  himself with Navy and Marine Corps 
organizational capabilities and procedures .  
ref lect  consideration of maintainability when submitting 
proposals and during the detailed design phases. 
He must 
To insure that the specified maintainability i s  
realized, the contractor  conducts design reviews 
p r i o r  to the re lease  of drawings f o r  initial fabrication 
o r  re lease  of purchase orders .  
We thus establish overall support philosophy 
concurrently with the very beginning of any develop 
ment. 
program policy as I shall now relate  in  t e r m s  of 
specific Navy examples. 
Support philosophy thus constantly governs 
Our concept of a i rc raf t  life span in the Navy i s  a 
key element of our  support philosophy. We no longer 
overhaul a i rc raf t  in the Navy. 
we do progressive a i rc raf t  rework, o r  PAR as we 
cal l  it. When a i rc raf t  were  considerably cheaper  
than they are now, by a factor  of a lmost  five, we had 
8000 to 9000 Navy a i rc raf t  instead of the 2000 to 3000 
we now have. Former ly  we could afford a long pipe- 
line of a i r c r a f t  awaiting overhaul at one of our major  
Overhaul and Repair  Depots. 
turned in an a i r c r a f t  f o r  a n  overhaul requiring f rom 
12- to -24 months, and then draw out one completely 
overhauled. In t e r m s  of today's multi-million-dollar 
supersonic a i rc raf t ,  we cannot afford to buy as many 
planes to  begin with; hence we cannot afford a long 
overhaul cycle with the large backlog of a i rc raf t .  
Instead of one overhaul taking between 5000 to 10,000 
Instead of overhaul, 
The squadron simply 
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manhours,dependinguponaircrafttype,during
abouteverythreeyearsofoperatinglife, anaircraft
is nowgivenaprogressiveaircraftreworkofabout
2000manhours,takingaboutthreetosixmonths
basedonaperiodic alendarinterval. Thisinterval
isaboutevery16-to -17monthsforourcarrier-type
aircraftand20-to -24monthsforutilityandtransport
aircraft.
The big difference in concept is not just another
way of performing rework; instead, the hard realities
of the situation are that our total aircraft inventory
is limited by high unit costs. Today, we cannot per-
mit an operating squadron to turn an aircraft into
rework (PAIR) and draw another aircraft; the squad-
ron must operate through its retraining and pre-
deployment period one or two aircraft short, depend-
ing on how many aircraft that particular squadron
has that are to receive major rework or PAR. Thus,
a 12-plane fighter squadron may have to do all its
pre-deployment gunnery training, night training,
and re-qualify its new pilots in their carrier-landing
requirements with perhaps only eight or nine air-
craft, some of which are down for other maintenance
reasons. In the PAR concept, the aircraft is brought
in at the end of the first PAR cycle of operation and
given rework which will include all the hydraulic and
flight-control systems and a major cleaning and
corrosion control. (Salt water and sulfuric acid
from the stack gases of our non-nuclear carriers do
not mix well with aluminum airframes and wing skins. )
The aircraft then goes back for an operational tour
and comes in again at a prescribed period for the
next PAR; this time the fire-control and electrical
and communications systems are given a complete
check, as well as items such as the landing gear and
other components; then the aircraft is returned for
Fleet use. When the aircraft comes in the third
time, the items that were worked on first cycle are
re-done, plus any additional required work is done.
At present the Navy plans an 84-month or seven-
year life span for its aircraft. The PAR cycles are
divided up accordingly.
What has all this to do with logistic support?
The Navy only has so many aircraft which can
operate from its carriers and support our operations
in the Pacific theater as well as support our NATO
requirements in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. We
must carefully tailor the PAR and rework cycles of
our aircraft to meet the deployment schedules of our
carriers. When carriers such as the Enterprise or
Forrestal are ready Lo deploy to the Atlantic or
Pacific, the air group must be ready to embark, and
all aircraft must be capable of operating the entire
deployment cycle without having any major mainte-
nance due. Accordingly, during the time that the
carrier is not deployed and is back for minor refit
and the crew is getting some rest and recreation,
the squadron must accomplish training of new pilots
in bombing and gunnery capabilities and in carrier-
landing qualifications. It thus takes a great deal of
logistics planning to tailor all the requirements to be
ready to meet the deployment date of the ship.
I have attempted to give you a brief picture of
the manner in which the Navy schedules and programs
its aircraft logistics support for its aircraft. Natu-
rally, there are many entities hard at work in carry-
ing out this program on a round-the-clock basis.
Identifying some of the major activities fully engaged
in logistic support would certainly include the Aviation
Supply Office, Philadelphia, commanded by RADM
Foley; the Naval Air Systems Command Headquarters,
Washinglon, recently known as the Bureau of Naval
Weapons and, prior to 1959, as the Bureau of Aero-
nautics; the Fleet Air Staffs in Norfolk and San Diego;
and our major East and West Coast Overhaul and
Repair Depots at Quonset Point, Norfolk, Jacksonville,
Alameda, and San Diego.
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SCOPING SUPPORT TO PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS: MAJOR GENERAL SAMUEL L. PHILLIPS, 'NASA, 
Director ,  Apollo Lunar Landing Program,  has  a BS 
in EE from University of Wyoming, an MS in electron- 
i c s  f rom University of Michigan, and an honorary 
Doctor of Laws from University of Wyoming. He 
served  in  Europe during WW I1 with the 8th A i r  
Force where he earned the Distinguished Flying C r o s s  
and Oak Leaf Cluster, A i r  Medal with seven Oak Leaf 
Clusters ,  and the Croix de Guerre .  H i s  assignments 
have included R& D work, including B-52 Project 
Officer, and Chief, A i r  Defense Missile Division, 
a t  Wright-Patterson, Chief of Logistics for  SAC 7th 
Air  Division of Thor; Dircctor of ILZinutemm Program 
a t  BSD, ARDC; Vice Commander, BSD, ARDC; and 
Deputy Director, NAS4 - Apollo Program. 
Good alternoon gentlemen 
It is a pleasure to participate in this, the f i r s t  
Annual Logistics Sym,uosium. 
Logistics Conference that in June of 11)6(i, af ter  soms 
seven years  at Wright Field in the rescarch  and de- 
velopment field, I was ordered to England and as-  
signed a s  the Director oE Logistics for the 7th A i r  
Division of the Strategic Air Command. 
to me on that a s s i p m e t i t  that I was probably being 
sent there  to live with some of the mistakes that we 
had made in research  and development. I quickly 
learned that the operator in the field and the logistician 
really are slaves to the system designer, to the 
materiel producer, and to the distribution system on 
which they must rely. 
I am reminded by this 
It occurred 
Some exnniplcs that come to mind from that ex- 
perience rclate to the B-52. 
that a i rc raf t  dictated the runway lengths in England. 
The equipment dictated thc kind of stocks we had to  
have such as alcohol o r  wetting agent. The require-  
ment to establish a reflex-type a le r t  force with the 
B-47's takeoff in England dictated the need for  u s  to 
establish aler t  quarters  for crews and tables of equip- 
ment for  maintaining the aircraf t  on a le r t ,  and for 
enabling u s  to s t a r t  them according to the reduced 
checklist. 
plies we had to have to make quick turn-arounds of 
a i rc raf t ;  i t  cvcn dictated the choicc o l  pcrsonnel in  
the organization. 
The takeoff conditions of 
It also dictated the kind of stocks of sup-  
I am reminded a l so  that we had to equip the B-47 
This resulted in 
with the rocket-assist takeoff units again because of 
weights and runway considerations. 
the many considerations of safety handling of rocket 
units on armed aircraf t .  
I recal l  the Egypt crisis which occurred in those 
y e a r s  and the almost  complete absence of conventional 
bombracks available for  s t ra tegic  bombers .  Logis- 
ticians and mater ie l  personnel were forced to obtain 
them from various places ,  to make some more,  and 
even to devise methods of getting them into the air- 
planes. We s e t  up somewhat of a production line in 
England to be able to equip the s t ra tegic  bomber which 
for many y e a r s  had not car r ied  conventional armaments .  
The sys tems designer ,  the system developer, and the 
producer establish the stock levels with which the 
operators  and logisticians have to deal. Support is a 
function of failure r a t e s ,  of the reliability, and of the 
quality that the developer and producer have been able 
to put into the system. 
I recal l  the deployment of the Thor intermediate 
range ballistic missi le  to England. 
were necessary to accom;sany the guidance and con- 
t rol  sys tems because of the way they were designed. 
Thc float in the platform had to be maintained at a 
cer ta in  temperature .  
operator  and the logistician really are s laves  of the 
designer and the producer of sys tems,  whether they be 
weapon sys tems o r  those in someonc e l se ' s  terminology. 
Bird watchers 
The lesson here  is that the 
• i
I learned also that the field operator's experience
is invaluable in improving system design. The only
really practical way to transfer learning in the rapid
culture in which we live is by transferring people.
The example I saw in my SAC assignment was the
transference of a man from the research and de-
velopment field to the operational area and back
again. This is an effective way to perfect the systems
design insofar as logistics supportability and support
requirements are concerned. I learned also that
fieldinnovation is quite possible and is very im-
portant. For example, part of our mission was to be
able to handle a large number of airplanes on a
small number of runways. Runways under emergency
conditions sometimes become clogged with crashed
aircraft. This situationemphasized the ingenuity of
the maintenance man. For 30 thousand dollars, some
1¼-inch steel cables woven intoa net, and some
Caterpillar tractors, we were able to come up with
a very effectivesystem of dragging anything as big
as a B-52, burning, off a runway.
I was asked to talk about the scoping of logistics
requirements. It seems that during the morning
discussions the main points in the science of logis-
tics have been well discussed from a variety of
angles. I'd like to discuss these from a still dif-
ferent standpoint.
My experience has convinced me that the most
successful systems, whether they be weapon or other
kinds, are measured by the results in the environ-
ment in which they must perform and by the manage-
ment of the cost and schedule factors. The support
requirements are scoped during the system design.
They are modulated during the development by factors
such as thoroughness of development, testing, and
reliability achieved during the process. They are
further modulated during production by the quality
which the producer achieves, and very importantly
by the stability of the configuration. For these
reasons, the first job of the logistician is in the
engineering phase. He must play an active part in
the systems concept itself as well as in the system
design and execution phases.
Both the system itself and the design of the sys-
tem must be geared to the goal and objective during
the early phases of total system planning. The
logistics support required for a system is in fact
traded off against the various final design alternatives
existing in the formulation of the system design,
always with the ultimate purpose of the system in
direct view.
We will recall that the Minuteman was a sealed
missile which was built and closed up tight in the
factory. This was the result of a tradeoff study
early in that system's conception. The tradeoff con-
sideration was that of building it as a sealed missile
versus building it for assembly in the field and at
operational sites. The objective was to achieve a
high rate of missiles on alert and to achieve the lowest
possible operating cost. The decision was made to
build the missile as a complete entity in a factory,
closed, so that it could not be entered for field main-
tenance. This immediately dictated overhaul in a
factory or factory-level depot. The tradeoff was one
of spending money to design a suitable level of re-
liability in the development process. This would
enable more economical total system operations than
if money were put into a logistics support system
which would provide maintenance in the field under a
lower level of reliability achieved during development.
Decisions like these in the conceptional phase set
much of the logistic pattern and also established re-
quirements for transporters of certain types. These
include the equipment involved in a transporter to
erect the missile in its operational site and most of
the handling equipment, the training of people, and
much of the logistics that becomes a part of the
system.
These early tradeoff considerations of develop-
ment versus logistics yielded decisions dictating a
black box maintenance concept providing the ability
to maintain black boxes in the field, for example,
versus moving and replacing whole boxes. This set
the logistics pattern for the provisioning of space
parts or of complete entities of subsystems, and set
the requirement for bench equipment versus a depot
or factory level capability, for training of people,
and for the data to support the system.
In the early concept of the Apollo systems,
spacecraft reliabilityrequirements were based on a
fairamount of inflightmaintenance of the electronics,
particularly the guidance, navigation, and commm_i-
cations equipment. The early designs were made on
thisbasis, and some hardware was about to be until
experience began to accumulate concerning the action
of moisture, weightlessness, and the corrosiveness
of the atmosphere. The electricalconnectors for
easy removal and replacement of boxes required that
these processes be carried out with a pressurized
space suitand gloves. In addition, the spacecraft
had to be designed to carry parts, tools, etc. Ex-
perience in the early stage of system development and
associated studies, therefore, have shown thatthe
result of pursuing that concept further would actually
result in degradation of reliabilityin flight. The con-
cept had to be turned around and the actual design had
to be changed to eliminate the flightmaintenance con-
cept.
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The scoping of logistics support for Apollo
versus Minuteman presents a situation of one versus
many. In the Manned Space Flight Program in gen-
eral and the Apollo program in particular, each in-
dividual operation is essentially a one or zero, in-
sofar as a success or a failure is concerned. Each
operation is exceedingly important in a rapid,
orderly progression to the objective of the system
and the entire system design. The logistician has to
bear that objective in mind. Each vehicle is destined
to serve its purpose best if it is launched on time in
a particular, established launch window. Therefore,
this objective sets the pattern for design of logistics
support. On the other hand, the end field objective
in the Minuteman system was a high in-commision
rate of having some 90 percent of the deployed force
on alert. In-commision was the ultimate and only
purpose of that system, and dictated certain features
in the design of the system that reflect themselves in
the scoping of the logistics support for later phases.
In the Saturn/Apollo space vehicle and its as-
sociated ground equipment, it is important to ac-
complish removals and replacements as well as
certain maintenance while the vehicle is in a stacked
condition and while it is in various conditions of its
fueled or loaded status. On the other hand, in the
sealed Minuteman the idea of sending the whole mis-
mile back to the factory was a satisfactory concept.
In the case of the Apollo/Saturn space vehicle, we
are able to remove the critical valves, electronic
black boxes, components, guidance and control plat-
forms, etc., for replacement or repair.
These different concepts also set the pattern for
the checkout equipment, which is the instrumentation
with which the system interior can be probed and
controlled. In the Minuteman operational system
the important consideration is merely whether or not
it is working. If it is not, the missile is sent back
to the depot; for this reason the concept calls for
fairly little in the way of checkout equipment.
The cost of the Apollo Project, about 10 million
dollars a day, emphasizes the importance of success
and expediency. It is dollar-effective for us to put
in a much higher cost, must more elaborate system,
to provide a much greater ability to control interior
operations, and to probe the exact causes of failures.
These demands result in a tremendously more com-
plex checkout system for that particular operation
and mission. In summary, the total system is best
if it is desit,med to its ultimate objective and purpose.
The logistician, if properly oriented, makes one of
his greatcst contributions by participating aggres-
sively in the concept and development phases of the
system program.
In earlier years and in more current times, we
have faced the question of how the system is assimi-
lated so that all the various tradeoffs are given the
most effective consideration and the correct de-
cisions. A handbook or guide cannot instruct every-
body on every system in exactly what steps to follow
to have the most effective results. Most of our pro-
grams, however, have the challenge of requiring
rapid progress; generally for large systems the
problem is to integrate and interrelate effectively
several organizations so that there is effective
coupling in terms of time, technology, and progress
among them all. Therefore, some Idnd of procedural
guidance and direction seems to be necessary and has,
in fact, evolved over the years. I think it is based
generally on an iterative system of functional analysis
as one of the cornerstones of strong systems engineer-
ing. This is the starting point. It is one of the points
General Cody developed thoroughly, so I'd like only
to reemphasize one fact: one of the most important
tools to enable the correct analysis for tradeoff de-
cisions involving logistics considerations versus other
facets of development and performance is a well con-
structed system functional analysis, which is the
real foundation of system engineering.
The third point I would like to make is to empha-
size the role of the logistician in the development and
production phases. Development is an iterative pro-
cess. We go through various rigors and rituals of
preliminary desig_ reviews, reviewing test results
and test data, and of accepting hardware. At each
one of these checkpoints, regardless of the manner
of establishing them for one particular program, there
is an opportunity for tradeoff decisions which are
based on the facts to that time and the experience,
results, and data to that point. One is able to make
tradeoffs dealing with, for example, achieveable life
based on results up to particular points of develop-
ment, versus the cost of achieving results in terms
of component life, for example, or meantime be-
tween failure, or failure rates of hardware. The lo-
gistician should make decisions to modify the logis-
tics support concept and ultimately the scope of the
logistics support as a real-time function of the pro-
gress of the program, just as the engineers are
motivated to change the design for improvement of
the performance as these results come in. These
steps in the development process actually provide
the data for scoping logistics support of the end sys-
tem and its purpose.
Now I suggest that we need aggressive logisticians
involved in all phases of development and production
who are willing to fight to be heard. They may some-
times get overruled, but as General Cody said, the
program director is supposed to be smart enough to
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know when not to. Dr. Debus this morning spoke
about KSC's job and their concept of supporting sys-
tems of the Apollo/Saturn when it arrives. You can
be assured that he and these people are loud and
aggressive on the points concerning logistics support
and maintainability. These points are regarded as
important, ultimately to get a vehicle ready for
launch, to meet a particular launch window. I em-
phasize the need for the logistician to be com1_etent,
experienced, agressive, willing to fight to be heard.
Again, I think that most of our experience tells us
that results are caused by people, not by procedures
that lie on somebody's desk. Today's programs gen-
erally demand an early payoff, whether they be for
a military weapon in the field or for a space mission.
There is a premium, therefore, on being right the
first time, and there is very much a premium on
government programs to be carried out within a plan
and on achieving the results within the time and bud-
get committed in the beginning.
We should be alert for ways to accelerate the
maturing of the system. I suggest thatone very im-
portant way to accomplish this for new programs is,
to the extent practicable, to have the same equip-
ment, whether it be flight hardware or ground equip-
ment, come from the factory through the field test
sites into the operational site with such augmentation
in the way of instrumentation as might be required
upstream. But we must start with an operational
system and augment it in the factory or test site
operation. By this means the hardware itself attains
experience, the people become experienced, and we
are able to explore the problems with the operational
hardware earlier.
The costs of systems become increasingly im-
portant to all of us. Logistics support costs are in
the range of 25 or 35 or even 40 percent of the total
system. There are various ways being considered
in the Apollo program to minimize cost. I would
emphasize, for all programs, that this phase must
start with a sound system concept and a sound sys-
tem design. Then establish the proper balance of
logistics support scope versus putting money into the
other facets of the development or production pro-
cess. One must be willing to pay for the reliability,
actually pay to develop components and system:_ that
have embodied in them the things that result in re-
liability.
We are emphasizing in Apollo, as a cost re-
duction means, such disciplines as finishing the
hardware in the factory and not sending it to the field
where it actually costs more to finish it. I am very
enthusiastic, obviously, about the Apollo flight suc-
cesses to date, but I am not deluding myself that we
would have been able to support these without some
cannibalization, which in a total system sense is
more costly than having been smart enough in the
earlier phases to program spares and logistics sup-
port in the required quantities. And I might add,
above all in the cost area, that supporting but not
over-supporting is the most dollar-effective way to
reduce program costs. I think we are emphasizing
the control of changes for the obvious reasons, in-
cluding logistics supportability in the field. We are
attempting to emphasize as much as possible in every
area that we can eliminate requirements that are
helpful but not necessary.
The Manned Spaceflight program is a very im-
portant element of national strength. Effective per-
formance by us in the Apollo organization is essential
to the U.S. strength as measured in the balance in-
ternationally. And it is most important that we pro-
vide not only the properly operating system but also a
properly scoped logistics support program.
In conclusion, I feel that the professional logis-
tician does know how to get the right things and the
right people to the right place at the right time to
support an operation. With variations, this is a quite
well understood process, and there are many pro-
fessionals, including those in this room, who know
how to do this. My challenge in this Logistics
Management conference to all of us is for the pro-
fessional logistician to become involved in the pro-
gram engineering phase so some professional logis-
tics engineering will be introduced in the concept,
the design, and the whole development process in-
cluding testing, production, and deployment. This is
where the logistics support requirements are really
scoped and where the logistician needs to have his
first influence. The logistician needs to be a full-
fledged member of the systems engineering program
management team as well as a professional in sup-
porting field operations once the system is built.
Logistics Management is, at this point in time, a
science, parts of which are moderately complex. If
the logistician is not effective in the early phases of
influencing the system, then he must absorb and
correct the deficiencies in almost everything that
happens downstream. Therefore he must be effective
in the beginning. To the newcomer in logistics I
stress that opportunities are unlimited in the per-
spective I have described. It is not an overcrowded
profession, and I would like to leave with you my
best wishes not only for the success of this symposium,
but for the future of the new Society which you are
establishing. Thank you very much for inviting me.
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EVENING ACTIVITIES 
INTRODUCTION TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND SEMINAR DINNER SPEAKER: ROBERT M. 
JOHNS, Master  of Ceremonies, Assistant 
Director, Support Technology, Missiles & Space 
Systems Division, Douglas Aircraf t  Co. , was the 
1966 recipient of the National Security Industrial As-  
sociation's Greer  Award, and is a member of the 
Symposium Steering Committee. 
and President Pro-Tempore of the Society of Logis- 
tics Engineers. 
in all phases of logistics management, ranging 
through maintenance planning, personnel training, 
technical publications, overhaul, repa i r ,  field sup- 
port, and development of new and improved support 
technologies for  Douglas' Missiles & Space Systems 
Division. 
He is co-founder 
He has  twenty-five years '  experience 
Good Evening, Ladies and Gentlemen: 
On behalf of the members  of the Society of Lo- 
gistics Engineers, I wish to express  our  s incere  
appreciation for your attendance tonight a t  the Soci- 
e ty 's  f i r s t  annual dinner. 
We believe the Logistics Symposium has brought 
together the most important group of the nation's 
leaders  ever  to be assembled to discuss  logistics. 
The Society feels  very honored and very humble that 
they have been permitted the privilege of participating 
in  such an occasion. 
A s  a member  of the Symposium Steering Com- 
mittee, I have viewed, with extreme interest ,  today's 
proceedings. I have been highly impressed by the 
manner in which the distinguished speakers  have pre-  
sented the multi-faceted disciplines with which the 
logistics engineer must live. 
I am quite cer ta in  that tomorrow's presentations 
will be  equally effective. 
Because of the nature of planning and contracting 
for support, the Symposium w a s  purposely planned 
around requirements  and not the people i t  takes to 
perform them. I would, therefore, like to take this 
opportunity to briefly describe the people who per -  
form the requirements ,  as this description will a lso 
identify the types of professionals that comprise  the 
Society of Logistics Engineers. 
I know that many of you are saying "How does 
this concern ms when I don't have any logistics en- 
gineers?" However, I think you will agree that you 
do maintain this capability. 
The logistics engineer is a composite of many, 
many interrelated disciplines. 
plines are solely directed to assuring maximum in- 
use capability of product lines. 
encompasses the talents of the maintainability spe- 
cialist,  the maintenance planner and analyst, the 
spare par t s  and supply management specialist,  the 
training instructor and training equipment designer, 
the handbook technician, the facilities and ranges 
All of these disci- 
Logistics engineering 
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planner,thepackagingandtransportationexpert,
andthefieldsupporttechnician.
And,ladiesandgentlemen,it is fortheimprove-
mentofthesedisciplinesthattheSocietystands.
Nowcomesthegreatestthrill ofmylife, thatof
introducingourdinnerspeaker.Youall knowhim...
theentireworldknowshim.., therefore,anything
I couldpossiblysayindescribinghisachievements
andleadershipwouldonlybeaduplicationofwhat
menhavebeensayingandwill continuetosaythe
worldover.., therefore,mayI justsaythatit is a
privilegeandan honortopresenttheforemostrocket
andspaceauthorityin theworld--Dr. Wernheryon
Braun.
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THEGROWING-NEED]:OR LOGISTICS ENGINEERS: DR. WERNHER VON BRAUN
Ladies and Gentlemen:
The invitation to speak to you tonight at this
major event sponsored by the Society of Lo_stics
Engineers was unusually gratifying to me.
I feel that I am participating with you in a history-
making occasion that heralds the long overdue re-
cognition of an ancient profession--that of the logistics
engineer.
Logistics is an age-old function, but its practice
has become sophisticated in our time. Modern lo-
gistics systems are the warp and woof of the fabric
that holds our society together. They distribute not
only goods and services to fill material desires and
needs, but also ideas that spread cultural, social,
and economic progress. Logistics systems are often-
times the instruments through which foreign policies
of aid and assistance are accomplished, or the avenues
through which the impetus of national will is exerted.
The travels of Marco Polo in the thirteenth
century will illustrate this spread of ideas. He car-
ried the culture of Europe to Asia, and he brought
home to Venice jewels, spices, and silk that bespoke
the wealth and splendor of China. He broadened the
horizons of Europeans, and increased their know-
ledge of the geography of Asia. His journey covered
17 years. How would you modern logisticians like
to work with that much lead time?
The efficiency of our modern logistics system
in the commercial world is taken completely for
granted--until our routine is upset. Did you ever
notice how irritated your neighbor gets when his
morning newspaper is not delivered on time? And
take, for instance, the familiar illustration of the
source of the food on your breakfast table this
morning: orange juice from California, bacon from
Illinois, waffles from North Dakota, maple syrup
from Vermont, coffee from Brazil, sugar from
Louisiana, and cream from Minnesota. Assembled,
prepared, and served for less than one dollar, that
breakfast is a bargain, even with inflation thrown in.
An efficient logistics system makes possible our
world-wide markets. Wherever you travel, you will
see Japanese transistor radios, Coca-Cola vending
machines, American gasoline pumps, and French
perfume. You are familiar with the confusion and
discomfort that follow when our industrial logistics
system is suddenly disrupted by natural catastrophes,
or strikes. Restoration of our logistics operations
would be one of the major and most urgent tasks
confronting us if we ever suffered a nuclear attack.
The military has always been concerned with
logistics. When Desoto was exploring the South-
eastern part of the United States, he carried along
live pigs for rations. They slowed his travels, but
he was uncertain about the resources of the land.
When some of the pigs got loose--or were turned
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loose when abundant game was discovered--Arkansas
got the razorback hogs for which its football team
of today is named. The Spanish also brought horses
to America. When some of these horses ran wild,
and multiplied, American Indians of the Southwest
gained a logistical asset in their search for game on
the Great Plains.
The classic example cited by American military
authorities today of the importance of a good logistics
system comes from World War II. General George
Patton's Third Army tanks were rolling hell-bent
for leather across Europe when they simply ran out
of gasoline. Since World War II the US Army has
completely revised its logistics operations, creating
logistics command units for management of logistics
activities, stressing logistics equally with tactics in
the training of commanders and staff officers, and
reorganizing its technical services.
The results of this new look by the Army at
logistics have been impressive. The greatest lo-
gistics challenge in America today is the support of
US operations in Viet Nam. Despite the difficulties
of distance, primitive Viet Nam development, rugged
terrain, and unfavorable climate, that challenge is
being met, as General Thurston T. Paul explained to
you at lunch today. I though that we had a tremendous
logistics opel:ation in Project Apollo, before hearing
his talk. Now, getting three stages of a launch ve-
hicle, the spacecraft, and three astronauts down to
the Cape for a trip to the moon before the end of this
decade doesn't seem so difficult, after all.
We have a logistics problem coming up in space,
however, that will challenge the thinking of the most
visionary logistics engineer. As you know, we are
currently investigating three regions of space: that
near earth, the lunar region, and the planets. Al-
though our investigations of the moon, the planets,
and deep space will yield immeasurable scientific
returns, the earliest practical dividends from space
will come from operations near earth. Many of the
characteristics of the earth's surface and atmosphere,
such as cloud patterns, are best seen or measured
from a distance. The observation of the earth by
men and instruments in space in the broadest sense
may easily turn out to be the best payoff of the entire
space program.
At the present rate of population growth, it is
estimated that the people of the world will number
between six and seven billion in the year 2000 A. D.
And in the year 2035, just 35 years later, world
population may total 12 to 14 billion. This population
growth will occur in a period when our children and
our grandchildren will be directly involved.
The task of systematically developing the re-
sources of planet earth to feed all these hungry
mouths is of the utmost importance and urgency. In
order to develop these resources, a much better,
up-to-date knowledge of the status quo and of trends
is necessary. Manned and unmanned spacecraft and
satellites will permit continuous observation of earth
in such areas as crop planting schedules, crop dis-
eases, salinity of the soil, harvest results, floods,
droughts, soil erosion, hydrology, oceanography and
life patterns in the oceans, population census taking,
etc. The technology to perform such work is already
in existence. The tools consist of the simultaneous
use of sophisticated photography, remote sensing of
a wide band of the electromagnetic spectrum, and
side-looking radar. The data collected will help in-
ternational humanitarian agencies to channel food to
the neediest areas. This is a job for the logistics
engineer.
Viet Nam, Project Apollo, and an exploding
world population thus set the stage for the discussions
of logistics in our symposium. We have been con-
cerned with the significance of logistics tasks and
functions in some of our nation's major civilian and
military activities.
While it is safe to say that all of us have un-
doubtedly been aware of many or most of the logistics
requirements and problems under discussion, at
least in a general way, I think it is also safe to state
that many of us have not realized the enormous scope
of the tasks performed in the logistics area. I hope
the discussions bring about a better understanding of
the fact that logistics support is a major portion of
most large development projects. Logistics support,
in fact, is a major cause for the success or failure
of many undertakings.
Here at the Marshall Center, we have assigned
a major role to the logistician in the support of our
design, development, manufacture, testing, and
operation of space systems hardware. We have come
to expect a great deal of these unique individuals.
We expect the logistician to have the right number of
spare parts of the proper configuration at the right
place at the right time. We expect him to have trained
personnel to perform the maintenance that will avoid
launch delays. We expect him to have a system of
transportation so efficient that, as soon as the hard-
ware receives the blessing of the final inspector, it
will be transported quickly and safely to its destina-
tion.
Transportation for some of our rocket stages has
been difficult, as they are simply too large for con-
ventional highway, railroad, or air travel. Slow
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movement by water was the only solution until the
ingenious Pregnant Guppy and Super Guppy planes
arrived on the scene. These modified and enlarged
Boeing Stratoeruisers lop weeks off our schedule in
the movement of stages from the West Coast to the
Marshall Center and to the Kennedy Space Center.
We also expect the logistician to see to it that
completed hardware is installed and checked out,
using technically accurate documentation, updated
to the current hardware configuration. And we ex-
pect the logistieian to see to it that all these happen
without fuss, strain, or bother to the design, de-
velopment, and test engineers--and to the program
managers. In short, we have come to expect of our
logistics managers something approaching perfection
in the porformancc of a multiplicity of difficult tasks.
We have come to expect these miracles routinely,
every day--like the food on our breakfast tables. And
perhaps this is one of the greatest compliments we
could pay the logistician.
I think that you will agree with me that logistics
is a demanding field, with a strong technical and
managerial challenge. And yet, in many instances,
we have had to assig_ this highly important task to
an otherwise ltighly qualified engineer who has no
formal training for this field, simply because a
trained logistician was not available. This does not
make a lot of sense.
What can we do to assist the logistieian to de-
velop and improve his capability to perform his tasks
that are so essential to our mission success?
Colleges and universities are jammed with a
great variety of courses in mechanical engineering,
electrical engineering, chemical engineering, in-
deed, in almost eve W conceivable kind of engineering.
Manufacturing skills and techniques are taught in
literally hundreds of vocational schools, and college
level courses are available for some of the more
esoteric techniques. And, as a supplement to these
formal and generally available curricula, both govern-
ment and industry have sponsored "in-house" training
and educational activities to boost the capability level
of our engineering ,and manufacturing personnel.
The unfortunate truth is that formal academic
training is virtually nonexistent in tile field of lo-
gistics. A brief conceptual course in maintainability
engineering here--a general familiarization program
on logistics functions there--but nowhere is there an
in-depth college-level curriculum dcsiglmd to educate
the logistieians to whom we have assigned the re-
sponsibility for properly expending billions of dollars
in the performance of tasks we recognize as essential
to mission success.
The development of the logistieian, in both in-
dustry and government, has been primarily a matter
of chance, not plan. The logistieians themselves have
slowly created worthwhile techniques and substantial
levels of expertise. And this body of inlormation and
know-how is passed on from man to man and group to
group. I'm sure all of us readily agree that this is a
slow, costly and limited manner of providing the kind
of professional support we need today.
It is my feeling that we, in this room tonight,
have both the opportunity and the responsibility to take
action to remedy this situation. The mere volume of
money involved in logistics activities makes it an im-
portant requiremcni. The training of logistics per-
somml is now a national problem. And the formation
of this new Society of Logistics Engineers gives us
the golden opportunity to take the lead in solving that
problem. You in this audience have tile experience
and know-how which needs to be shared with those
just entering the field of logistics. What is the best
method for importing this valuable information?
Would it not be feasible to develop a complete educa-
tional program designed to produce qualified logistics
engineers to meet the increasingly stringent require-
merits of both government and industry?
Three sets of goals could be the building blocks
for this program,
Short term goals would provide for interchange
of logistics information and know-how as to techniques,
advances in the state of tile art, and projected new
requirements. These objectives eouldbe accomplished
through the holding of symposia, seminars, and short
courses. Such activities have, in tile past, been
largely a fall-out or a subordinate topic in meetings
held by professional groups whose primary interests
lay in other specialties. As a result, the logistics
aspects considered have usually been presented piece-
meal, with no substantial value to the broad impact of
logistics as an essential part of the systems whole.
The Marshall Space Flight Center will certainly do all
it can to support and assist with tile meetings that will
help attain these short term goals.
In the category of intermediate goals a joint ef-
fort between industry and government agencies might
develop specific educational objectives for career de-
velopment of the logistieian. It would undoubtedly call
for rather heavy participation by educators to assm_e
proper relationships of the disciplines identified with
tile mosaics of disciplines already available. Such a
study might be undertaken m_der auspices of the
Society of Logistics Engineers.
The intermediate progq'am might also contain
college-level specialized courses involving such
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subject matter as maintainability analysis and meas-
urement; logistics cost effectiveness analysis tech-
niques; life cycle costing determination; incentive
contract management; maintenance analysis proce-
dures; quantitative and qualitative logistic personnel
identification methods; spares selection techniques;
and computerized inventory control systems.
As for the long term objectives, college degree
programs might be established in logistics, including
graduate-level courses, based on joint studies with
the academic community to define and refine the lo-
gistics disciplines into a professional career struc-
ture. We have had some very preliminary informal
discussion with University of Alabama officials, and
they were receptive to this proposal and eager to
discuss it further. Logistics scholarship funds and
programs could be sponsored by interested agencies.
There is a need for research aimed at developing
scientifically sound predictive tools for use in lo-
gistics cost and performance planning and measure-
ment. And there is a need for survey type courses
for the orientation of engineering, marketing, con-
tract, financial and other personnel having frequent
interface requirements with logisticians.
These are, of course, only suggestions for your
consideration. You are the experts who could outline
the educational requirements for enabling logistics
to "come of age" as a true profession with all that the
term implies for career planning and development.
The Society of Logistics Engineers is the appro-
priate vehicle for moving an imaginative program
forward.
I understand the Society has already set for itself
a series of goals in the areas of education and re-
search. I urge it to pursue those goals to fulfillment,
and I hope that all of us in industry and government
will fully support and participate in its performance.
I believe that this new professional society can
make really significant contributions to the improve-
ment of the general well-being of the nation and the
world. In a sense, all of us are involved deeply in
and depend upon logistics to sustain ourselves.
The need for more highly trained, capable lo-
gistics engineers is obviously great today, and the
need will become greater in the future. We are already
late in preparing to meet that need.
This Society can also perform a useful service in
the unification and direction of the logistics engineers
in their efforts to support our world of tomorrow. You
can help to make it the most exciting and most abun-
dant era mankind has ever seen.
DINNER CLOSING REMARKS: ROBERT M. JOHNS
Thank you, Dr. von Braun. We of the Society of
Logistics Engineers are instilled with increased con-
fidence and pride by the tremendous support you have
given us. You may be assured, sir, that I speak for
our membership when I say that we will bend every
effort to attain the goals you have so ably set forth.
Thank you once again.
Ladies and gentlemen, Dr. von Braun stated
that the logistics engineer was a new profession, and,
when one considers today's and tomorrow's challenges,
he is correct. If you remember, however, Dr. yon
Braun also said that certain facets of the logistics
spectrum have been with us for hundreds of years and,
prior to closing this dinner meeting, I would like to
leave concrete evidence of this fact with you.
I would like to quote an entry from the log of the
United States Ship Constitution entered in the years
1779-1780, which relates to the supply management
facet of the logistics engineering discipline. The ex-
cerpt is as follows:
"On the 23rd of August 1779, the United States
Ship Constitution set sail from Boston. She left with
475 officers and men, 48, 600 gallons of fresh water,
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7400 cannon shot, 11,600 pounds of black powder,
and 76,400 gallons of rum on board. Her mission
was to destroy and harrass English shipping.
Making Jamaica on 6 October, she took on 826
pounds of flour and 68,300 gallons of rum. Then she
headed for theAzores, arriving there on 12 November.
She provisioned with 550 pounds of beef and 64,300
gallons of Portugese wine. On 18 November she set
sail for England.
In the ensuing days she defeated five British
men-of-war and captured and scuttled twelve (12)
English merchantmen. By 27 January her powder
and shot were exhausted.
Unarmed, she made a raid on the Firth of Clyde.
Her landing party captured a whiskey distillery and
transferred 40,000 gallons on board by dawn. Then
she headed home.
The Constitution arrived in Boston harbor on 20
February 1780 with no cannon shot.., no powder ...
no food ... no rum ... no whiskey.., but with 48,000
gallons of stagnant water ....... "
Ladies and gentlemen, good evening.
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MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL 
INTRODUCTION TO MORNING SESSION AND INTRODUCTION OF MODERATORS: BERT 
GREENGLASS, NASA, Chief, Program Control Office, 
Kennedy Space Center, has a Bachelor of Industrial 
Engineering degree from New York University. He 
has  had engineering positions with several  industrial 
f i rms;  was management engineer a t  the Brooks Army 
Medical Center; and was Program Coordinator for  
the Missile Firing Laboratory, ABMA, US Army 
prior to his present  assignment. 
A s  Dr. Debus noted yesterday morning, we at  
KSC are most sensitive to the problems of logistics. 
We cannot help being so when you consider that we 
are simultaneously activating a one billion dollar 
launch facility launching integrated space vehicles 
and operating a 100,000 a c r e  launch area .  
complish this  we br ing  together approximately 19,000 
persons represent ing 8 major stage support con- 
t rac tors ,  6 general  support contractors ,  and hundreds 
of secondary and subcontractors. 
b e r  in  the hundreds of thousands and are required 
not only for  the launch vehicle, but for spacecraft, 
ground support equipment, and facilities for several  
programs.  F o r  LC-39 s i te  activation alone, we have 
some 60, 000 s t ra tegic  PERT activities, each of which 
is a series of potential logistics problems. 
To ac- 
Our spares  num- 
By necessity a l l  of the above represent  variables. 
Only two things seem to be held constant, funds and 
launch schedule. Dr. Debus discretely alluded t o  
this point yesterday morning. 
The point i s  that poor logistics planning and ex- 
cution on any par t  of the Apollo team invariably has 
an adverse impact at KSC and normally makes inroads 
into our two constants, money and time. Did I say 
we were sensitive to logistics problems? Gentlemen, 
we a r e  hypersensitive! 
Yesterday we heard much about the immensity 
and complexity of the programs with which we are 
associated. Specifically, we heard of the need for  
logistics; the importance of in depth planning; and 
scoping and integrating support for program require- 
ments. 
Today we come to the next natural s tep in the 
development of a logistics program: "control and 
evaluation. " Philosophy, policies, and plans alone 
cannot guarantee an effective logistics program. In 
programs of the comp!exity we a r e  discussing here  
this week, effective communication and surveillance 
is mandatory. Management control systems and their 
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related techniques must be developed to assure that
policy and plans are being implemented. Constant
evaluation must be conducted to assure that manage-
ment decisions were effective and that procedures
are being followed. General Phillips once noted that
Program Management, in a very real way, is doing
what you said you would do. To accomplish this one
must have the control and surveillance capability to
assure that his integrated management systems, of
which logistics is a prime, are being effectively
executed.
We are fortunate to have with us today a truly
well informed panel. Each has become an expert
on the subject through the most valid means, ex-
perience.
Our panel moderator and first speaker has been
intimately concerned with logistics for some 20 years.
In his present capacity as Corporate Director, Lo-
gistics for North American Aviation, Inc. , he is re-
sponsible for the development, coordination, and
administration of corporate policies relative to lo-
gistics. He will speak to you on "Management of
Logistics Support. " It is my pleasure to present
to you Mr. Sterling B. Smeltzer.
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MANAGEMENT OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT: STERLINGB. SMELTZER, Corporat; D s e c t o r ,  - 
Logistics, North American Aviation, Inc. ,  is re- 
sponsible for  the administration of logistics policies 
for  North American Aviation. He has  held previous 
logistics management positions with both North 
American Aviation and Curtiss-Wright Corporation. 
Mr. Smeltzer graduated from Carnegie Institute of 
Technology where he was awarded a scholarship and 
elected to severa l  honorary professional f ra terni t ies .  
Since that time he has  completed various aerospace 
technical and management courses  at Ohio State 
University and the University of California. 
GENERAL REMARKS 
May I express  my appreciation for being per- 
mitted to participate in activities of this important 
NASA sponsored Logistics Management Symposium. 
Yesterday was both productive and rewarding. This 
symposium, without question, represents  a signifi- 
cant  milestone in  the continued development of lo- 
gistics as a pr ime discipline. 
without saying that those who have brought the sym- 
posium into being are to be commended for  their  
effort and zeal. 
Furthermore,  it goes 
{q LOGISTICS 
MANAGEMENT 
AND CONTROL 
LOGISlliS M A N A G f M E N i  SYMPOSIUM 
HUNlSVl l t l  ALA SEPI 13 I 4  1966 
Yesterday we discussed methods for defining 
logistics requirements  and techniques for  preplanning 
logistics and reviewed methods available to us  for  
achieving a technically sound integrated logistics 
posture for space-age support. 
This morning we are concerning ourselves  with 
I would like to preface this presen- 
control and evaluation and their effect on overall 
program costs .  
tation with a very brief review of the key events which 
se t  the stage for  the management of logistics as we 
know it today. 
a clear  correlation with the types of management pro- 
jections provided in the symposium. 
This baseline is important to provide 
EVOLUTION OF LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
Logistics received i t s  initial impetus as a re- 
cognized separate  discipline during World War 11, 
but remained for years  a s e r i e s  of very loosely coor- 
dinated separate  functions--with practically no re- 
lation of one to the other, as regards  overall control 
or management. 
By 1955, as the military customer moved toward 
a “weapon system” concept, industry responded by 
organizational integration of most ,  o r  i n  some cases ,  
all support elements. Organizations called “Product 
Support” and “Logisticsyt began to appear. 
marked the f i r s t  s tep  in  a continuing effort to acquire 
This 
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EVOLUTION OF 
LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
WORLD WAR I t  
INITIAL IMPETUS 
WEAPON SYSTEM CONCEPT 
ORGANIZATIONAL 
INTEGRATION 
PACKAGE CONCEPT 
COST CONCERN 
a be t te r  managerial hold over the total logistics sup- 
port effort. The Weapon System concept a l so  brought 
into sharp  and almost s tar t l ing focus f o r  the f i r s t  
time the magnitude of logistics resources  required 
for any given program. A s  a resul t  of this total lo- 
gistics recognition, by 1958 o r  1959 there was ser ious  
emphasis on the cost  of logistics support. Studies 
reflected that lifetime support of electronic gear  
cost f rom 5 to 10  t imes the cost  of the original equip- 
ment. 
approximately 25 percent  of its budget was required 
for  maintenance. A s  a resul t ,  logistics cos ts  became 
the bas i s  of se r ious  study by both the Government 
and industry. These studies resulted i n  two key 
admonitions to engineers and logisticians: 
The Department of Defense recognized that 
1. Design equipment which requires  less and 
simpler logistics support and maintenance. 
2. Develop techniques for  more effective lo- 
gistics management systems.  
LOGISTICS COST CONCERN 
; ?', IMPROVE-LOGISTICS 
&A MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 9 <:3 
The f i r s t  ground rule  set in  motion the effort 
which led to quantified maintainability. 
ground rule  provided the b a s i s  for  an integrated 
logistics management concept; that i s ,  implemen- 
tation of logistics in  a planned order ly  fashion in any 
program. 
The second 
However, we've moved on since these two basic  
''cost of ownership, " "con- 
ground rules  were established. Today we speak of 
"package procurement, 
tractually established maintenance goals, " ' 'life cycle 
costing, 'I and so forth. 
TODAYS ENVIRONMENT 
o PACKAGE PROCUREMENT 
oLlFE CYCLE COSTING 
olNCENTIVlZED MAINTENANCE GOALS 
'v' 
ALL 
IMPACT LOGISTICS 
' 
All of these concepts are an outgrowth of the 
e a r l i e r  realization that logistics cos ts  are truly 
significant, and, being significant, they must be  con- 
s idered,  and they must  b e  effectively controlled and 
managed. Accordingly, these concepts are making 
ser ious  demands of logistics. They require  much 
more exacting program controls and visibility, as 
well as the need for  increasingly effective measure- 
ment techniques. For if logistics performance is to  
be  judged in  t e r m s  of incentives and cost  effective- 
ness ,  then it a lso must  b e  established in  measurable 
te rms .  Added to these effectiveness/measurement 
requirements  is the fact that logistics management 
must  now cope with the dynamically different support 
environment involved in  limited population space 
programs without the benefit of comfortable learning 
curves.  
Having drawn this current  baseline, le t  us  ex- 
plore the ro le  of the logistics manager and the con- 
t ro l s  which affect the success  of his  program. The 
responsibility of the logistics manager is unique be- 
cause of his position i n  the sequence of events. Al-  
though he participates actively in  the program from 
i t s  ear l ies t  conception, his  major contribution is 
made when the equipment appears  a t  the t e s t  o r  
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operational site. This  is also the point where the 
effect of schedule s l ips ,  funding overruns,  over-. 
looked details, misunderstood requirements, and 
misplaced assets are most strongly felt. 
quently the real-life world adds the resul ts  of ad- 
ditional engineering changes, especially on develop- 
ment-type programs.  
environment in which today's logistics manager must 
perform. This environment presents  a major chal- 
lenge to the success  of the program as a whole. How- 
e v e r ,  as we shall see la te r ,  if identification and de- 
finition of logistics requirements  have been properly 
accomplished ear ly  in  the program, resolution of 
most of the support problems, at least ,  is reasonably 
c lear ,  assuming that logistics funding has  been 
properly considered. 
Too fre-  
This is pretty much the 
LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN 
The importance of thorough planning to the suc- 
The function of a logistics support 
cessful  control of a logistics program cannot be 
overemphasized. 
plan is to provide a bas ic  outline of how the overall 
system is to be  maintained; what facilities and equip- 
ment will be  available; and the maintenance capa- 
bilities planned for  each site; as well as the role  
which each participating contractor or  government 
center  is expected to fulfill. 
The support plan serves  as a basis  around which 
the contractors  and government logstics personnel 
can integrate the i r  support efforts, determine where 
inadequacies exis t ,  and improve efficiency where 
opportunities ex is t  to consolidate maintenance effort. 
The plan is an invaluable aid in  rapidly appraising 
subcontractors of their position in the maintenance 
pattern and providing them with a framework upon 
which to determine their  own maintenance needs. 
LOGISTICS SUPPORT PLAN 
oINTEGRATED GOVT / CONTRACTOR 
PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ... 
SUPPORT 
''IMPROVED STATUS KNOWLEDGE 
OEFFICIENT SUB-CONTRACTOR EFFORT 
L, 
In a quasi-contractual manner, the support plan 
permits the contractor to determine the scope of his 
contractual comxxitment. 
sometimes subjected to major  change, the extent of 
the change and its effect on the scope of each affected 
contract can be  readily determined. 
A s  the support plan is 
The technique for developing support plans has  
been pretty well formalized in  recent  y e a r s  with the 
issuance of various government directives such as 
the Navy's WR-30. However, I would like to direct  
your attention to four specific elements which are 
essential to the effective development and use of a 
logistics support plan: 
1. The support plan, i f  i t  is to be  really ef- 
fective, must be developed ear ly  in  the pro- 
gram. 
2. A s  the program develops, the plan must con- 
tinue to be definitized and updated. 
3.  The revision process  must  be  subject to con- 
t rol  procedures. 
4. The plan must be used. 
THE CONTRACT AS A MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
Those who are speaking during this morning's 
session will review in considerable detail the tech- 
niques and problems involved i n  contracting for  lo- 
gistics support. We are extremely fortunate that 
this is going to be done from the Military Service, 
NASA, and contractor points of view. 
I would like to touch briefly on the contract as a 
management control. 
Nevertheless, 
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ORGANIZATION FOR CONTROL 
THE CONTRACT AS A 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL 
oCLEAR DEFINITION 
oGROUPlNG OF SUPPORT ELEMENTS 
0 COMMONLY ACCEPTED TERMINOLOGY 
A s  stated heretofore, proper identification and 
definition of requirem.nts i s  imperative to success-  
ful implementation of any logistics program. 
in this regard that the contract becomes, a s  I see  i t ,  
an exceedingly important logistics management con- 
trol. It seems apparent that the contract se rves  
best as an effective control when it specifies require- 
ments sufficiently to permit  both contractor and 
customer to achieve agreement on the scope and 
variety of support effort expected. We have seen 
contract language wherein the logistics effort has 
been very loosely and inadequately defined. Although 
br ief ,  such definition presents  a very nebulous base- 
line from which to plan. It provides no means for 
evaluating the efficiency of the logistics program. 
Imprecise coverage can leave the program in a 
position to receive inadequate support, over-support, 
or misdirected support. 
manager is cas t  in a position of constantly groping 
to find just  what his role  i s ,  as well as having to 
continually justify his program and his budget. This 
practice i s  not conducive to good scheduling, budg- 
eting, o r  management. 
It is 
The contractor's logistics 
It is also advisable that the support program 
elements be grouped in acontract  work statement 
and that commonly accepted logistics terminology be 
utilized. Industry associations such as A M ,  EIA, 
and NSIA have aided the government measurably in 
developing such commonly accepted terminology. In 
this regard NSIA has performed a recent  valuable 
service in drafting a series of documents covering 
each aspect of space p r o g a m  logistics support. The 
terminology used in  these documents is accepted in 
logistics c i rc les  and the format is sufficiently flex- 
ible to permit tailoring to  a specific program. 
A function of equal importance to ear ly  logistics 
With definition and planning is proper organization. 
respect  to organizing for optimum control, the 
s implest  organization commensurate with meeting 
program objectives is the best. 
but not so easy to do. A special problem related to 
the logistics manager 's  job resul ts  f rom the large 
number of functional interfaces he must maintain. 
These interfaces are above, below, and to both s ides ,  
within his  own company and outside, with cus tomers ,  
associated, subcontractors, project offices, tech- 
nical directors ,  integrating contractors ,  and tes t  
cen ters .  Sooner o r  la ter  in the development of a 
program these relationships become fairly well de- 
fined and stable. However, in the ear ly  portion of 
many programs,  the relationships many t imes are 
unclear and much management confusion must be 
overcome to achieve smooth working conditions. Such 
dual reporting relationships must be accepted as 
norms1 in  s t ructur ing for today's programs which 
interrelate  pr imes ,  associates ,  subcontractors, and 
o thers ,  as well as those who establish policy, those 
who provide technical administration, those who 
provide schedule and funds administration, and those 
who are responsible for  work performance. With 
respec t  to logistics organization, particularly for  
major programs,  may I suggest that: 
This is easy to s a y ,  
Logistics i s  a pr ime function. 
A s  such i t  should be made responsible for 
the total spectrum of support elements if it 
i s  to function effectively. 
To insure direct  management visibility on al l  
logistics mat ters  the logistics manager should 
be placed on a top line of functional organi- 
zations. This emphasis s e e m s  evident too 
if we consider the amount of money involved 
in logistics and the matter  of operational 
effectiveness. 
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 
Let us review briefly the subject of logistics 
management controls. Consideration of controls for  
conduct of any support program should b e  predicated 
upon a pr ior  analysis of what the controls are for and 
- who needs to use them. Fundamentally management 
controls are necessary to a s s u r e  that program ob- 
jectives are being achieved a t  a r a t e  comparable to 
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0 POLICY VS PROCEDURE 
customer, and downstreaming of support assets have 
also contributed to the logistics success  of large 
programs. 
MANAGEMENT CONTROLS 
ASSURE PROGRAM OBJECTIVES ARE MET 
-\PROVIDE DECISION-MAKING BASE 
ENSURE ECONOMIC SELECTION AND USE 
OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT RESOURCES 
LOGISTIC 
MAINTAINABILITY 
ADMINISTRATION 
(BUDGETS ETC ) 
SUPPORT ENGRG COORD 
the expenditure of resources .  A control system also 
requi res  presentation of information which i s  vital to 
making decisions with respect  to changes in program 
objectives. 
Management controls may take many forms.  
Frequently they are imposed as limitations in  head- 
count o r  do l la rs ,  of which we shall speak briefly 
la ter .  They may take the form o f  a series of incre- 
mental approval s teps  wherein cer ta in  tasks must b e  
satisfactorily com2leted before funds are released 
for  the next step. 
ment sys tems and be reflected as PERT char t s ,  
s ta tus  repor t s ,  and so forth. 
They may take the form of manage- 
Management controls applied to the selection 
and provisioning of support resources  have evolved 
to a science in recent  years .  
such as the use of resident provisioning teams,  joint 
utilization of support asse ts  by contractor and 
Management techniques, 
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The application of controls to effective and cost- 
responsive use of logistics assets,however,still  pre-  
sents a r e a l  logistics challenge. This challenge is 
especially evident on programs involving a limited 
population of vehicles. 
Providing quick response to site needs and con- 
tinuous surveillance over  a l l  assets is essential. Both 
industry and government have responded by developing 
EDP status  systems to control the flow of equipment 
and reparables .  Accordingly, utilization of machine 
systems in the control of support assets is increasing, 
and the economical use of these techniques will char- 
acter ize  the successful programs of the future. 
Another technique, known as downstream plan- 
ning, h a s  been used effectively in  maximizing use of 
GSE, s p a r e  par t s ,  and training equipment. This 
technique provides for  long range utilization of lo- 
gistics asse ts  to subsequent program phases beyond 
an immediate support commitment. One of the con- 
tributors to high costs  in space and military programs 
is the residual hardware a t  completion of tes t  phases. 
By utilization of complete planning data showing re- 
lease of asse ts  from a specific support commitment, 
many i tems  may be programmed in a n  order ly  manner, 
with modification when necessary,  for  application to 
the next phase of the program. 
EXERCISING LIMITATIONS 
One area of program control that deserves  men- 
tion deals  with the time and manner in  which head- 
count and cost reductions are frequently applied to a 
program and the very  special affect this method of 
application has on logistics. Generally speaking, 
and in the case of most programs,  manpower and 
dollar constraints o r  reductions are introduced during 
the latter stages of a program as a correct ive meas- 
ure .  It is well understood that this action on an 
across-the-board bas is  is a t  t imes the only avenue 
open to a program manager. However, he should b e  
aware that this happens to be  the very period when, 
due to normal program phasing, logistics responsi- 
bilities are becoming most extensive. Since the 
tendency is to apply such constraints .as  an across-  
the-board action, logistics feels the impact most 
severely in i ts  ability to perform. This is an im- 
portant point, because eventually the need for  addi- 
tional support funding generally becomes manifest 
and re-establishment of logistics hardware and ser- 
vices is accomplished at premium cost. It may a l so  
impact operational performance to a marked degree.  
Thus, the program manager would do well to consider 
carefully headcount and cost reduction in  t e r m s  of 
logistics support impact. 
.... 
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This  brings us  to the ultimate contribution of a 
well-planned logistics effort. 
Minuteman missile, an F-100 in Viet Nam, o r  a 
space vehicle on the pad, there  is one common point 
of measurement--that when the demand is made the 
vehicle will respond. In the case of space effort, 
this is an assurance that the "launch window" will 
be  met. Assurance that despite a large variety of 
possible problems which can occur  during the check- 
out and countdown, the par ts ,  equipment and skills 
necessary to meet launch requirements within a 
limited time span will be available. When the cost  of 
a missed launch is compared to the cost of an ade- 
quate support program, the choice seems clear--an 
Whether i t  be a 
economic yet effective logistics program appears  to 
be the bes t  insurance available. 
Let us recognize that the launch window for  a 
moon shot may be about 3 days out of each lunar 
month. If we consider only the interest  accrued on 
the investment in a space vehicle "stack" while i t  
sits awaiting the next launch window, after perhaps 
missing the las t  opportunity due to  an unavailable 
spare ,  we find the lack of a spare  to be  extremely 
expensive. It is such a situation that points up the 
essentiality of analyzing logistics requirements i n  
the broadest of program economic t e r m s .  
CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 
Thus we face the challenges of the future in  lo- 
gistics. There are many,of course. 
54 
A serious challenge emanates from the logistics
of distance built into our unfolding world-wide military
responsibilities. In this expanding arena our enemies
are heat, humidity, rain, mud, and dust. They are
equipment enemies that corrode and infiltrate with
deadly results in a costly and never-ending cycle.
The logistics of transportation and packaging offer
challenges set in a framework of serious importance.
The logistician must be responsive to this challenge.
He must carry the message to those involved in this
activity within his own area of responsibility.
A key challenge relates to the need for improved
methodologies as applied to managing and planning
for programs of limited population which operate in
an environment characterized by change. The ob-
jectives are the same as when the equipment popula-
tion was larger and more stable. The risks, how-
ever, are harder to define, backup is thinner, and
the margin for error on the short side is minimal.
Under these circumstances the logistician must make
fuller use of mathematical modelling techniques and
automation. He must learn to predict with greater
accuracy and, as I have stated, without the ease and
benefit of comfortable learning curves.
A key challenge also relates to the logistician
himself. For if these foregoing challenges are valid
then they directly affect the logistician. To meet
such challenges he must make full use of his past ex-
perience, yet, as a person, he mustbe eager to ac-
cept new concepts. He must be always seeking to
improve. Dr. yon Braun spoke eloquently last
evening on the logistician and his role.
A challenge that is already upon us deals with
the increasing use of package procurement and the
testing of life-cycle costing. Logistics must work
closely with procurement in devising standards,
measurement devices, and accountability practices
which will support these procurement devices with
an acceptable degree of confidence.
A less obvious challenge that bears upon us as
a nation and a society suggests that the logistician
should make a critical review of his logistics plan-
ning and analytical techniques to assess their ap-
plicability to problems which we as a people face
today. His normal involvement in such areas as
training, transportation, and methods of communi-
cating information are potentially fruitful fields of
exploration.
Another broad challenge relates to the serious
need for sound control and management of national
aerospace resources. We have massive commitments,
both military and nonmilitary, which dictate economic
consideration. Accordingly, as it relates to logistics,
Government and industry as a team must continue to
introduce fresh new management concepts for control
of logistics costs. This means that we must make in-
creased use of advanced logistics techniques to pro-
vide us the basis for management decisions and to
insure visibility for controlling our material re-
sources most economically.
In summation, may I recap several key points
made during this presentation that bear directly upon
logistics management.
1. Lo_stics is a prime function. This assess-
ment is dictated by the percentage of program dollars
involved in its accomplishment and by the direct im-
pact it has upon operational effectiveness. As such it
must be organizationally structured to deal on an
equal basis with other key functions.
2. I_gistics responds most effectively when its
elements are integrated as a single organizational
entity. Only in this manner can the most effective
deployment of logistics support resources be realized
in a manner that insures optimum interaction and
timing.
3. Proper logistics support is dependent upon
proper logistics planning. The entire logistics per-
formance structure rests upon a sound support plan.
This planning must be accomplished early in the pro-
gram. All too frequently the management concept
of logistics is that of something which occurs or is
required late in the program. As a result, badly
needed logistics planning funds are frequently not
made available to the detriment of the program.
4. Logistics management itself m;ast accept the
challenges presented by new technologies and advanced
program requirements. The ultimate space challenge,
for instance, relates to the broader perspective of
efforts extending beyond lunar exploration. We are
studying ways to send men on flyby missions past the
planets Mars and Venus as a stepping stone to manned
landing missions. These are scientific investigations
which capture the imagination. The logistics prob-
lems inherent in such a venture are immense. But
logisticians must, even today, begin to lay the foun-
dation for management of advanced space mission lo-
gistics resources. It remains largely with men such
as are represented here today to insure that such
future space history will be a triumph of American
ingenuity, accomplished under dynamic and complex
circumstances. The challenge is ours.
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THE PROGRAM MANAGERS' PROBLEM: DR. ARTHUR RUDOLPH, NASA, Director ,  Saturn v Program 
Office, Marshall Space Flight Center, has  a Bachelor's 
Degree in mechanical engineering from College of 
Berlin, and an honorary D.Sc.degree from Rollins 
College. 
Engineer, and Technical Director for  pilot V-2 
manufacturing and testing at Peenemuende; and 
established the underground plant f o r  m a s s  producing 
V-2. 
Hermes Il programs.  
and Industrial Division of ABMA; was Technical 
Director of Redstone Missile Weapon System, Project 
Director of Pershing System, and was Assistant 
Director ,  Systems Engineering, Office Manned Space 
Flight 
He was Chief, Fabrication, Chief Planning 
He worked a t  White Sands with the V-2 and 
He was with Dev. Opr. Div. 
Gentlemen: 6, 000, 000 pounds at lift-off. The Saturn V itself 
s tands 282 feet high and develops 7 . 5  million pounds 
of thrust  a t  launch. The Saturn V Vehicle System is big. The number 
of governmental and industrial organizations and the 
number of people within these organizations, working 
on the Saturn V, i s  big. The problems are big. With 
a few figures I will t ry  to illustrate for you the im- 
mensity of our hardware. 
The four Saturn V stages see each other  for  the 
f i r s t  t ime a t  the Kennedy Space Center, where they 
are assembled, "stacked," as we call i t ,  to make the 
Saturn V Launch Vehicle. This stacking, followed 
by checkout, is accomplished i n  the Vehicle Assembly 
Building, the VAB. 
world. 
It is the largest  building in the 
364 FEET 305 f f f l  
FIGURE 1. SATURN/STATUE O F  LIBERTY 
z - In this figure you may compare the height of the 
Statue of Liberty of 305 feet with the Apollo/Saturn v 
Space Vehicle which stands 364 leet  high and weighs FIGURE 2. 500F ROLLOUT OF VAB 
5 b  
In this picture you see the rollout of the Saturn 
V Facilities Vehicle f rom the VAB. The s ize  of this 
vehicle system, i t s  performance requirements ,  its 
complexity, and the continent-spanning activities to 
make and support i t ,  surpass ,  to my knowledge, 
anything previously attempted. 
In Figure 3 you see the F i r s t  Stage o r  basement 
booster  
Michoud Plant at New Orleans. 
(S-IC) . It is being built by Boeing in  the 
Figure 5 shows the Second Stage (S-D) . It is 
manufactured by North American at Seal Beach, 
California. It is shipped on a "Converted LSD" 
(Landing Ship Dock) through the Panama Canal to  
New Orleans. There it is transloaded to a "r iver  
barge'! and moved to  the Mississippi Test Facility 
for  captive acceptance firing. After refurbishment 
it is taken back to  New Orleans by r i v e r  barge,  loaded 
once more on the "Converted LSD, and shipped to 
KSC. 
FIGURE 3. FIRST STAGE (S-IC) 
It is moved by "r iver  barge" to the Mississippi 
Test Facility (MTF)  for captive acceptance firing, 
returned to Michoud by "r iver  barge,  I '  refurbished, 
then shipped to Kennedy Space Center by a modified 
!'ocean-going barge. 
FIGURE 5 .  SECOND STAGE (S-11) 
The Third Stage (S-IVB) is being built by Douglas 
a t  Huntington Beach, California. It is shipped to the 
FIGURE 4. MAP O F  UNITED STATES WITH 
SHIP LANES FIGURE 6.  THIRD STAGE (S-IVB) 
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Sacramento Tes t  Facility for  captive acceptance firing 
ei ther  by "ocean-going barge" o r  by a uniquely de- 
signed aircraf t ,  called "Super Guppy. If 
It is also flown by Super Guppy to KSC. 
ment does not lend itself to a simple pictorial 
pnrtmval .  
'The Problem i s -  THERE'S SO MANY OF THEM' 
FIGURE 9. GSE MANAGER 
FIGURE 7. SUPER GUPPY WITH STAGE 
The Instrument Unit (IU) , shown i n  Figure 8,  is 
manufactured b y  IBM at Huntsville, and is flown to 
KSC by Super Guppy. 
FIGURE 8. INSTRUMENT UNIT 
Now, let me give you a thumbnail sketch of the 
Launch Vehicle Ground Support Equipment (LVGSE) . 
It is that complement of Ground Support Equipment 
furnished by the Marshall Space Flight Center to 
equip the Launch Site. It is manufactured by numerous 
contractors  scattered all over  the United States, and 
is transported to the test sites and to KSC by all 
known means of transportation. Because of i t s  
multifarious elements, this Ground Support Equip- 
My GSE Manager feels  that he is literally in- 
undated by the end i tems  for which he is responsible. 
Let me give you a perspective by comparing some 
PERT figures: Our four Stage Contractors t rack  a 
total of 40,000 events, but for  the Ground Support 
Equipment in  excess  of 60,000 events are being tracked. 
PERSPECTIVE OF GSE MAGNITUDE 
-PERT- 
@ 
VEHICLE 
( 4  S l A G H )  
GSE 
FIGURE 10. PERSPECTIVE O F  GSE MAGNITUDE 
My illustration of the Saturn V Launch Vehicle 
System did not provide you with much visibility ; in  
fact it was just  a b a r e  glance. 
will not be  hard for you to visualize the demands 
placed on Logistics Management in  a program of this 
magnitude and complexity. 
Even so, I think it 
In the ear ly  days of the Saturn program, a number 
of people s ta ted emphatically that, since we were not 
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tofieldaweaponssystemin thesensethatthe
militarydoes,wedidnot,therefore,needaweapons
systemlogisticsprogram.Andthisisbasically
true. Certainlywedonotneedaprogram"identical"
totheMinutemanor to the Army's Pershing, having
been personally very familiar with the latter one.
However, differences between launch vehicle system
logistics and weapons system logistics exist only in
certain aspects. The basic problems of the two
systems are, in essence, identical. I am not at all
sure that logistic support of a launch vehicle program,
with its high rate of advancement in the state of
technology and its associated highly complex ground
support equipment, is not more difficult than lo-
gistic support to a weapons system.
The axiom: "We do not need a weapons system
logistic program," unfortunately carried with it the
implication: "We do not need a logistics program."
Misinterpretation, then, caused neglect of an inte-
grated logistics program. Thus, we have created
for ourselves a considerable problem by not allowing
enough thought and planning toward logistics at the
very outset.
By the way, based on my experience, I strongly
suspect that this may be the case in many other pro-
grams.
Well, the belated identification of the require-
ments of a logistics program led naturally to an
aggravation of one of our biggest problems, money.
CONTRACTORS
SATURH V BUREAU OF
MAHAGER BUDGET
FIGURE ii. LOGISTICS AND THE "NOT ENOUGH
DOLLAR"
In the Saturn V Program, where we have become
accustomed to talking in terms of hundreds of millions
of dollars, there now is simply not enough money to
satisfy all of the legitimate demands, or to do all the
things that our systems analysis indicates should be
done in logistics. Somewhere, something's got to
give. And, of course, it is the program manager's
job to decide what is going to give, and how much.
That is, how much of a calculated risk can he afford
to take.
With guidance and support of the Apollo Program
Office in Washington, intensive, accelerated studies
were conducted in order to mold the Saturn V logistics
program to fit the status of launch vehicle system
development and the prevailing monetary situation.
Within my Saturn V Program Office, each Project
Manager has wide latitude to exercise management
actions just as long as these actions meet established
technical performance requirements and schedule and
budget constraints.
I impose controls on my Project Managers only
to the extent that I have assurance that the afore-
mentioned parameters are met, that interfaces are
maintained, and that redundancy is eliminated. This
policy of management, by exception, has enabled us
to operate effectively and efficiently and has given my
people the incentive to perform to their fullestcapa-
bilities.
In accordance with that management concept, and
in pursuance of the logistic studies I mentioned before,
the major responsibility for adequate logistics support
was placed directly on my hardware managers. Each
of these managers examined with his contractor the
existing arrangements to determine what logistic re-
quirements were essential, which could be trimmed
back, and, on the other hand, what additional procure-
ment of logistics resources was required. This
"agonizing reappraisal" lasted over many, many
months, but, in this way, we were able to tightly
tailor, I repeat, tightly tailor, our logistics program
to meet the essential requirement of each stage, yet
stay within budget limitations.
This improved Logistics Plan is, by now, a
working part of Saturn V.
During preparation of that plan, it became clear
that we did not have proper management visibility of
the logistics activities of our contractors. It was
mandatory that we know what had been accomplished--
where we stood--and how we, or rather our con-
tractors, were progressing toward our logistic goals.
To obtain management visibility is certainly not
easy; it is especially hard in an area like logistics.
Well, we tackled this task by, first, requiring the
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contractorstoreporttousperiodicallyagainstthe
hnprovedPlan,and,second,bymaintainingcontrol
chartswhichdepicthestatusofprogress.Ofcourse,
neitherofthesemeansreplacesthedynamicindividual
logisticsmanagerbuttheyareveryeffectivetools
forhim.
Eachoneofmyhardwaremanagersnowhasa
logisticsmanager,andI haveonein myprogram
officewhoreportstomeandlooksovertheshoulders
oftheselogisticsmanagers,ourcontractorsandour
Marshallaboratorieswiththeiroutstandingtechnical
experience.All thateffortis necessarytoinsure
thatthelogisticsprogramis progressingsatisfac-
torily instepwiththeremainderoftheprogram.
Needlesstosay,mybossusesthesame"overthe
shoulder"concept.
Weplaceagreatdealofrelianceonourcon-
tractorstoexecutearealisticlogisticsprogram.
Andnowthatwehaveincentivizedmostofourcon-
tracts,weshalldependuponthemtoanevengreater
degree.Thiswill requirethatthecontractorsplace
evengreaterdemandsupontheirownorganizations.
I havemadenoefforttocatalogall theSaturnV
logisticsproblems.Suchacatalogwouldboreyou
andgiveallof'usawrongperspective.I think,
though,thatbyfacingsquarelytheprimecauseof
ourlogisticsproblems,thatis, inadequateearly
planning,andbytakingcorrespondinglyfirm and
effectivecorrectiveaction,late,yes,butnottoo
late,wehaveputtheshowontheroadfor arealistic,
facts-of-lifelogisticprog]:am.
I sometimeswonderif I don'tpresentmanyap-
pearancestomanypeople,dependingontheparticular
exposure.
Tothecontractors,I mustseemtobeatight-
fisted,penny-pinching,grouchyoldso-and-sowho
is neversatisfiedwiththeirprogressnomatterhow
hardtheywork,howoftentheyaresuccessful,and
howmuchtheycuttheircost.
Tomyownpeople,I'msureI frequentlyappear
tobeanirritable,nit-picking,hard-to-pleasemanager,
wholikesconferenceswhichlastfarintothenight.
Tothelogistician,I mustseemthoroughly
patient,heartilysympathetic,andcompletelyunder-
standingof allprogramelements,exceptlogistics,
andthatI amnotonlycompletelyignorantofthesub-jectbutplantokeepit thatway.
PleaseletmeassureyouthatI amall andnone
ofthese.
BeingaProgramManagerandexposedtomany
conflictingdemands,if I succumbedtoall ofthem,
willy-nilly,I wouldcopytheStephenLeacockcharac-
ter who"flunghimselfromtheroom,flunghimself
uponhishorse,androdemadlyoffin alldirections."
PerhapsthisFigure12will strikeasympathetic
chordwiththoseofyouwhoaremanagers.
• WORKFAITHFULLYFOR 8 HOURSA DAY
AND DON'T WORRY.
• YOU MAY BECOMEPROGRAM MANAGER
AND WORK_ HOURS A DAY AND HAVE
16
ALL THE WORRY.
FIGURE 12. TWO RULES FOR A PROGRAM
MANAGER
Not the least of the problems in the Saturn V
System is logistics. Nevertheless, I would like to
state that we of the Saturn V team, and I mean the
team of Government and industry, have found timely
solutions, even to problems which hit us like thunder-
bolts out of the blue. Admittedly, we do not always
come forward with the best solutions, but we can Hve
with our solutions, and I am confident we will make
our first Saturn V launch early next year.
6O
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CONTRACTING FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT: REAR ADMIRAL JOSEPH L. HOWARD, USN, airecter af 
(GOVERNMENT POSITION) Procurement, Office of the Assis tant  Secretary of the 
Navy (I& L) has a BA degree in economics from the 
University of California, graduated from the Naval 
War College, and completed Advanced Management 
at Harvard Business  School. 
ous articles on procurement ,  supply, and logistics 
and recently published the book "Our Modern Navy. 
During the Korean effort, he received the Navy 
Commendation Medal for  organizing and operating a 
new supply depot in  the Far East ,  and in WW I1 won 
the Bronze Star w/combat "P' f o r  service i n  the 
Okinawa Campaign. 
He has  written numer- 
In contemplating the subject of contracting for  
logistic support, i t  is appropriate at the outset to 
look at a bit of history, review present  trends in 
contracting in  general ,  and put the support question 
in  perspective. 
HISTORY 
Throughout the 19th Century, the Army and the 
Navy rel ied very heavily on government-owned 
manufacturing facilities for the production of i t s  heavy 
weapon sys tems.  
ordnance plants, the Army had i t s  a rsena ls  and 
ordnance depots. 
The Navy had its shipyards and 
The 20th Century brought the airplane, and the 
airplane in  its turn brought some new approaches to 
the production of major systems.  
Without going into the details of basic  national 
policy decisions which were made in the 'twenties, 
suffice to say  that the idea of government reliance 
on private en terpr i se  for the production of aircraft 
became well established between World War I and 
World War 11. 
A s  this reliance matured, grew, and flourished, 
we saw also the leaps and bounds in technological 
progress  that came with the 'forties and 'fifties. 
We are now i n  a n  era of technological complexity 
that involves the convergence of many divergent dis-  
ciplines in the production of operating hardware. 
Electronics sciences now have interfaces with power- 
plant disciplines. These in turn have bearings on the 
human sciences,  and we see the need for  concurrent 
efforts and trade-offs between the various possibilities 
and limitations in  chemistry,  metallurgy, biology, 
and hosts of other  lines of scientific and engineering 
endeavor. 
PRESENT TRENDS 
The t rends  began in  the 'twenties, and reliance 
on industry and the growing complexity of technology, 
are continuing today. 
In the field of government contracting, the t rends 
a r e  keeping pace, both in complexity and in  seeking 
to strengthen the economic bas is  on which the United 
States has  become prosperous and powerful. 
Specifically, the t rend i n  Department of Defense 
procurement policy is to stimulate competition among 
private industrial complexes, and to shift the burdens 
of r isk to the private sector  of the economy. 
More specifically, the Navy today has  an expressed 
policy, recently issued by Secretary Nitze, that seeks  
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notonlytointensitycompetitiveeffortamongNavy
suppliers,butequallyimportant,toassurethatthe
benefitsof competitionbekeptinviolatethrougha
policyof"handsoff"duringthecontractor!sper-
formanceofthecontract.
Alongwiththisexpressedpolicyis themoveto-
wardmorespecificdeterminationftheperformance,
quality,andreliabilitywewantinourhardware,and
lessdependenceondetailedblueprints,drawings,and
designspecifications.
Compare,forexample,theNavy'straditional
approachtoordnanceproductionandshipbuilding.In
theseareaswehavefor decadesbeentherecognized
experts.Wecouldconceive,create,design,de-
velop,andbuildnavalgunsandships.Wehad,and
still have,awomb-to-tombcapability,includinga
capabilityforsupport.
Wehaveneverhadthisin thesamedegreein
aeronautics.Wehaveacknowledgedexpertsinair-
craftandpowerplantdesign.Butgenerally,wehave
foryearsreliedveryheavilyontheinitiative,im-
petus,andimaginationofindustry.
Inaeronauticswehavestated,in termsofper-
formance,quality,andreliability,whatwewanthe
airplanetodo,whereit is tofit inacarriercon-
figuration,andhowit shouldoperateatsea. Butwe
haveleft mostofthegraphicdetailstoindustry.
Wearebeginningto applythatphilosophyin
otherfieldsaswell. TheFDLprojectis acasein
point.Thesameis trueincertainmissiles,and
torpedoes,andcommunicationsequipments.Weare
saying,ineffect,thatwewill specifytoindustrywhat
wewanthesystemtodo,andit is ourintentionto
drawonindustry'simaginationandprofitmotiveto
dotherest.
Thereareanumberofillustrationsof these
trendsofaction.Wearedrivinghardtoreducethe
useof CPFFcontracts,andshifttoincentive-types
andfixedprices.Theseplacetheburdensofeconomic
riskonthecontractors.
Weareusingweightedguidelineswhichhave
specificfactorsforcompanycontribution,company
risk, andsoforth. Wearemovingin thedirection
oftotalpackageprocurementinwhichtheAir Force
hasbeenapioneer.
PERSPECTIVE
Now,toputthesethingsinperspectiveit is im-
portantolookatthisquestionofrisk.
Therisk toacontractorinafixedpricecontract,
or in incentive-typecontracts,costor fixedprice,
is clear. It is primarilyamatterofeconomicrisk.
Thesurvivalofthecompanyis atstakeif it overruns
its coststosuchanextentthatit folds.
Thereareriskstothegovernmentaswell. The
risk, fromthegovernment'sstandpoint,is in failing
togeteitherwhatit wanted,or to gettheitemwhen
needed.Thisisparticularlycriticalin themilitary
field.
Thismeans,therefore,thatthecontractmust
beafinelybalancedinstrumentthatcontainstheright
amountof risk forthecompany,andtherightamount
ofincentivereward,togivethecompanytheneces-
sarymotivationtosucceedinperformingthecontract.
Wedonotwantodriveany company out of business.
That is not in our interest whatsoever. This is why,
from our standpoint, the penalties for degrees of
shortfall must be reasonable.
On the other hand, the penalties for shortfall
must be stringent enough to hurt. And the incentives
for success must be worth the effort to gain the re-
wards.
While we consider these factors, however, the
government must also have a contract that gives it
reasonable confidence that the right quality will be
delivered on time at reasonable cost.
The achievement of such delicately balanced
contractual instruments is most difficult. In re-
viewing most of the contracts we have today, one
might question whether we have yet achieved the per-
fect balance desired.
Now, the perspective required here is that we
have been discussing the problem of development and
production. Following these things is the problem
of support, continuing support.
Clearly, in the area of major weapon systems,
we are always in a state of calculated risk. We
assess the threats at sea, in the air, below the sea,
in space, and on land. We determine what we need to
meet those threats. And we define the time-frame
within which, or the time by which, we need the
capability required.
If we do not make it, the threat is magnified.
Think back to Sputnik and remember the pressures
we were all under in those months following that turn
of events.
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aNow, when we do in fact have a hardware capa-
bility, in the hands of the men who must use them,
and we have the trained men, the vehicles, and all it
takes to operate the weapon systems, the question of
support becomes absolutely critical.
Awesome though it is to contemplate that a hard-
ware capability might not be at hand when we need it,
it is equally critical that we have assured and con-
tinuing support for those weapons that are at hand.
THE PROBLEM
The problem in the area of support, therefore,
is in getting absolutely certain support. There can
be no ifs or buts about it. We must have it.
The problem is to structure contracts so care-
fully as to provide airtight response. If we do not
get the material we need in support, we can lose
skirmishes, battles, and wars. We can penalize the
contractor under the contract, but this would be small
penalty compared with being loser in war.
In the services, of course, we meet this problem
by building up our own in-house capabilities for supply
and maintenance support, complete with overhaul
depots, repair facilities, supply installations, stock
levels of supplies, and war reserves.
Of course, we do in fact rely on commercial sup-
pliers for a lot of these things too. We send many
equipments directly back to commercial plants for
rework, overhaul, and modification. We use basic
ordering agreements, and indefinite quantity con-
tracts for parts support on the expectation that the
moment we order something it will be forthcoming
immediately.
But generally, the theory has been that opera-
tional support must be a matter of command, not
contract This is why we have depots and overhaul
shops as organic parts of the military services.
This does not =nean, however, that we cannot
rely on industry for support. On the contrary, we
can and do. And, as we have seen in major end-item
production, and trend is definitely toward more of
the same in the support area.
We are using contractors more and more these
days to man our missile ranges and advance bases.
We are using contractors for certain support ser-
vices, for example, data collection and processing
services. We use contractors, as indicated, for
overhaul, for on-the-spot supply, and so forth.
But the problem remains one of structuring
contracts so carefully as to provide assured support
on time at reasonable cost.
With the shift from CPFF contracting, the de-
mand upon us for finely structured contracts is
greater than ever before. We shift the economic risks
to our contractors, but we assume a greater re-
sponse risk on the government's side because the
higher-order contracts carry the strong implication
of hands off.
We cannot, for example, pump in more money
just to give the contractor more people and facilities
to make him more responsive. These actions are not
in keeping with the purpose of incentive and fixed price
contracts.
We are, nevertheless, moving gradually to greater
reliance on contractors in certain of these support
areas. The total package concept is one example.
The newly evolving concepts of integrated logistics
management is another thrust in this direction.
Specification WR-30 is another thrust. Here we
enter into contracts which call for the producer to
make those parts and components he needs to keep
ahead of final assembly, but at the same time make
these same parts and components immediately avail-
able to us for deployment support where necessary.
We have to make our withdrawal decisions in time to
permit the contractor to make up some more to keep
his production line going under the prime system con-
tract. But the point is, we are relying on the con-
tractor for this material support rather than simply
buying up a provisioning quantity at the outset and
put it on our shelves to hold until we need it.
CONC LUSION
The subtitle to my remarks was labelled as the
"government position. " It is difficult, of course, to
call something a "position" unless you say I'm for it,
or I'm against it. The "position" expressed here may
seem to be equivocal and ambiguous.
Let me conclude, therefore, by summarizIng
what the "position" is. We have a proven and dem-
onstrated support system in the military services
today. We have professionals whose lives are devoted
exclusively to the methodology and techniques of
supply management, maintenance management, and
s uppo rt.
These professionals are responsive to command.
And at the same time they are responsive to the
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demandsofeconomy.Forthislatterreason,these
sameprofessionalsareconstantlyseeking,de-
veloping,andimplementingewandbetterwaysto
dothesupportjob.
Contractingfor logisticsupportisoneofthese
ways to which the professionals are wholly open-
minded. They are not only receptive, but are care-
fully expanding into the contracting approach. We
are gaining in experience in this approach, and with
this experience we are refining our contractual in-
struments to give us progressively greater assurance
that the support will be there when it is needed.
As we gain in experience and refinement, we
expect to gain in contractor response, and gain in
confidence as well. In the final analysis, it is some-
thing like learning to ride a bicycle. It scares a kid
the first time he takes off. But as he learns how to
achieve and maintain his balance, and as he gains in
experience, he gains in confidence as well.
Pretty soon he sails past the house and hollers,
"Look, Ma, no hands... "
That is the direction in which we are going in
contractor support. But we don't want to crash in
the process.
That's the government's position, as best I can
state it.
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CONTRACTING FOR LOG I STI  CS SUPPORT: GEORGE J. VECCHIETTI, NASA; Director ,  P r o c u r a m a t  
(NASA POS TION) Office, holds an LLB degree from the Catholic 
University of America. During WW I1 he served  as 
a pilot in the Army A i r  Force.  He practiced law in 
Washington, D. C. ; was with the American Commercial 
Company as Vice President; was with the Munitions 
Board of the Department of Defense; was Deputy for  
Procurement Policy, Directorate of Procurement & 
Production, Hdq. USAF; was A i r  Force policy member 
of Armed Services Procurement Regulation Com- 
mittee; and served as NASA Assistant Director of 
Procurement. 
Webster defines "logistics" as "military science 
in  i t s  planning and handling and implementation of 
personnel and materiel and facilities and related 
factors .  Now there 's  a beauty; Mr. Webster would 
have made a fine specification wri ter .  
touched a responsive chord in me which I couldn't a t  
f i r s t  identify until I realized that it reminded me of 
many of the work statements that show up in the 
government's requests  for  proposals on contracts! 
That definition 
Fortunately, e a r l i e r  speakers  have more pre- 
cisely identified the meaning of logistics, at least  
for  the purposes of this symposium, to a point where 
we can zero  in on those aspects  of procurement con- 
cerned with "contracting for  logistics support. ' ' Among 
the i tems included in the identification were: 
Spares  provisioning 
Maintenance and maintainability 
Technical documentation 
Training 
Ground support equipment 
Transportation 
Pressurants  and propellants 
contractually provided for  in most instances in  the 
contract f o r  hardware. Stop and think a moment, and 
you'll recognize a common denominator to that list. . . 
the contractual coverage on all of them almost  inevit- 
ably consists of a generic description of the i tem,  a 
requirement for  i t ,  and then sets up a procedure which, 
i n  varying degrees ,  provides for  defer ra l  of prec ise  
identification, defer ra l  of pricing, and deferral  of 
implementation action decisions. Test  the validity of 
what I've just  said against, for  example, s p a r e  p a r t s  
provisioning under any one or all of the sys tems s e t  
up under the contracts you may have awarded o r  re- 
ceived. 
(logistics support) which accounts for  about 25 per-  
cent of our  budget expenditures! 
Remember,  we are speaking of an area 
Why do I make this point? Because i t  exemplifies 
what Dr. von Braun, Dr .  Mueller, and the other dis- 
tinguished speakers  who opened this program stated 
very clear ly  about this area of logistics support; 
namely: 
1. It needs top management support. 
2. It requires  cooperative effort within govern- 
ment as well as between contractor and govern- 
ment. 
Excluding the las t  two, transportation, pres-  
surants  and propellants, which are generally the .~ 
" 1  subject of a separate  contract, the others  are ~~ ~. 
3.  We must plan, in advance, as much as o u r  
knowledrze Dermits. 
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4. Wemustdefineourrequirementsfar more
clearly,and
5. Wemustachievecost-effectivenessin the
logisticsupportaspectsofourprograms.
Whatisthevehiclebywhichthegovernment's
requirementsforlogisticssupportaretranslated
intoactuality?It's thegovernmentcontract.Thus,
thelogicalplaceinwhichtoattempttoachievethe
improvementsju tlistedwouldappeartobein the
procurementprocess.Letmeatthispointremind
youthaicontrarytoamisconceptionnquiteafew
quarters,theprocurementprocessdoesnotbegin
andendwiththenegotiationandawardofacontracL
It beginswellinadvanceofnegotiationandcontinues
farbeyondaward.It beginswiththeformulationof
arequirementandcarriesonthroughtheinitial
planninganddefinition,projectapproval,contract
definition,negotiationandaward,andlast,butnot
least,contractexecution,thatlargeamorphous
areamostfrequentlydescribedascontractadmini-
strationorcontractmanagement.
So,tothoseofyouwhoareintherequirements
generatingbusiness,thechallengeis clear;there
mustbeanintensivedrivebygovernmentandin-
dustry,workingcloselytogether,todeviseasystem
orsystemswhichwill placelogisticssupportplan-
ningandexecutiononthesameplaneofimportance
asthatonwhichtheenditemhardwareor serviceis
nowsituated.It cannolongerbetreatedasa
"sometimething,"thatis, anafterthoughtor filler
inourcontractandprojectmanagement.Early,
productiveplanningis amust. This,ofcourse,is
easiersaidthandone.
NASAhasalreadytakencertainstepsin this
directionandis currentlyworkingonothers.Wewill
berequiringinourprojectapprovaldocumentsan
exposureoflogisticssupportequirements,including
costestimates,whichshouldbeatleastasdefinitive
asourinitialcontractcoverageis today.Wehave
builtintoourProcurementPlans(thisis thedocu-
mentbywhichtopmanagementau horizesmajor
procurementactions)arequirementforevenmore
definitivediscussionandplanningonlogisticssup-
portaspects.Ourrevisedsourcevaluationand
selectionprocedureswill includesignificantweighting
ontherealism,definitiveness,andeffectivenessof
logisticssupportplanssetforthin industrypro-
posalsandwill playanappropriatepartinour
evaluationofcontractors'proposalsinacompetitive
atmosphere.WeareincorporatinginourPhased
Project Planning system provision for orderly
transition from initial logistics suppor_ concepts to
a high degree of preciseness in the sequential con-
tract phases that follow. These techniques are not
ends in themselves. Nor will they cause miracles.
But, they will force attention by proper management
levels on logistics support at every stage of our
otherwise well disciplined procurement process.
Most of you are familiar with NASA's efforts and
activities in the field of incentive contracting. Among
the many types of incentive arrangements in existence,
there is one which in my opinion is eminently suitable
for use in the logistics support area. That is the
Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF) contract as to which
NASA was a pioneer and to which we are now heavily
committed, particularly in our support service con-
tracts.
The award fee concept was arrived at as a result
of our seeking ways and means to incentivize con-
tractual efforts which were not amenable to the more
precise definition required for effective "formula"
type incentive arrangements wherein once the formula
is set at the outset, it becomes an inflexible measuring
standard for determining the contractor's reward or
penalty. If the assumptions on which the formula is
based are not based on solid fact, it founders, either
by way of windfall or heavy loss on the part of the
contractor, to say nothing of adverse effect on the
project itself. The award fee technique provides the
flexibility to adapt to circumstance lacking in the
"formula" approach. We have studied in depth our
experiences with this technique, both by in-house
teams and by contract. One clear finding has come
through in all studies, one particularly germane to
our discussions here today.
That is, that the award fee concept has caused
earlier, better planning and definition, continuous
management attention both by contractor and by
government, and, perhaps most important of all, it
has caused a dramatic improvement in communications
between contractor and government at all levels.
We are seriously considering the use of the
award fee concept in contracting for logistics sup-
port, whether it be as an integral part of the end
item development contract or as a separate contract
standing on its own terms. As a starter, you will be
seeing in the reasonably near future a NASA con-
tract, perhaps as an initial experiment, in which
logistics support aspects will be covered by award
fee arrangements.
We're also hard at work on getting meaningful,
yet early, pricing on logistics support line items.
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Youcanbeassuredofonething,NASAisnot
goingtoremainstaticin thisarea. Weareprobing
andseekingoutnewandbettertechniques.Weurge
youtojoinusinthiseffort. I'll meetandtalkwith
anyindividualor groupthatfeelsit hasevenaglim_
merofanimprovedapproachtothisdifficultarea
incontracting.
At NASAHeadquarters,theOfficeof Manned
SpaceFlightandtheProcurementOfficehavejoined
forcesinattackingtheproblemsfromacombined
programmanagementa dprocurementmanagement
viewpoint.We'reseeking,andgettingfeed-back
fromourfieldinstallations,theNASAcenterswhere
actualcontractingandprojectmanagementarecarried
out. ForrestWaller,fromwhomyou'llbehearing
shortly,hasbeenonatourofourmannedspace
flight centersin recentmonthsonbehalfofGeneral
SamPhillips,devotinghiseffortsprimarilytoseeking
improvedlogisticssupportmanagement.Ourother
centershavejoinedtheProcurementOfficeandthe
Officeof MannedSpaceFlightandits centersin
formingataskgroupworkingexculsivelyonspare
partsprovisioning,whichisbutonefacetoflogistics
support.We'veworkedwithcertainindustryassocia-
tionsonthisarea;butquitefrankly,all thathasbeen
servedupis essentiallyare-hashofoldtimeworn
proceduresthatjust"don'thackit. " What'sneeded
is imaginationandinnovation.
I'mconfidentthatwhenthisgroup,or onelikeit,
meetsfor theSecondAnnualLogisticsManagement
Symposiumnextyear,we'llallbereportingaccom-
plishmentsratherthanrecitingproblemsandpotential
solutions.You'rethepeoplewhocandoit.
Thankyou.
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( INDUSTRY POSITION) The IBoeing Co. , received his  degree in aeronautical 
engineering from the University of Minnesota. He 
joined North American Aviation, Inc. in 1937. At 
the s t a r t  of WW I1 he went to Dayton as coordinator 
between North American and the A i r  Force. After 
twenty-five y e a r s  of se rv ice  with NAA and as Director 
of Contracts, Los Angeles Division, he joined The 
Boeing Company in 1962. 
Special Assistant to the Director of Contracts, he 
ass i s t s  in negotiation of contracts with customers  
and with the establishment of policy. 
In his present  position as 
The procurement plan for any program must a t  
the outset also include in i t s  planning the logistics 
program to be followed during the total service life. 
In fact, the procurement of the logistic i tems to be 
supplied by the contractor should, to the extent they 
can be defined, be an integral par t  of the contract 
buying the basic program. 
will lead toward inadequate planning for  the total 
program. 
Separating these elements 
Contracting for  logistic support f rom the in- 
dustry point of view can be no different than con- 
tracting for any other requirement. 
of the same considerations in contracting for any 
i tem.  
It involves all 
Successful contracting has always involved de- 
veloping a c lear  statement of the work desired,  the 
schedule, and the conditions under which the con- 
t rac t  i s  to be performed. The combination should 
highlight exactly what you, our customer,  desire  
from us as contractors. 
The end result both of us  desire  from the logistic 
support program i s  that the total program be properly 
supported throughout its life. You want this to allow 
you to obtain the full benefit of the program. We also 
want it for  the same reason because we then have ac- 
complished the purpose of the contract you issued to 
us. 
An ideal logistic program would be  one that would 
never be  the cause of a program delay and, upon pro- 
gram completion, would have a zero residual of con- 
sumeable inventory. To reach such an ideal is not 
practical in a dynamic program environment. It is 
practical to s t r ive  to obtain the lowest overall cost ,  
keeping in mind cost  of delays created by a logistic 
deficiency. 
The work statement for logistic support must 
clearly se t  forth the effort that is to be  provided by 
the contractor to make s u r e  that the contractor can  
integrate these requirements  with those of the rest 
of the program for  total system effectiveness. 
a portion of the total logistic effort can  be included in  
the contractor 's  work statement, i t  will be necessary 
to establish a total plan including the elements to be 
performed by the customer.  Since most  total pro- 
g r a m s  involve more than one contractor ,  i t  will be  
highly important to highlight which of the parties in- 
volved will have the responsibility for coordinating 
the required effort. It is s imilar ly  a necessity that 
the various Government agencies a l so  be coordinated 
in their  approach to logistics. The work statement 
must recognize that the logistics program involves a 
high degree of team effort. 
Before 
A total logistics program can be compared to a 
football team. 
program must have a c l e a r  cut assignment of his 
Each of the participants in the logistics 
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responsibilityand,furthermore,anunderstanding
of hisresponsibility.Theworkstatementshould
providethefirst, andareviewofhislogisticplans
shouldprovidetheassurancethatheunderstandshis
assignment.Thisaloneisnotenough.Thepartici-
pantmustalsobecapableof accomplishingtheeffort.
It mightbenecessarytomakeaslightmodification
sothattheassignmentiswithinhiscapability.It is
oftenoverlookedthatto accomplisht eeffortyou
aretoperform,it is mandatorythatyouarealso
familiarwiththeremainderoftheplantoallowthe
bestinterfacewiththeotherparticipants.
Each of us is desirous of staying on the team.
You as the ultimate user, have a responsibility of
keeping us informed of the kind of problems we have
been giving you in carrying out your part of the total
program. A periodic analysis of your experiences,
carefully conceived and compiled on allprograms
will aid immeasurably in improving industry's total
capabilityto assist you. It would also be helpful if
you would institutetours and briefings illustrating
successes, failures, and innovations. The develop-
ment of a greater exchange between the user and the
contractors will be highly beneficial.
For us to plan the lowest cost program for you,
we must understand not only our cost but also those
you are expending in your part of the total effort.
Through this understanding we will be able to better
plan our portion of the whole so as to minimize the
total cost. There is no question that you are the
quarterback, but we'd like to be in position to make
recommendations in the huddle, that, hopefully,
would be beneficial to the total program performance.
To the extent that a contractor understands and
recognizes the customer's needs and can put himself
into the customer's shoes when conceiving and pro-
viding his system, to that extent, the customer will
get a better total system.
Let us now address our thoughts to the type of
contract that should be used for procurements. There
can't be too much argument with the criteria set
forth in the procurement regulations. The conditions
for use of each type are concise enough to properly
allow application. I am sure that you, as well as we,
have found that our respective interpretations have
in actual life varied as to the proper type. The rea-
son for our varying opinions is our assessment of
the degree of risk actually involved in the procure-
ment.
After having expended a great deal of effort in
an attempt to define the desired services and product,
we still may have a loose statement of work allowing
wide interpretation by the parties. In such a case
it might be desirable to utilize a cost type contract.
Emphasis has been to spend a bit more time to allow
the use of contracts that involve the contractor to a
greater degree in the risk of performance. Generally,
as an industry, we are not adverse to such a shift.
It has been recognized that this shift in risk makes it
desirable to remove controls instituted under the
lower risk contracts.
A great deal could be said concerning the various
methods that could be applied for management con-
trol of performance, cost and schedule. Suffice it to
say that after executing a contract, it is necessary
for the contractor to implement the contract require-
ments. He must assign the various elements of the
procurement to the responsible organizations. He
must establish a means of control to assure the per-
formance, to the schedule requirements and within
the costs negotiated with the customer. The con-
tractor should do this regardless of the type of con-
tract. It is necessary that he have control of his
total resources to assure their availability in accom-
plishing the total effort.
To assure consideration of the total system re-
quirements in the initial design, DOD has introduced
total package procurement. It allows competitive
procurement of development, production, and the
logistic effort, to the extent that it could be defined,
during the period where the selection could be made
from several contractors. The evaluation of con-
tractors' proposals under these conditions allows
consideration of the total system's effectiveness
over the life of the program as well as the product
performance set forth in the specification.
There are many incentives that are important to
us as contractors. We are energized to provide you
with a product that will enhance our reputation with
you. There is no question that we are also energized
to improve our return on the investment of our re-
sources. The use of incentive contracts has long
been recognized as a means for contractor motivation.
Initially, the use of incentive contracts was limited
to cost. Dollars are easy to define and measure.
The contractor certainly has a high degree of control
over their expenditure and the reduction in total dol-
lars required is of benefit to you, the customer.
In recent years, the use of incentive provisions
has also been applied to items of performance and
schedule. The purpose of these incentives is to
direct the contractor's attention to those elements of
greatest importance to the customer so that by maxi-
mizing these, the contractor may also maximize his
profit.
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Although contracts have not had specific in-
centives concerning the overall logisticsperformance,
these requirements have been fundamental in the de-
velopment of the product design. The improved re-
liabilityof the product has been stressed; this cer-
tainly reduces logisticcosts. The abilityto perform
the maintenance, the emphasis to reduce the skill
level requirements, and the use of parts already in
your inventory allhave the same effect.
In past programming of logistic support effort
the separation of effort between the various partici-
pants has made it difficult, if not almost impossible,
to prepare definitions and measuring techniques that
would allow the development of meaningful incentives.
In certain testprograms, totalresponsibilityfor the
furnishing of spares has been included as a require-
ment for the contractor. This then places the re-
quirement under the cost incentive features of the
contract.
In summary, I would like to say that logistics
must always be considered as part of the whole pro-
gram thatyou are buying. It is extremely important
thatwe work as a team in developing a statement of
work that clearly sets forth the work we are to per-
form and that this does not leave voids in the total
program.
In development of logistic requirements, let us
not accentuate these to the exclusion of other items,
but, instead, provide emphasis that the total system
is structured to meet the end program objectives at
the lowest overall cost to you, the customer.
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EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE: PANEL DISCUSSION 
. MEASURING LOG I STI CS PERFORMANCE: - JOHN F. SUTHERLAND, Director, Product Support, 
McDonnell Aircraf t  Corp. ,  holds a BS in mechanical 
with Naval Aviation during WW I1 in  the South Pacific, 
being credited with at least  five "kills. '' He earned 
two Distinguished Flying Crosses  and the A i r  Medal. 
He served with the Bureau of Aeronautics and was re- 
leased to inactive duty as a Lt. Commander. He has  
had more than twenty years  experience in  the field 
service,  customer service,  and product support 
divisions of McDonnell. 
MODERA TOR 
I engineering from University of California. He served  
You have been listening and been talked to for a 
day and a half, and, af ter  a few introductory r e m a r k s  
by representat ives  f rom the three military depart- 
ments and NASA, we are going to give you a chance 
to do a lot of the talking. We'll have each of the 
gentlemen say  a few things and then we'll invite ques- 
tions f rom the audience at that time. The subject of 
Evaluation of Logistics Performance is a real little 
gem because,  as severa l  of the other  speakers  have 
said,  you have a hard t ime defining the subject to 
start with, and how you evaluate it is even more  dif- 
ficult. 
get your ideas. 
Everybody has  notions and we would like to 
The whole of the defense departments and NASA 
are being evaluated on logistics performance al l  the 
t ime whether you know it or not. Some of this evalua- 
tion is in  very broad t e r m s  and is what you might cal l  
emotional. I leave to your imagination the situation 
that would occur  when a million-man North Vietnamese 
a r m y  comes roar ing  a c r o s s  the border  and captures  
a couple hundred thousand American troops and God 
knows how many tanks and helicopters because they 
are out of s p a r e  par t s  o r  POL. I can assure  you it 
would be  in the form of a Congressional Committee 
and nobody would like it. Likewise if NASA had to  
hold up for  months or years  a planned launch f o r  a 
lack of p a r t s  o r  lack of equipment o r  lack of ground 
support equipment, i t  would be evaluated in  a hurry.  
This kind of evaluation you don't want. So, in  general, 
you are a l l  being evaluated, all of the departments 
a r e  being evaluated by the public and their  elected 
representatives i n  Congress. 
the military departments are evaluating, and the 
higher up you go the broader  i s  the evaluation, and 
the less  detailed. 
ing sub-commands, the sub-commands and purchas- 
ing agents a r e  evaluation contractors ,  who in turn 
evaluate subcontractors, who in turn evaluate, by 
whatever form they use,  their  vendors. A big question 
that always occurred to me i s  who i s  evaluating the 
budgeters and planners. They s e e m  to escape this 
sor t  of thing fairly handily and, as some of the pre-  
vious speakers  have mentioned when the budget 
squeeze gets on, somehow the logistics funds get cut 
because they are the las t  ones to change. A t  the r i sk  
of repeating of what has  been said before, the logis- 
tics functions must be considered in budgetary t e r m s ,  
certainly, and planning te rms ,  absolutely. F r o m  the 
broadest plans and budget dimension to detail plans 
The headquarters for  
The commands in  turn are evaluat- 
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and budgets you have got to get in the basic design
and trade-offs, in the engineering design hardware
maintainability, in the manufacturing quality practices,
so that your logistics plans have to be evaluated all
the way up and down the lines. The subject of this
panel is how you go about evaluating this performance.
After the fact, after something has failed due to lack
of logistics consideration, planning or funding is too
late. You have to know where you stand and have
visibility on your program as you go. Unfortunately,
in the budget squeeze the logistics funds are the first
thing to be cut because they are the last thing on the
chain, and you are frequently forced into crash over-
tim 2 programs and higher expenditures than ever.
It has been said by cynics that logistics is a game
where you can't win, you can't break even, and you
can't get out of the game. We hope by having some
evaluation procedures and methodology, we don't
expect to get out ot the game, we don't even expect to
win, but we'd certainly like to break even occasionally.
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EVALUATION IMPLEMENTATION: 
PANELIST 
- - - - m n  
REARADMIRAL, H. J. P. FOLEY, J R . ,  USN, SC, 
Commanding Officer, Navy Aviation Supply Office, 
Philadelphia, is a graduate of the US Naval Academy 
and of the Naval War College. 
was in the Atlantic, Canal Zone, and the Pacific 
where he participated in seven major campaigns. 
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Gentlemen: 
I will descr ibe how evaluation of support is 
actually performed in  one defense agency, the US 
Navy Aviation Supply Office. It is not necessar i ly  a 
typical approach, but it does include techniques in 
general use in Navy inventory control points. I will 
focus on the evaluation of initial support for  a i rc raf t  
spares  and special  support equipment. 
The initial support period begins when the pro- 
duction contract is awarded, that i s ,  about three 
years  before the Navy takes over responsibility for  
support of the aircraf t .  The contractor has  a very 
large role  in  all aspects of support during this period. 
The evaluation p r o c e s s  is therefore  an integrated 
one, a joint Navy-contractor effort. This joint ap- 
proach is given full s ta ture  by inclusion in  the pro- 
duction contract of WR-30, the Navy standard for 
support during this  initial period. 
The pr ime purpose of evaluation in this period 
is to get feedback into the support control mechanism. 
That i s  how we take advantage of the knowledge 
gained through evaluation. To achieve this purpose, 
WR-30 requi res  the contractor to develop a Support 
Management Plan. The plan i s  approved by a joint 
Navy-contractor team several  months after award 
of the production contract. From then on to the 
Navy Support Date, a period of several  years ,  this 
plan i s  the principal bas i s  for  joint evaluation of 
support. The measurement  is in te rms  of progress  
through a long series of check points. 
target dates for  significant support actions by the 
contractor and by the Navy. For example, i t  states 
when the contractor will determine the s p a r e s  re- 
quirements for  individual assemblies  in the weapon; 
when he will submit specific types of technical docu- 
mentation to the Aviation Supply Office; when he will 
provide a list of special support equipment to the 
Navy. And the plan covers  the related actions re- 
quired of AS0 and other Navy agencies as well. 
The plan cites 
The actual work of measuring progress  on the 
Support Management Plan occurs  continuously by a l l  
parties. 
on a highly specific basis .  The contractor may ask  
AS0 to keep on schedule in processing cer ta in  de- 
sign change notices. AS0 may inquire of the con- 
tractor why a package of provisioning documents is 
not fully adequate. But beyond this daily evaluation, 
there is a time for a n  over-all review of progress .  
The evaluation process  peaks a t  l eas t  once a quarter .  
This is when the joint Navy-contractor team meets  
to review progress  against the plan. This is where 
the evaluation process  generates tremendous feed- 
back of information into support control. Recovery 
plans are agreed to where there  is slippage; new 
procedures are developed for  more effective joint 
action against a problem a r e a ;  and a new vision is 
gained of what must be  done to keep support actions 
on schedule. 
This generates daily questions and demands 
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4ASO's part in this evaluation process requires
a significant internal effort. There is an ASO plan
for support for each weapon. This ties back to the
joint Navy-contractor plan. It embodies a similar
approach - a detailed list of milestones to be a-
chieved over several years. Some examples are:
completion of review of the vendor's list of repair-
ables; the dates by which funds must be received to
initiate procurements; the period during which ASO
will conduct the provisioning preparedness review,
and so on. This again is a means for continuing
evaluation by the ASO weapon managers. Visibility
is achieved by monthly presentations to top manage-
ment on the status of all weapons in the initial sup-
port phase.
There are other tools for ASO evaluation of sup-
port. The operating sites scheduled to have the
weapon receive tailored lists stating delivery dates
and quantities of important spares and special sup-
port equipment. Deliveries are matched against the
lists and ASO receives progress reports from these
sites. Also, our weapon managers make scheduled
personal inspections at the sites to evaluate the
status of deliveries. So, it is apparent that the eval-
uation process operates in depth and includes the
supply people at the field level. This all serves to
supplement the regular input of on-order and delivery
information furnished to ASO by the contractor, which
we maintain in automated form.
I will mention one other important aspect of
evaluation: the informal but strong relationship
which develops between ASO personnel and the con-
tractor's representatives. Experience shows that
much is lost if we depend solely on what is written
into a contract. The common purpose, to support
the weapon, stimulates an interchange of data and
opinion when it is needed for evaluation. Happily,
it goes beyond that, to the point of mutual effort to
improve the support picture.
Which brings me to the matter of the main prob-
lems being revealed by the support evaluation pro-
cess. As you would expect, with this strong emphasis
on meeting target dates, deficiencies in the timing
of support actions are frequently revealed. Much of
this results from the twin pressures of meeting pro-
duction lead times and the urgent Navy requirement
for the earliest possible receipt of stable supply and
technical data.
Another major area pointed up in the evaluation
process is the status of funding. There is a great
variety of forces, for example, which create a
tendency toward late and incremental funding. The
Navy is learning more about what the cures are,
and about how to adjust to the funding tempo, through
evaluation.
Gentlemen, we look for improvements to come
in the techniques of support evaluation. Much of this
will result by taking advantage of the various refine-
ments in management methods and data processing
equipment. There is bound to be increased use of
ADPM for interchange of data. The emergence of
high-speed and high-capacity data communications
systems will be a significant help in the area of
timing. I envision many benefits for the evaluation
process in the more effective use of configuration
control. Finally, I believe that the increasing at-
tention being given to management information sys-
tems may well contribute to a breakthrough in sup-
port evaluation.
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Good morning, gentlemen: 
I have but a few last  words to say to this dis- 
tinguished f i r ing squad before the questions begin. 
If my neighbors at the Marshall Space Flight 
Center plan to make this gathering of logisticians 
an annual event, it should have a theme. May I 
suggest "Nobody knows the troubles I've seen. 'I 
There ' s  a shor t  poem about soldiers  I have 
always enjoyed. 
casion, with a few minor word changes. It goes 
like this: 
It s e e m s  appropriate for  this oc- 
God and Logistics we adore,  
In t ime of c r i s i s ,  not before. 
The schedule met ,  all troubles righted, 
God is forgotten, Logistics slighted. 
I have a hard t ime convincing myself that NASA 
really has  a logistics problem. 
when I wish that Army missi les  went directly f rom 
the factory into orbi t  or the Atlantic Ocean. Dis- 
counting the obvious differences between our pro- 
grams,  however, I find there are some similar i t ies .  
I shall confine myself then, to some general com- 
ments on common problems. 
There are many days 
Foremost  in  my thoughts is the reluctant con- 
clusion that there  is no magic in this business. It 
boils down to people doing a job, people in a govern- 
ment management operation and people in a contractor 
organization. Strip away the computers and the 
alphabet soup of management tools and you begin 
with people. 
Usually, I might add, they are people who 
started out to be  something else. I find very few 
young officers o r  newly graduated engineers delib- 
erately requesting assignments in  logistics. 
acquired skill. 
It's an 
When it comes time for  c red i t  to b e  given by a 
grateful public, the logistician finds himself in line 
behind the r e s e a r c h  and development people who de- 
sign and develop hardware and the men who use it. 
The spotlight shifts to the logistician only when the 
launch is delayed because some minor par t  is missing 
o r  the tanks stop because they have run out of fuel. 
We can leave an exploration of what motivates people 
to tackle careers in  logistics management for  ex- 
amination a t  some future symposium. I wonder about 
i t  now and then. 
When do the R & D people take the logistics ex- 
per ts  into their confidence? Never soon enough. 
Many of my people contend that basic  decisions on 
logistic support must  be made even before a firm 
requirement is established for  the hardware. 
I maintain there  are at least  three things a de- 
signer needs i f  he is to do an outstanding job. 
include: 
They 
1. Whatis thissystemsupposedtodo?We
callthisarequirement.
2. Second,howis thissystemtobeused?We
callthisemploymentdoctrine.
3. Third,howis thissystemtobesupported?
Wecallthisalogisticsupportplan;it includesthe
typeorganization,thelevelofmaintenancecapability
andthemethodselectedforsupplyof repairparts.
Manyofusin thisroomlearnedthatgraftinga
supportplanontoagrowingprogram,whichises-
sentiallywhatwasdonewiththeRedstonemissile
system,isnotthewaytoruntherailroad.
At theveryleast,supportplanningmustbegin
withinitialdesignofthehardware.Thisisnota
procedurethatmakesdesignengineershappy.They
areinclinedtofeelthatthehardwaremustcome
first. Workingtogether,however,thedesignerand
logisticiancanmaketrade-offsindesignandcost.
Theyusuallydonot,butthepossibilityis there.
Ourexperiencehasbeenthatif wecanspellouta
militaryrequirementorasetofspecificationsfor a
pieceofhardware,wecantakeafirst cutatspelling
outaplantosupporti in thefield. Bythetimewe
areintoacontractdefinitionphaseonanewArmy
systemsuchasSAM-D,wearereadytoprovidede-
tailedscopesof workonthelogisticsaspectsaswell
asthedevelopmentprogram.
Thereareelementsof logisticscommontoany
program.Iwouldincludemaintainabilityandreli-
abilityengineering,newequipmenttraining,manuals
andinitialprovisioningor stockageofrepairparts.
Some,suchastrainingrequirements,canbeclearly
setdownbythegovernmentprogrammanagerand
definitedirectiongiventoacontractoratthevery
outsetoftheprogram.Others,suchasinitialpro-
visioning,requireclosecoordinationbetweengovern-
mentandindustry,betweenthesupportman,the
reliabilitymanandthedesigner.Again,there'sno
magictoit, justplainhardworkandcooperationre-
quiredtoprepareaverydetailed,timephasedbreak-
outofwhatwillberequired,whenit willberequired
andwhois goingtodoit. Butyoumustdoit early,
youcan'twaituntilit's failedtoaskforsupport.
Experienceountsmostrighthere. Weplanan
initial stockofspares,forexample,fromdesign
knowledge,reliabilityknowledgeduringdesignand
maintainabilityengineeringandknowledgeained
fromothersystems.Theinitialstockofsparesis
ourbestengineeringestimateofwhatwill bere-
quiredtosupporttheitemonceit is fielded.Even
beforethatis needed,however,someonemustassess
thesystemandprovidespares,andmoney,tocover
contingenciesthatwill undoubtedlycropupduring
adevelopmenttestprogram.Oncetheitemis opera-
tional,of course,failuredatafromthefieldcanbe
usedtorefinethecalculations.
Whenit comestorelationswithacontractor,
I feelcommunicationsmeanasmuchasthetypeof
contract.Wehavenothadenoughexperiencejust
yetwithincentivesfor metopassjudgementon
whetheror notincentivesholdanyrealadvancefor
thelogisticsbusiness.Mybestguessis thatthere
is anopportunityhere,specificallyin theareaof
reliability. Theweightofourcontractincentivesi
ontheelementsofrisk. Theytendtobeinthehard-
waredevelopmentandhowwellweplanourlogistics
beforetheitemis fielded.
BycommunicationswithacontractorI'mrefer-
ring,ofcourse,tothelanguagein thecontract.
Veryearlyinthegamethegroundrulesmustbere-
ducedtowriting. Whatthecontractoris todomust
beincontract.
Andit mustbespelledoutindetail...
Andit mustbeclearlyunderstoodbybothparties
tothecontract.Wehavefoundout,thehardway,
thattherecanbegrossdifferencesin interpretation
oflanguageb tweengovernmentandcontractor,yet
bothpartiesarereadingthesamewordsin thesame
document.
Now,howdoyougoaboutpreventingsuchmis-
understandings?Youmightbeinterestedinoneap-
proachthatisworkingwellfor usin themanagement
of theLancemissilesystem.Lancehasatotalpro-
gramincentivecontractwhich,byits nature,pro-
videsthecontractorf eedomtoexercisemanagement
judgement.Theprimecontractincludespecifications
for theenditem. Managementusesacomprehensive
PERTandPERT/COSTsystemasatoolfor visibility.
Theinitial approachto limit misinterpretations
wastoplaninconsiderabledetail. Oneresultwas
morethan10,000PERTevents,butastheprogram
progressed,wefoundwehadtheoldproblemof de-
cisioninterfacecroppingup.
Asahypotheticalexample,industrymightbe
workingtowardaninterimreliabilityof say50per-
centfromasamplebasedonsix tests;whereas,the
governmentconsidered80percentfromasampleof
20testsessefitialbeforeproceeding.Obviouslythere
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wascausefor disagreementonwhatconstitutedreal
progresstowardthedesiredenditemreliability.
Lancesettledonamanagementapproachre-
ferredtoas"quantifiedmilestones,"asasolution.
Previously,programmilestoneshadbeenestablished
anddefinedbydescribingtheevent,butnotthelogic
andtheconditionswhichconstrainedtheevent.
TheArmyprojectmanagerandhistoppeople
satdownwiththeircounterpartsinthecontractor
organizationandagreedtoquantifyseveralkeypro-
grammilestonesbydelineatingprogramobjectives
toadegreesuitablefor usebyall membersofthe
team.
Thisinvolvedwritingadescriptionofeach
activitywhichconstrainsamilestoneandspellingit
outinspecifics.Todothis,youmusthaveforeach
majorsystemcomponentaperformancespecification
describingthedesiredprogressiontowardenditem
performance.Theminimumnumberoftestsmust
bedetermined,for example,andthehardwarecon-
figurationidentified.Inbrief, thisagreement
formallyconveystheminimumessentiallogicneces-
sarytostartthemilestoneinquestion.Inatotal
programpackage,youmayhavetoquantify10or
moremilestones,butonceyouhavedoneit andapply
PERT, you have an effective management tool which,
so far at least, has provided consistent program
visibility.
There are many such tools to achieve visibility.
Line of balance charts are in common use. So are
regular progress reports from the contractor,
periodic meetings and program reviews. But again,
there is no magic involved.
We have found that the best way to get manage-
ment visibility of a contractor's performance, in
logistics, development or production, is with plain
blue or brown eyeballs. You put people in the con-
tractor's plant and they look over his shoulder and
they ask nasty questions. I have been a program
manager and I have sent people into plants to stick
with a critical item or problem. Sometimes I've
gone myself. After ten years in the missile business,
I must confess that I do not have a better way to do
it.
So you say, what's new? That's just my point.
Nothing is really new.
I suppose that is why no one I know in the lo-
gistics business is content with the system he is
using. We have yet to really apply technology to
logistics. When we have, we have settled for mar-
ginal improvements. Computers, for example, are
in widespread use but they are keeping the records
we have always kept.
We are fond of saying that guided missiles have
revolutionized warfare. If they have, we are over-
due for a corresponding revolution in how we support
them. Today the logistics system we use for missiles
is essentially the same as we use for trucks and
rifles.
Yet missiles are different and I believe they de-
mand different logistics. We are dealing with high
cost, sophisticated low density items, and the lo-
gistics system should be tailored to the item, not
the other way around. I cannot reconcile this with
standardization. I'm just stating the problem as I
see it.
Some new things are being tried.
Our Hawk battalions in Viet Nam, for example,
are in good shape. The units were deployed with
mandatory stockage. We are supporting them di-
rectly from my Supply and Maintenance Diredterate
here at Redstone Arsenal. The funds are here and
the people are here. The units draw directly on us
for whatever they need. We have recorded deliveries
on requisitions from those units in less than six days.
We are doing it by by-passing a good portion of the
normal Army supply system.
At the same time we have begun some research
and development on logistics using Hawk as our
model. We are looking not for problems, but for
causes of problems. We have established a mathe-
matical model of the present system which we shall
modify gradually to determine the points of sensitivity
to determine what to change. This model was re-
viewed by Research Analysis Corporation and ac-
claimed as an advance in the state-of-the-art. I
shall withhold my comment until something comes
out the pipeline. The point I am making is that for
the first time we are doing some R&D in logistics
systems which I think is 40 years late.
Having said that, let me conclude with this
thought. I am told symposium panelists are expected
to throw out thought provoking statements to stimulate
discussion. Here's one:
NASA has a very special logistics problem, one
in which the experiences of the military and industry
may not even apply. In drawing up a logistics system
to satisfy its special needs, NASA has a chance
that military logisticians never get, a chance to
start absolutely fresh.
The only real advice I can give you is try it.
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General, you really threw out quite a challenge 
and perhaps we can discuss some of the things which 
we are doing at NASA which may be surpr is ing and 
pleasing to you. I hope so anyway. Now I have been 
asked today to discuss  the area of support versus  
total p rogram evaluation. In my view, I'd like to  
b reak  this thing down in to two pa r t s ,  because you 
have to have a base on which you can discuss the 
subject, support, evaluation, program evaluation, 
and things of this nature. 
The first par t  concerns management and manage- 
ment pract ices ,  systems analysis techniques, which 
are used whether we start a t  the end of the program, 
la te ,  whether we start at the middle of the program, 
and whether we start at the very beginning. Last  
November we in NASA and Apollo Program Office 
published the Apollo Logistics Requirements Plan. 
We call  it 7500. 1. 
engineering approach to logistics management. It 
was specifically developed for the Apollo program 
calling upon our backgrounds, the 375 series docu- 
ments,  and the WR30 documents of the Navy; and i t  
embodies,  o r  the plan embodies, management ap- 
proaches and techniques to acquire,  t rack,  and affect 
cost  trade-offs. 
Now since implementing this plan, over  the past  
yea r ,  our  efforts have been devoted primarily to  im- 
proving o u r  contracts,  both the contents and the 
quality of them. Further  development in the refine- 
ment of ou r  in-house capability, to determine, to 
t rack,  and to measure ourselves,  measure not only 
This document is a systems 
This is the middle of the program. 
what we're doing but also what the contractors are 
doing. I believe that we have made major p rogres s  
but we s t i l l  have quite a long way to go before we 
will have anything such as mathematical formulas,  
symbologies, r z k i n g  matr ices ,  incentive s t ruc tu res ,  
o r  nomographs for use in day-to-day working rela- 
tionships. They're r e a l  hard to develop. Plenty of 
textbooks are available, many government phamphlets, 
and many industry phamphlets, but the practical  ap- 
plication where there is a good payoff to the program 
takes hard analytical adjustments and assessments  
of those documents. 
That's my f i r s t  point. The second point i s ,  i n  
my opinion, the overriding logistics management 
problem today, and i t  has  emerged here  as the single 
point of this whole symposium. We have to  start 
ear ly ,  in the initial phases of the program; we need 
to preplan early.  That is the par t  that program of- 
fices must,  of necessity,  accept, and logistics goals 
and milestones must be included as an integral ele- 
ment of program management. In the initial phases 
of the program we have alternatives for bes t  balances 
which we don't have available i f  you come in at the 
middle o r  the end of the program. To my knowledge, 
this is the only time in the hardware life cycle 
wherein logistics objectives can be developed; they 
can be analyzed in relation to total program objectives 
and missions.  
various program approaches can be broached on an 
individual o r  eqvdl bas i s  for cost and compatibility 
comparison. 
This i s  the only time where all the 
Interactions to other essential  program 
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elements{design,manufacturing,test,andopera-
tions)logisticsrequirements,andtheresourcesat
thispointandtimecanbeestimated,theycanbe
refined,andtheycanbequantified.
Dowereallyhavetodevelopaseparatelogistics
systemforeachkindofsystemthatwearegoingto
comeupwithin thefuture?Whatdowemodify?
Somethingin thebasesupportarea,maybeasa
commonplacebackupsupport?Systems-wiseit could
easilyevolveintosituationwherewehaveapeculiar
systemofsupportalmostfor eachsystem.I don't
know.Wehaven'tstudiedit. Thebestmeansmust
beselectedfor achievingthelogisticsobjectivesand
in turnit mustbeintegratedirectlytowardcommon
programgoals.
Managementpracticesandsystemsanalysis
techniquesI thinkcanbeidentified.Proceduresfor
acquiring,tracking,andmeasuringlogisticsper-
formanceshouldbedevelopedinamannerandtime
frameforimplementationwhichwill contributeto
therealizationofoverallprogramgoalsatthelowest
practicaltotalcost. Thesemustbeconsistentwith
programscheduler quirements.Now,actionis
currentlyunderwayin thesecondinstanceofNASA
tomeethischallenge.We'renowintheprocessof
developingachecklistoflogisticsactions,andI
knowyouheardGeneralPhillips,myboss,yesterday.
Hehasachecklisttocovereverything.Sodidother
peoplementionthis;butwearedevelopingacheck-
list whichwewill recommendforinclusionanduse
in theirphaseprojectplanning,whichDr. Mueller,
also,mentionedyesterdayandofwhichMr. Vecchietti
alsospokeinpassingthismorning.
Whenthiseffortis consumated,ourlogistics
supportsystemsandtheattendantresourceswillbe
consideredearlyandtheywillbesubjectedtothe
samecriticalanalysisasothermajorplanningele-
mentsoftheprogram.TheDepartmentofDefense
isalsoworkingonthissubjectthroughtheLogistics
ManagementInstitute.Logistics;Management
InstituteProject6615contemplatesthedevelopment
ofaintegratedsystemoflogisticssupportplanning,
requirement,andguidanceforusethroughoutall
phasesoflife-cycleofweaponsystems.NASAand
LMIhaveestablishedaninformalinterfacetoex-
changeinformation,particularlyin techniquesof
measurementandmeasurementanalysis.Other
managementac ionsofaninterrelatedandcomple-
mentarynatureareunderwayundertheguidanceof
Mr. Vecchietti.Theseincludethedevelopmentof,
one,ahandbooktobeusedasaguidein thepre-
parationofcontractworkstatements,theperformance
profilefor contractorperformancesvaluation,and
thesparepartsprovisioningdocumentfor agency-
wideusewithinNASA.
Theforegoing,inmyview,areimportantsteps
in theamalgamationfsystemsmanagementmethods,
particularlyforapplicationanduseinthemanage-
mentandcontrolofourlogisticsrequirementsand
attendedresources.However,considerableworkis
still requiredtoinsurethatweupgradeourselves
andtakeadvantageofthemanymanagementtech-
niqueswhichareavailableforon-the-jobapplication.
I amremindedof aquotefromAdmiralRayburnof
Polarisfame,"if youcanthinkoutaplan,youcan
alsowriteit down." I wouldliketogoonestep
further. If youcanwriteit down,it canalsobe
brokenoutintotasks. If youcantestit youcan
establishmilestones.If youcanmilestoneit, you
canflowdiagramthethingfor tracking.Youcan
placeweightsonit forranking,andthenyoucan
incentivizeit. Nowwhathisreallymeansi that
weshouldbeabletomakepracticalapplicationof
thesetechniqueswhicharehelpingtomakelogistics
andlogisticsmanagementatrueprofessionaltech-
nology.Thankyou.
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If you have been waiting for  the end to find the 
answer to this logistics problem this i s  your las t  
chance, and I'm s o r r y  I don't have the answer. I t  
a l so  makes i t  difficult to tell you something new, and 
the speech I had prepared has been torn up long ago. 
I want only to reflect on some things that have been 
said,  for  I feel that they affect the ability to get pro- 
curement ,  to influence, and to measure  the per- 
formance of the logistics function. There 's  currently 
a lmost  a revolution in our  procurement field and the 
incentive contracts that have been mentioned give a 
very  wide opportunity for  all of us  to improve the 
utilization of these incentive features. I know from 
my own point of view and from the fair ly  broad range 
of forms  of incentive contracting to which we have 
gone in the Air Force ballistic program that we have 
yet to achieve a very fine balance in these incentives. 
Probably the best example I can give you of 
measuring logistics performance through the pro- 
curement  process is  the most  expensive single cle- 
ment of Minuteman, the guidance control system, 
which i s  a little under a half million dol lars  pcr  
copy. F o r  a thousantl-missile force ,  lhis i s  a very 
high-priced item for  logistics support. In the plan- 
ning f o r  the spares  and spares sys tems and compo- 
nents for  this, you can well imagine thxt there has 
been a g r e a t  deal of effort that's gone into estab- 
lishing a budget for  reliability in thc mean-time 
between failurc of the gyros and  the various ele- 
nients of the systems. 
In concert  with the development of the la tes t  
version of this guidance and control system, my 
friends in the atomic scientific brotherhood have been 
inventing new weapons, and they have had their  ef- 
fects  on our  sys tems.  So we had to re-design the 
guidance and control system after i t  was in develop- 
ment ,  and you cau appreciate the impact on logistics 
and logistics planning. We had a c r i t i ca l  design re- 
view on the cur ren t  model in April 1963, another one 
a year  later in  April 1964, and a final one in February 
1965. Thus, considering cr i t ical  design reviews of 
a system that was changing that much, you can imagine 
the problems that would have been forced upon a lo- 
gistics planner i f  the engineers had come up with a 
plan to contract  for logistics support in 1962 and had 
been expected to s tay with it.  
There is a very severe  problem, however, with 
the mean-time between fai lure  which i s  now beginning 
to be exposed in the field. Our f i r s t  experience says  
that our planned logistics sys tems a r e  not sufficient 
to support the experienced mean-time between fail- 
u r e s .  Also, our f i sca l  1967 procurement of these 
sys tems was based on incentive contracts  that re- 
warded the contractor principally in the areas of cost  
and some of the elements of accuracy. 
seem r ight  to have the principal incentive based on 
c o s t  of thc system, where our  main concern was in- 
c r e a s e  in the mean-time between failure. So we 
modificd the contracts  and we have a very s t rong 
I t  didn't 
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mincentive for Autonetics, North American, to meet
and even increase the mean-time between failure of
this system. It will be measured through the pro-
curement plan, so we have what I think is an oppor-
tunity to experiment with some incentive features
which influence logistics planning.
Now back to last night and Dr. von Braun's de-
scription of the "brave new world" for the Society of
Logistics Engineers. I believe it's really true. I
think that the challenge General Zeirdt made to NASA
means that the evolution and the expansion, almost
explosion, of the procurement process can be ac-
companied by some imagination and some very des-
perately needed effort in the engineering of the lo-
gistics systems so these can be incorporated earlier
in the procurement process. This integration effort
probably will swing like a pendulum and we will be-
come tied up in the contractual arrangement between
the government, the Air Force, and industry in
logistics objectives that may not be met. But after
we have allowed the pendulum to swing from where
it is now with almost no integration, to the other
direction, I think we will have the opportunity to
make something out of the marriage of the procure-
ment system with the logistics system, and the
engineering of both. And, as Sterling Smeltzer was
describing the wall for logistics with the logistics
element bricks held together with the mortar of ele-
ment integration, I mentally built the other wall that
keeps the auditorium in balance. This other wall is
built of program management discipline blocks in-
cluding reliability, configuration management,
logistics support, and procurement. The mortar
which holds the blocks together is the integration of
these disciplines with total program requirements
and management. However, the walls must be built
together and at the same time, to provide a usable
auditorium.
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QUESTIONSAND ANSWERS: MODERATORANDPANEL
Mr. Sutherland: Now who has a question? We
are running a little behind, but would like to get as
many questions as possible.
Question: Mr. Waller, you mentioned something
about a logistics checklist. Can you tell me when
that will be available?
Mr. Wailer: I can't give you the kind of answer
that I would like to, but I can tell you about where we
stand. The checklist is somewhere between 65 and
70 percent complete. Our target date for getting it
into the hands of the normal review cycle is about a
month and a half away. I'm convinced we'll meet
that deadline. We will then proceed in the normal
coordination cycle, but planning instructions are
from the agencies in the first place so I don't view
that your're going to get them before a year and a
half at the outset.
Question: I don't know how to phrase it, but there
is a nagging thought in the back of my mind as a result
of conversation about evaluation of performance. In
this 25 percent of our budget there is an opportunity
to make a great savings. General McCoy has pointed
out improvements in reliability and also maintain-
ability, but the crux of the problem perhaps lies in
the selection of the contractor in the first place. We
are in a system where we select contractors on a com-
petitive basis, and our contracting officers are hard-
nosed enough to want their answers in dollars. I think
we've got a real tough problem in deciding how to eva-
luate predictive reliability and maintainability in a
contract selection process.
General McCoy: Precisely! One of the answers
we are looking for concerns how you go about evalu-
ating this very nebulous sort of thing. All contractors
promise wonders.
Question: I have one for General Zierdt. The
question is, what methods does the Army use to insure
logistics consideration in their trade-off studies during
the preconceptual and conceptual phase?
General Zierdt: I have in my command main-
tenance engineers and production people, and they
are made part of the boards and sub-boards and sub-
committees which we set up for evaluation. I think
this is one of the best things you get out of a commod-
ity command in the Army. I have here on one installa-
tion people who are experts in maintenance and reli-
ability. They were a real and complete part of the
SAM-D evaluation, for example, and will continue to
be so as we go through the contract definition phase
that we are in now. Does that answer your question?
question?
Question: Yet that answers it. I have one more
question. What specific method of measurements do
you use?
General Zierdt: I think that the specific method
of measurement is something that the engineers have
to decide. What performance do you want out of this
particular item, this monster that you're creating?
I could break it down into its components and could
give you specifics but I would have to sit down with
an engineer and we would have to determine each one
on its merits. I don't see any other way to do it. We
have people who are qualified in the guidance field.
They know what the state of the art is in the guidance
so they would determine what the factors are ahead of
time.
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CLOSING:JOHNF. SUTHERLAND
I'd liketoreadyouonelittle gemonthegeneral
theoryofleavingthemlaughing.I thinkthisis
fairly funny,andI thinksomeofyouhavereadit.
I chasedit backtoabout1936andI'mstill looking
for theauthor;I amsurehecameoutoftheArmy.
It's asummarizationflogisticians.It sayslo-
gisticiansareasadandbitteredraceofmen,very
muchindemandinwar,whosinkresentfullyinto
obscurityinpeace.Theydealonlywithfacts,but
mustworkfor menwhomerchantin theories.They
emerge during war because war is very much fact.
They disappear in peace because in peace, war is
mostly theory. The people who merchant in theories,
who employ logisticians in war and ignore them in
peace, are called generals. Logisticians hate
generals. Generals are a happily blessed race who
radiate confidence and power. They feed only on
ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace they
strive confidently to invade a world simply by
sweeping their hands blandly over a map, pointing
their fingers decisively up terrain corridors and
blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their
hands. In war they must stride more slowly because
each general has a logistician riding on his back, and
he knows that at any moment the logistican may lean
forward and whisper in his ear, "Oh, you can't do
that. " Generals fear logisticans in war, and in peace
generals try to forget logisticians. Marching along
beside generals are strategists and tacticians. Lo-
gisticians despise strategists and tacticians. Strate-
gists and tacticians don't know about logisticians
until they grow up to be generals, which they usually
do. Sometimes a logistieian gets to be a general.
In such a case he must associate with generals whom
he hates. He has a retinue of strategists and tacticians
he despises, and on his back is the logistican whom
he fears. This is why a logistieian who gets stars
also gets ulcers and cannot eat his ambrosia."
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CONCLUSION
The objectives set forth for the symposium
were:
1. definition of logistics elements to serve as
a common base of understanding.
2. development of an effective communications
vehicle for exchange of support information between
NASA, DOD, and industry.
3. presentation of support management tech-
niques and procedures to program management.
4. presentation of program support require-
ments to all echelons of Government and industry
management.
5. determination of a requirement for program
support standards for future support programs.
6. development of closer relations between pro-
gram and support managers of Government and in-
dustry.
A study of the papers presented shows that all
of the cited objectives were satisfied, except for ob-
jective 5, the development of program support stan-
dards; even so, the principles set forth in the papers
will serve as a sound basis for the subsequent de-
velopment of standards.
One symposium objective was the establishment
of a logistics management communications link be-
tween NASA and industry at the top and program
manager levels. An allied objective was to thoroughly
explore the broad facets of support management ior
establishing a base of understanding for top and
program managers. This was accomplished in such
a way that the timeliness of support program imple-
mentation was emphasized. This will insure con-
sideration of these requirements as related to the
pertinent program schedule milestones to preclude
costly get-well procedures which would compensate
for delayed support implementation.
The Air Force, Army, and Navy described their
present procedures for program support and related
them to possible NASA use. While a presentation of
present practices does not satisfy the need for a
future guide, it does provide an absolutely necessary
base for planning the next symposium, especially
if one of the objectives is "where do we go from here. "
Objectives which were not fully achieved during
the First Annual Management Symposium which were
outgrowth from discussions during the Symposium,
or which were reserved for later meetings, are of
five general categories. These include:
1. an examination of the elements of logistics
support.
2. determination of detailed methods of manage-
ment and control of logistics support, including con-
tracting, identification of critical elements, methods
of display and methods of monitoring.
3. development of NASA standards for logistics
requirements which will provide a checklist or guide
for scoping each support program in accord with the
requirements of specific programs.
4. development of practical advanced predictive
procedures for support programs based on present
and past programs.
5. development of a logistics formal education
program which will enable logisticians to broaden
their technical knowledge and also privde a reservoir
of formally educated personnel for work in the lo-
gistics field.
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CLOS ING REMARKS: BRIGADIER GENERAL EDMUND F. O'CONNOR
On behalf of Dr. yon Braun, and also speaking
for myself, let me express my gratification as this
First Annual Logistics Management Symposium
draws to a close.
I think there is no doubt in anyone's mind that it
has been a success. I have learned a great deal in
the past day and a half, as I am sure all of you have.
I feel certain that program management now has a
deeper appreciation for the logistics elements of
their program, and the logistics manager must ap-
preciate more readily the many problems faced by
the program manager. All of this makes for better
relations and improves management.
My personal thanks go to all of the speakers
who so graciously consented to be with us. And I
would be remiss in my duties if I did not also express
the thanks of all of us to you very busy managers
who have interrupted your schedules to listen to the
proceedings.
Let me assure you that we do not intend now to
rest on our laurels. We shall continue to seek even
greater understanding of management and shall strive
to carry out a program of effective logistics manage-
meat in accordance with the principles outlined during
this symposium.
I sincerely hope that very shortly we shall see
the establishment of the educational program which
Dr. von Braun outlined last evening, and once again
I should like to reaffirm that Marshall Space Flight
Center not only supports this proposal, but will
actively participate in its development.
It has been a very great pleasure for me to have
acted as your host. Again my thanks and best wishes
for a continued and increasing interest in logistics
management.
We shall all look forward to the time when we
shall meet again next year.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. MEMORANDUM OFAGREEMENTBETWEENAFLC/AFSC
PART I AFLC SUPPLY TASKS
AFLC SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE DIS-
CHARGED DURING CONCEPTUAL, DEFINITION,
AND ACQUISITION PHASES IN SUPPORT OF THE
OPERATIONAL PHASE OF SYSTEM PROGRAMS.
TASK NO.
1
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Expand SOR Supply concept in:
a. Section 8 PSPP
b. Section 8 SPP
c. Materiel Support Plan
Update as required Section 8:
a. PSPP
b. SPP
Develop and project common/standard AGE (MGE) quantitative requirements for
support of the operational program.
Develop fund requirements for all initial spare parts (including provisioning
documentation) for inclusion in PSPP/SPP, Section 11.
Develop and disseminate Weapon System Equipment Component List (WSECL).
Prepare and distribute initial Controlled Mission Equipment (CME) and Absolute
Essential Equipment (AEE) list and revisions.
Obtain end item applicability of spare parts requested by contractor.
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TA SK NO.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Determine procurement data requirements for Spares and Spare Parts.
Apply MIL-D-26715 data:
a. Initiate Requirements.
b. Place on Contract
c. Process Data.
Determine supply support system (e.g., Vol XXIII, AFM 67-1, etc. ).
Activate supply support system.
Establish qualitative and quantitative requirements for facilities to support un-
conventional storage and warehousing requirements; ammtmitions, fuels, ex-
plosives, etc.
a. Organizational.
b. Field.
c. Depot.
Establish criteria for contractor supply support for Cat III Testing and operations.
Determine the utilization of residual assets received from Acquisition Phase for
operational use.
Prepare and implement plan for maximum use of assets received from other
Government agencies, e.g., Army, FAA, etc.
Code listings of RPIE spare parts which will be CP/BP supported.
Prepare Statement of Provisioning Policy (Forms 263 and 263A).
Conduct guidance meeting (AFPI 71-673/674).
Provisioning Programming Check Lists (Forms 321 series and Form 555) :
a. Programming Preparation.
b. Processing.
c. Dissemination.
Determine repair kit requirements for recoverable items.
Compute Ware Readiness Materiel (WRM) requirements.
Process applicable supply management data and determine interchangeability and
standardization data (MIL-I-8500).
Review and determine Figure 2 data for AFLC to be incorporated into MIL Hand-
book 300 (Appendix C, MIL-D-9412).
Obtain from AFSC official Noun-Name to equipment (MIL-N-18307C) or
(MI L-N-7513C).
88
TASK NO.
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Obtain from AFSC official type designation for equipment (MIL-STD-196/ANA
Bulletin 440, MIL-STD-155).
Initiate actions to update, modify or dispose of assets affected by Configuration
Control Board actions.
Analyze supply data obtained from Development, Test and Site activation programs
for utilization in preparing budgets and computation of requirements to support
Operational Phase.
Establish quantitative requirements for AGE (MGE) for operational program
(AFPI 71-650).
Prepare shipping instructions for AGE (MGE) to operating command (AFPI 71-
65O).
Provide provisioning Spare Parts order to contractor (AFPI 71-673).
Assure that operational supply support considerations are covered in site
selection surveys.
Resident provisioning team operation for support of the operational phase:
a. Initiate necessary contractual actions.
b. Conduct operations.
e. Provide representatives to provisioning teams.
d. Provide SPD with periodic status reports.
Develop provisioning policies and procedures to be used in the acquisition of all
initial spares for systems/equipment.
Initial Spares lay-in (org, field, depot):
a. Establish stock levels.
b. Establish delivery schedules.
c. Initiate shipping instructions.
d. Maintain status of lay-in.
e. Provide SPD with periodic initial Spares lay-in status reports.
Insure timely programming of DD 780 Common Standard type equipment for
support of operational program.
Develop supply support documentation inputs to the system contract for support
of operational phase:
a. Contractual exhibits.
b. Work statements.
Develop contractual requirements for the preparation and submission of
engineering data (cataloging, standardization, etc., ) required for operational
support. AFLC/AFSC Manual 310-1.
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TASKNO.
38
39
4O
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
5O
51
52
53
54
55
56
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Establish supply milestones to reflect actions necessary for operational
program.
Develop applicable cataloging specifications (i. e., prescreening, etc. ) for
inclusion in contracts.
Provide supply input to international agree ments relating to A F LC's operational
support.
Compute requirements, manage, and accomplish provisioning/source coding
for acquisition of initial spares for operational programs.
Provide supply operational support inputs to host-tenant agreements.
Review and comment where appropriate, on AGE plan and Figure 1.
Chair AGE (MGE) contractor provisioning guidance meetings (AFPI 71-650).
Review Section 6 and update Section 8, PSPP/SPP, to insure an orderly transition
of supply support from Acquisition to Operational Phase.
Establish basis of issue on Figure A for AGE (MGE).
Implement the principles of Selective Item Management. (Hi-Valu).
AFLC TRAINING EQUIPMENT SUPPLY RESPONSI-
BILITIES TO BE DISCHARGED DURING CONCEPTUAL,
DEFINITION AND ACQUISITION PHASES IN SUPPORT
OF OPERATIONAL PHASE.
Develop the operational supply support plan for training equipment for inclusion
in Section 8, PSPP/SPP.
Develop operational spares support program data for trainers and training
equipment.
Develop policies and procedures covering disposition of ATC's trainer and
training equipment.
Develop the operational supply support documentation inputs to training equipment
contract (s).
Develop or approve and publish table of allowance documents for training
equipment.
Prepare and publish stock list catalogs for Training Equipment and Spares.
Accomplish training equipment inventory control.
Accomplish NORS, critical item, etc., status reporting for Class I Training
Equipment.
Provide operational supply support input to training equipment portion of
transition agreement.
9O
TA SK NO.
1
10
11
12
13
14
15
PART II AFLC MAINTENANCE TASKS
AFLC MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE
DISCHARGED DURING CONCEPTUAL, DEFINITION
AND ACQUISITION PHASES IN SUPPORT OF THE
OPERATIONAL PHASE OF SYSTEM PROGRAMS.
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Develop Maintenance Engineering plans and requirements for inclusion in Section
8 of PSPP/SPP.
Provide maintenance representation in System Source Selection Board proceedings.
Provide maintenance input for preparation of Category III Test Support Plans.
Develop qualitative and quantitative requirements and time-phased schedules for
facilities to support depot maintenance.
Analyze test program results for maintenance implicaUons.
Insure preparation of -06 Work Unit Code Manuals to permit AFM 66-1 data
collection for operational maintenance program.
Plan depot level maintenance capability, i.e., SRA/MDA/Contraetor.
Provide maintenance representation for Engineering Inspections and other
reviews, e.g., DEI, FACI, etc.
Establish Repair Programs for reparable items:
a. GFAE Common
b. GFAE Peculiar
c. DSA Items
d. GFP and/or Bailed
Determine quantitative AGE requirements for Depot level maintenance.
Provide response to Maintenance Engineering queries from USAFI ATC, Using
Commands, etc., concerning the operational phase and including the Category
III test programs.
Respond to EUR, MIP, and Accident/Incident Reports as pertains to operational
phase.
Determine Depot requirements for Contract Technical Services Personnel (CTSP).
Develop and/or review operational maintenance portions of JointTenancy Support
Agreements (AFR 11-4).
Resolve maintenance interface problems between Contractors, Using Command,
AFLC, A FSC, and other services pertaining to the operational phase, including
the Category HI test program.
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TASKNO.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
92
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Determine reparability of all items of materiel; select, source code, and
establish maintenance factors for Air Force spares and spare parts support.
Issue immediate, urgent and routine action T. O. 's.
Participate in the selection of specific items for configuration accounting.
Establish Depot tooling schedules.
Present the AFLC position on updating changes/modifications to the SPO CCB.
Establish operational maintenance data collection system in consonance with
AFM 66-i for the system.
Review standard failure data to determine trends and initiate MIP action.
Review contractor mathematical logistics models (repair cycle) for operational
maintenance implications.
Develop maintenance workload requirements for SRA's/MDA's.
Provide maintenance input for updating characteristic screening data.
Determine adequacy of and provide effective instructions for corrosion
prevention/control procedures.
Develop the AFLC maintenance aspects of the plan for transition of systems and
equipment engineering from AFSC to AFLC.
Validate -6 inspection and work card procedures and requirements.
Review and recommend tools and equipment for inclusion in ECLs.
Assure compatibility of Section 8 maintenance concepts and requirements with
Sections 5 and 6 of PSPP/SPP.
Establish which items must be organically support from initial turnover and
develop time phase plan to insure SRA by need date.
Develop a plan for periodic review of depot maintenance to insure maximum field
maintenance is being accomplished by the using command.
Prepare precise maintenance criteria as to what will be inspected/demonstrated
during engineering inspections (AFR 80-28) and test programs (A FR 80-14).
Establish maintenance requirements for GEEIA installation engineering and
installation technical data.
Participate in the Design Reviews for the purpose of assuring contractor com-
pliance with maintainability requirements.
Develop calibration plan for test equipment within AFLC.
a. Determine requirements.
b. Budget for requirements.
c. Determine activity responsible for calibration of each item.
TASKNO.
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
DESCRIPTIONFTASKS
VerifyduringCategoryIlt tests,calibrationdataandproceduresthat had been
developed for systems/equipment.
Participate in contractor development of site activation plans to insure maximum
compatibility with A F maintenance concepts, and to provide optimum joint use
of facilities, test equipment, and spares. (AFSCR 400-3/AFLCR 400-19).
Review contractor production tooling method/technique for application to depot
use.
Review and revise inspection requirements based upon reliability/maintainability
data and failure reports obtained during Cat II tests.
Provide operational maintainability requirements inputs for system/equipment
design specifications (AFR 66-29).
Review maintainability and maintenance analysis data provided by contractor to
verify consonance with AF maintenance policies and practices. (MIL-M-26512C).
Review contractors PME Certification Program.
Prepare and publish CEM-Maintenance and Supply Support Lists.
Develop plans for the accomplishment of updating change/modification program.
Determine the need for parts kits and request the application of AFPI 71-673
(Incl 3).
Furnish to SPD, A FLC requirements for contractual coverage of configuration
data (baseline, approved modifications, production accomplishments) as
authorized by AFR 310-1 and supporting documents.
Plan and schedule transfer of configuration records during transition of system
responsibilities.
AFLC MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE
DISCHARGED DURING CONCEPTUAL, DEFINITION
AND ACQUISITION PHASES IN SUPPORT OF TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS.
Develop training equipment portion of Materiel Support Plan.
Accomplish source coding of training equipment and spare parts.
Provide maintenance training plan for inclusion in PSPP/SPP, Section 8.
Participate in mockup inspection review of training equipment.
AFLC TECHNICA L MANUA L RESPONSIBILITIES
DeveLop Technical Manual objectives for inclusion in Section 8, PSPP/SPP.
Determine the quantitative technical manual/orders requirements to support
systems.
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TASK NO.
55
56
57
58
59
6O
TASK NO.
I
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Provide Technical Manual publication numbers to contractor.
Conduct operational Post Publication Review of Technical Manuals.
Determine changes to Technical Manuals that are required by modifications to
operational equipment.
Determine the specific technical orders required to support a system or equip-
ment and forward these requirements to the SPD.
Provide assistance in accomplishing pre-publication and verification review of
T. O. 's.
Coordinate requests for deviations from specifications to assure that logistics
support impacts for the operational inventory are considered.
PART HI AFLC TRANSPORTATION TASKS
AFLC TRANSPORTATION RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE
DISCHARGED DURING CONCEPTUAL, DEFINITION
AND ACQUISITION PHASES OF THE OPERATIONAL
PHASE OF SYSTEM PROGRAMS.
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Develop transportation packaging and materials handling objectives, principles,
general qualitative requirements, concepts and other considerations for input
into PTDP and Section 8 of PSPP/SPP with AFSC and using commands.
Provide technical guidance to assure transportation, packaging and materials
handling requirements, including those of using command, are given adequate
consideration in system programs:
a. Evaluate design proposals and specifications.
b. Evaluate proposed modifications and Engineering Change Proposals.
c. Participate in DEI's, CTCI's, mockups, etc.
Provide technical logistic guidance to the SPO to assure the incorporation of
required operational support handling and transport characteristics in the design
of systems hardware and design and selection of transport and handling equip-
ment:
a. Provide operational support handling and transportability requirements
for use by the contractor in design effort.
b. Evaluate contractor proposals for adequacy of handling and transport AGE.
c. Provide specific considerations to be included in handling loading and
unloading tests and demonstrations..
d. Evaluate contractor developments at DErs, CTCI's, mockups, tests,
AGE meetings, and demonstrations.
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TASK NO.
4
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
During source selection, evaluate traffic patterns, packaging capability, overall
contractor ability to perform transportation tasks, etc.
Develop transportation section of Materiel Support Plan.
Develop detailed Transportation Movement Plans for operational phase: Update
the plan and insure compliance with the plan.
Arrange for and provide the contractor with technical Transportation direction
and guidance for movement of materiel to and from and between contractor
facilities.
Review actions of contractors to determine compliance with movement and
documentation instructions supporting the operational phase.
Manage movement requirements for MATS special airlift services to support the
operational phase.
Manage movement requirements for MATS scheduled services to support
operational phase.
Manage movement requirements for MSTS services, both scheduled and special
lift to support operational phase.
Develop operational phase fund requirements for First Destination cargo (FDT)
and packaging costs. Provide cost estimates to SPO.
Develop fund requirements for second destination cargo.
Provide buyers/contracting officers with operational requirements for trans-
portation, packaging and handling factors for consideration during contract
negotiations and/or in support of Invitations for Bids (IFB's) and Requests for
Proposals (RFP's).
Prepare Section 5 (Preparation for Delivery) requirements of "Commodity
Specifications" as pertains to operational support.
Develop operational packaging and materials handling requirements and terminology
for inclusion in contractual exhibits and specifications.
Provide technical Packaging, Materials Handling and Transportation guidance to
using commands.
Participate in Source Coding Conference to insure consideration of Packaging
and Handling requirements.
Develop technical data requirements, detailed instructions, drawings,
specifications, for Packaging and Materials Handling.
Evaluate adequacy of contractor prepared technical data for handling, loading,
etc.
Provide handling methods analysis for use in selection and in determination of
basis of issue of systems handling equipment and establishing authorization and
distribution.
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TASKNO.
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Review Cat Ill test results and failure data to update packaging and transportation
instructions, criteria and techniques.
Develop and monitor a "Loss and Damage Prevention Program" to control im-
proper or inadequate packaging or handling.
Provide operational support, transportation, packaging, and materials handling
input into transition agreements.
Prepare detailed handling techniques and methods for inclusion in the training
support plan and instructions.
Negotiate systems transportation, packaging, and materials handling support
portion of Host/Tenant Support agreements.
Furnish requirements for and obtain special transportation support (LOGAIR
routes, Extra Sections, contract carriage, etc. }
Develop and/or evaluate Packaging and Materials Handling techniques, special
container, equipment and devices.
Review and coordinate transportation packaging and materials handling equipment
and techniques for input into "Dash 9" Handbook.
96
APPENDIX B. MEMORANDUM OFAGREEMENTBETWEENAFLCIAFSC
PART I. AFSC MAINTENANCE TASKS
AFSC MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE
DISCHARGED IN SUPPORT OF CONCEPTUAL, DE-
FINITION AND ACQUISITION PHASES OF SYSTEM
PROGRAMS.
TASK NO. DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
i0
Develop qualitative and quantitative maintenance facility requirements to
support Category I and II Test programs.
Establish time-phased schedule for maintenance facilities required to support
Category I and II Test programs.
Develop Maintenance Engineering Support Objectives for inclusion in Section 6
of PSPP/SPP.
Provide Section 11 (PSPP/SPP) cost estimates for maintenance support of
Category I and II Test programs.
Participate in maintainability determination for System Design requirements.
Provide maintenance representation in Source Selection activity.
Prepare Work Statements and/or Exhibits to establish and guide the contractor's
Maintenance Program for support of Development, Test and Site activation.
Provide Maintenance criteria and inputs to contractor management surveys
regarding Development, Test and Site activation.
Evaluate and approve contractors proposed maintenance plan in support of
Development, Test and Site activation.
Provide maintenance input for preparation of Test Support Plans during Category
I and II.
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TASKNO.
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
25
DESCRIPTIONFTASKS
AnalyzeTestprogramresultsfor Maintenanceimplications.
Participatein thepreparationof-06"WorkUnitCodeManuals"toinsure
implementationfAFM66-1DataCollectionduringCategoryII testing.
a. Participateinthepreparationof-6"InspectionRequirementsManual"
tofacilitatetheimplementationfAFM66-1.
Participatein theevaluationofthoseproposedupdatechangesresultingfrom
Categorytesting.
EstablishRepairProgramsforreparableitems:
a. GFAECommon
b. GFAEPeculiar
c. DSAItems
d. GFEPeculiar
e. GFPand/orBailed
ParticipateasrequiredwithAFLCinSourceCodingConferences.
ParticipateintheevaluationofcontractorsPrecisionMeasuringEquipment(PME)CertificationProgramincludingReviewofCalibrationRequirements
Summary(Figure3).
ProvidemaintenanceinputsasnecessaryatapplicableGFAE/GFPprovisioning
conferences.
ProvideresponseonMaintenancequeriesfromUSAF,ATC,UsingCommands,
etc., duringDevelopment,TestandSiteactivation.
Respondto EUR,MIP,orAccident/IncidentReportsduringDevelopment,Test
andSiteActivation.
Developcriteriafor ContractTechnicalServicespersonnel(CTSP)usedin
completingtheacquisitionprocess.
ProvideMaintenanceinputforresolutionofmaintenanceinterfaceproblems
betweenContractors,UsingCommand,AFLC,AFSCandotherservicesduring
Development,TestandSiteactivation.
ProvideavailablemaintenancedatatoAFLCforissuingimmediateandurgent
actionT.O.asrequired.
Establishrequirementfor andinsureadequacyofcorrosioncontrolprocedures.
DeveloptheAFSCmaintenanceaspectsoftheplanfor transitionof systemsand
equipmentfromAFSCtoAFLC.
Participatein reviewof maintenanceconceptsandplanscontainedinSections
5, 6, and8of PSPP/SPP.
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TASK NO.
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
TASK NO.
1
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Plan contractor depot level maintenance support during Development, Test and
Site activation.
Develop and/or review Maintenance portion of Joint Tenancy Support Agreements
(AFR ll-4).
Review contractor mathematical logistics model (repair cycle for DT& E
maintenance implications).
Prepare contractual exhibits which will enable using command "over-the-shoulder"
participation in maintenance tasks during test and site activation.
Evaluate site activation plans for compatibility with AF maintenance concepts for
joint utilization of facilities, equipment and spares.
Provide maintenance representation for engineering reviews and inspections,
e. g., DEI, FACI, etc., in support of system acquisition.
Develop and provide information for contractors on A F Maintenance capabilities
and limitations (skill level, etc. ) for guidance in design of hardware for non-
operational systems.
Establish requirement for reporting maintenance actions in accordance with AFM
66-1 during acquisition effort.
Participate in the qualitative evaluation of tooling requirements for all levels of
maintenance.
Participate in configuration control board action.
AFSC MAINTENANCE RESPONSIBILITIES PERFORMED
DURING CONCEPTUAL, DEFINITION AND ACQUISITION
FOR TRAINING REQUIREMENTS.
Provide maintenance input to exhibit and work statements for initial training
equipment contracts.
Provide maintenance training plan for inclusion in PSPP/SPP, Section 6.
PART II. AFSC SUPPLY TASKS
AFSC SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE DIS-
CHARGED IN SUPPORT OF CONCEPTUAL, DE-
FINITION AND ACQUISITION PHASES OF SYSTEM
PROGRAMS.
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Prepare supply support guidance and parameters for inclusion in "Request for
Proposal" to be utilized by contractors in developing their proposals.
Evaluate contractors supply support proposals during Source Selection conferences.
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TASKNO.
3
I0
tl
12
13
14
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Develop Supply Support Concept for inclusion in Section 6, PSPP/SPP:
a. Development and Test.
b. Site activation.
Review, analyze, and refine cost estimates for supply support of Development,
Test and Site activationfor inclusion in Section ii, PSPP/SPP:
a. System Equipment
(1) CFE Spares and Spare Parts.
(2) GFAE/GFP Peculiar and Common Spares and Spare Parts.
(3) Applicable DSA/GSA Stock Funded Items.
Utilize the System Program Documents to formulate criteria necessary to compute
Development, Test and Site activation quantitative requirements.
Review and approve quantitative requirements to support DT& E and Site
activation for:
a. CFE Spares and Spare Parts.
b. GFAE/GFP Spares and Spare Parts.
c. Applicable DSA/GSA Stock Funded Items.
Assure that supply support consideration for Development, Test, and Site
activation is covered in site selection surveys.
Insure timely receipt of DD 780 type equipment for support of Development, Test,
and Siteactivation.
Take action to program established requirements to appropriate agency for
Common and Non-standard items, other than those included in test support tables
and contractor material listings required in support of Development, Test and
Site activation.
Develop the supply support documentation inputs to the system contract for
support of Development, Test and Site activation:
a. Contractual exhibits.
b. Work statements.
Prepare budget estimates for conventional and unconventional propellants for
support of Development and Test.
Forecast requirements for conventional and unconventional propellants for
support of Development and Test.
Validate requirements for conventional and unconventional propellants for support
of Development and Test.
Establish supply milestones to reflect actions necessary for Development, Test
and Site activation.
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TASKNO.
15
16
17
18
19
2O
21
22
23
24
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Develop supply concept for Test plans.
Develop supply concept for Site activation plans.
Contractor Materiel Support Guidance Conferences regarding Development, Test
and Site activation where applicable:
a. Chair and conduct Materiel Support Guidance Conferences.
b. Review and refine contractors supply support plan for Development and
Test programs.
c. Approve for implementation the Development and Test program supply
support plan.
In conjunction with A FLC develop contractual requirements and Command
agreements regarding the establishment of Resident Provisioning Teams.
Develop AFSC policy and procedures covering the interface between the inte-
grating contractor, associate contractors, Divisions, Centers, CMR and AFLC
complement of the Resident Provisioning Teams.
Participate in Resident Provisioning Team joint operation:
a. Provide representation to Provisioning Team.
b. Implement the Spares Joint Usage policy and procedures.
c. Maintain a continuous review of contractor's assets, records, and usage
data to insure their current status.
d. Effect necessary procurement adjustment and downstreaming actions.
Develop Test Support Table:
a. Provide contractor guidance for preparation of TST.
b. Chair TST Conference.
c. Evaluate TST in conjunction with AFLC to determine availability of
Command standard items in support of Categories I and II Test programs.
d. Approve TST quantitative requirements.
Develop policies and procedures covering utilization of AFSC residual assets
from Development, Test and Site activation, i.e., downstreaming (movement
from test site to test site, one program to another) or planned turnover to AFLC
in support of the operational program:
a. Identify and list residual assets.
b. Review residual list for downstreaming.
c. Monitor disposition of residual assets.
Provide supply input to transfer agreement as relates to Site activation.
Maintain current status of NORS and critical items for Development, Test and
Site activation programs.
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TASK NO.
25
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
4O
41
42
43
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Initiate actions to update, modify or dispose of assets affected by Configuration
Control Board actions for support of Development, Test and Site activation.
Provide supply representation on System Management surveys.
Prepare supply check list for use in System Management surveys.
Determine supply requirements for support of bailed aircraft and equipment.
Provide supply input to international agreements relating to Development, Test
and Site activation programs.
Participate as required in the determination of quantitative AGE (MGE) require-
ments.
Participate as required in AGE (MGE) contractor guidance meeting.
Participate in review of AGE Plan and Figure 1. Research functional parameters
of existing equipment and provide such to Engineering for qualitative deter-
mination.
Provide acquisition supply support requirement to Joint Tenancy Agreements
(AFR 11-4).
Review Sections 6 and 8 of PSPP/SPP to insure transition of supply support
from Acquisition to the Operational Phase.
Perform visits to contractors' plants, training organizations and sites being
activated for the purpose of reviewing the implementation of System Support Plan
and procedures and to help resolve major supply problems.
Participate with elements of Hq AFSC in study groups, panels, committees and
meetings, as directed by higher headquarters, concerning supply matters.
Transition Agreements:
a. Provides supply input to Transition Agreements.
b. Approves supply inputs to Transition Agreements.
Participate in the preparation of a Master Equipment List (MEL) that will
identify Real Property Installed Equipment (RPIE) for a system.
Assure development of the Recommended Spare Parts Lists (RSPL) for RPIE.
Assure that spare support of RPIE is sufficient to support the equipment until
45 days after final acceptance by the using organization.
Insure that contractors lists of residual RPIE assets are properly prepared.
Assure management control over supply matters during Test and Site activation.
Evaluate, on a continuous basis, the effectiveness of supply activities providing
support for Development, Test and Site activation.
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TASK NO.
44
45
46
47
48
49
5O
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Implement the principles of the Selective Management Policy (hi-Valu) during
Test and Site activation as applicable in accordance with AFR 400-21.
AFSC SUPPLY RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE DIS-,
CHARGED IN SUPPORT OF CONCEPTUAL, DE-
FINITION, AND ACQUISITION PHASES FOR
TRAINING EQUIPMENT.
Provide inputs for training equipment supply portion of Transition Agreement.
Develop supply support concept for trainer and training equipment for support of
Acquisition Phase.
Develop supply support program data requirements for trainers and training
equipment in support of Development, Test and Site activation.
Participates in Training Equipment Spare Parts Provisioning Conferences.
Review and approve contractors recommended spare parts in support of training
equipment during site activation.
Develop supply policy and procedures covering interface between contractors,
using commands, and AFLC in support of training equipment.
Provides supply inputs to Development, Test and Site activation training plan.
Review and refine contractors cost estimates for spare parts required in support
of site activation for training equipment.
Initiate actions to implement CCB decisions affecting the update, modification
and disposition of spare parts.
Develop policies and procedures covering disposition of Test and Site activation
assets.
Schedule delivery of spares and spare parts.
Review contractors recommended list of GFP needed for trainer assembly and/or
training. Initiate action to obtain GFP (AF Standard Item) from the Air Force
inventory.
Determine spares availability for new training equipment prior to delivery.
Develop the acquisition supply support work statement inputs to training equipment
contract (s).
PART III. AFSC TRANSPORTATION TASKS
AFSC TRANSPORTATION RESPONSIBILITIES TO BE
DISCHARGED IN SUPPORT OF CONCEPTUAL, DE-
FINITION AND ACQUISITION PHASES OF SYSTEM
PROGRAMS.
Develop transportation, packaging, and materials handling objectives, principles,
general qualitative requirements, concepts and other considerations for input into
PTDP and PSPP/SPP, Section 6, (including spares for test and site activation).
Coordinate inputs to PTDP and Section 6 of PSPP and SPP with AFLC.
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TA SK NO.
2
i0
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Develop First Destination Transportation costs and packaging costs for inclusion
in Section 11, PSPP/SPP.
Develop fund requirements for second destination cargo.
During source selection, evaluate traffic patterns, packaging capability, overall
contractor ability to perform transportation tasks, etc.
Develop packaging and materials handling requirements and terminology for
inclusion in contractual exhibits and specifications.
Develop Materials Handling techniques, devices, packaging techniques and
special containers.
Insure packaging and materials handling requirements, including those proposed
by major commands, are considered in designing and constructing new equipment
and systems.
Develop detailed Transportation Movement Plans in support of acquisition; update
and insure compliance with the plan.
Provide buyers/contracting officers with acquisition support transportation,
packaging and handling factors for consideration during contract negotiations
and/or in support of Invitations for Bids (IFB's) and Request for Proposals
(RFP's).
Review actions of contractors to determine compliance with movement and docu-
mentation instructions supporting acquisition.
Arrange for and provide the contractor with technical Transportation direction and
guidance for movement of material to and from and between contractor facilities.
Manage movement requirement for MATS special airlift services to support
acquisition.
Manage movement requirements for MATS scheduled service to support
acquisition.
Manage movement requirements for MSTS services, both scheduled and special
lift in support of acquisition.
Insure consideration of transportability criteria.
Assure contractor compliance with transportability criteria.
Negotiate systems transportation, packaging, and materials handling support
portion of Host/Tenant Support Agreements.
Furnish requirements for and obtain special transportation support (LOGAIR
routes, Extra Sections, contract carriage, etc. ).
Coordinate and provide input to requirements for bailed cargo aircraft.
Verify contractor developed handling, loading packaging technical manuals and
specifications.
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TASK NO.
II
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Develop time phase plan for verification of Technical Manuals and maintenance
check lists during Category II testing to include location and participants.
Authorize printing of final Technical Manuals.
Prepare Quarterly/Annual Cost Report for Technical Manuals.
Assure Technical Manual data is documented in DD Form 1423/AFSC Form 40.
Review Engineering Change Proposals to determine Technical Manual Changes
or revisions required during DT& E.
Conduct initial post publication review of Technical Manuals.
Determine qualitative technical manual requirements to support system.
Participate in the determination of maintenance training equipment requirements.
Assist in preparation of Training Equipment Planning Information (TEPI).
Selectively participate in mockup inspection and review of training equipment.
106
TASK NO.
21
22
23
24
25
26
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Review and verify AF developed handling, loading, and packaging instructions for
applicability to systems/equipment and specifications.
Provide transportation, packaging, and materials handling input into transition
agreements.
Review and coordinate transportation packaging and materials handling equipment
and techniques for input into "Dash 9" Handbook.
Prepare detailed handling techniques and methods for inclusion in the training
support plan and instructions.
Provide technical guidance to insure transportation packaging and material
handling requirements, including those of using command, are given adequate
consideration in system programs:
a. Evaluate desig_ proposals and specifications.
b. Evaluate proposed modifications and Engineering Change Proposals.
c. Participate in DEI's, CTCI's, mockups, etc.
Develop Transportation Packaging and Materials Handling input to Materiel
Support Plans.
OTHER AFSC SYSTEM MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS HAVING LOGISTICS IMPLICATIONS
TASK NO.
1
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
IO
PART IV. TECHNICAL MANUAL RESPONSIBILITIES
DESCRIPTION OF TASKS
Develop budget estimates on Technical Manual preparation and printing for
inclusion in Section ii PSPP/SPP.
Develop contractual documents (i.e. , work statements, purchase requests, etc. )
for Technical Manuals.
Review contractors Technical Manual proposal.
Approve contractors Technical Manual publication plans.
Conduct Technical Manual requirements and guidance conference with contractor.
Schedule milestones of events for delivery of Technical Manuals.
Conduct pre-pubIication review of Technical Manuals.
Assure validation of Technical Manuals by Contractor.
Accept reproduction art work and negatives from Technical Manual contractor.
Assure delivery of preliminary Technical Manuals to Test Sites and Training
Activities.
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